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The need for a deeper understanding of public policy instruments is well
established in public administration literature.  Growth in ethanol and alternative fuel 
policy instruments across the country and the importance of these policies to national 
energy security only adds urgency to this need.  Policy instruments are defined as tools 
governments use to address public policy problems.  Public policy scholars traditionally
focus on processes of policy making or the policies, with little attention paid to how 
governments accomplish policy goals.  This dissertation shifts the focus to policy
instruments to fill this void in public administration scholarship.  It examines factors that 
influence policy instruments chosen by policy makers in the fifty states.  Using the lens 
of biofuel policies, it links three diverse public policy theories: Policy Instrument 
Theory, New Public Management (NPM) Theory, and Political Culture Theory, into a
single model of policy instrument choice.  The dependent variable is derived using cluster 
analysis methods and results in four distinct groups of states based on state level biofuel 
policy instrument characteristics.  These groups are used to test proposed hypotheses 
   
 
     
 
 
 
   
  
    
     
     
 
 
regarding state level characteristics including levels of NPM reform, individual state 
political culture and elite political ideology as well as fundamental measures of state
policy capacity of state wealth, impacts of economic sectors, and political interests.  
Multinomial logistic regression analysis is used to establish the likelihood of membership 
in one group of states versus other groups with specific instrument characteristics. The 
results conclude that policy makers in states make different instrument choices based on 
state level characteristics.  Wealthy states choose policy instruments that rely upon 
changing citizen behavior rather than direct government intervention.  The levels of 
agricultural and manufacturing employment influence instrument choice. Agricultural 
employment was the most influential variable introduced to the model.  These economic
sectors did not appear to receive favorable treatment as policy instrument theorists
contend.  Strong evidence was found for a connection between political ideology and 
policy instrument choice. States with liberal elite ideology choose different biofuel 
policy instruments than states with conservative elite ideology. The research offered
initial evidence that NPM philosophies translate to policy instrument adoption.  
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an examination of how three theoretical perspectives impact 
the policy formulation process and the choice of public policy instruments. It does so 
through an examination of biofuel policy instrument choice across the fifty American 
states using the perspectives policy instrument theory, New Public Management (NPM), 
and Political Culture.  These three frameworks have been examined separately and in 
other contexts but have not been examined together nor have they been examined in 
conjunction with policy instrument choice at the state level.  It is expected that NPM and 
Political Culture have a direct impact upon the choice of biofuel policy instruments.  This
dissertation will show how the types of biofuel policy instruments adopted by different 
states are influenced by a variety of measures including the state‘s dominant political 
culture, the ideology of its citizens and political elite, interest influences and the economy
as well as the adoption of the tenets of New Public Management (NPM).  This research 
represents the first time that New Public Management and Political Culture theories have
been used in an attempt to understand the types of policy instruments chosen by policy
makers.  This approach tries to answer the challenge issued by public policy and 
administration scholars for 21st century governance to develop a deeper understanding of 
1
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
the types of policy instruments employed to address public problems and why those 
instruments are chosen by policy makers.  
In The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau spoke of government, governance, 
and public administration when he stated action has two components:  the will to act and 
the power with which to act (Rousseau 1968).  Since he made this statement in the mid-
1700s, these two components have been the subject of a great deal of scholarship by
social scientists as well as the focus of numerous reforms.  While some questions 
regarding mechanisms of governance have been answered and problems solved, many
more have not. This dissertation explores how public officials and managers choose the 
instruments with which to influence citizen behaviors.  It asks whether New Public 
Management and Political Culture theories inform the decision calculus of public officials 
as they make choices regarding policy instruments and if so, how?  In turn it is expected 
that this research will help public administration scholars and practitioners develop a 
deeper understanding of the issues facing public management and governance.
For the last century, public managers‘ and public administrators‘ energy has been 
focused on reform.  Indeed, reform has been a constantly recurring theme in American 
public administration scholarship and practice.  Since the founding of the country, 
American public administration has moved from a government by gentlemen to 
government by third party (Henry 1987; Salamon 2002a).  Public administration practices 
in the twentieth century are bracketed by Progressive reformers during the early decades 
to the public sector‘s entrepreneurial reformers of Osborne and Gaebler fame of the 1990s 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  
2
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
New Public Management (NPM) is one of the current reform movements to sweep 
through the public sector and capture the attention of scholars and managers alike.  It 
advocates the freeing of public managers from the bonds of over-regulation of processes, 
creating a ―customer-focused‖ culture within the public sector, and converting the public 
manager from a manager of processes to an entrepreneurial government agent (Osborne
and Gaebler 1992; Frederickson 1996).  NPM advocates espouse the development of less 
direct government interventions, market based approaches to governance, and famously, 
the concept of ―steering, not rowing‖ culture within government agencies (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992).  
The reforms resulting from Osborne‘s and Gaebler‘s Reinventing Government
capture the attention of contemporary public administration scholars.  The work of this 
journalist and former city manager sparks vigorous debate regarding government‘s 
effectiveness, reinvention as a reform movement and its basis in theory and practice.  The
reinvention tenets receive attention from the lowest to the highest levels of government 
and the academy.  Reinvention, as exemplified by Vice President Gore‘s National 
Performance Review, is premised on freeing government from the bonds of bureaucracy, 
allowing public servants to act more like entrepreneurs, incorporating tools such as 
contracting, privatization, and performance measures to create a government that is leaner 
and meaner, able to do more with less or ―steer rather than row‖ (Osborne and Gaebler
1992; Peters 2000).  
The focus of much of the research on New Public Management (NPM) practices 
has been on the management processes.  As Peters contends in his article on bridging the 
gap between management and tools, there is a tacit understanding among NPM 
3
  
 
 
    
 
 
  
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
practitioners and scholars that if a process is efficiently managed then outcomes will be 
good, inferring that well-managed processes will automatically lead to well-chosen or 
appropriate policy instruments (Peters 2000).
The reinvention movement has also sparked a renewed scholarly focus on the
basic assumptions, practices, and interpretations of traditional public administration.  
Many public administration scholars view the work of Osborne and Gaebler as simply
pandering to wide-spread ―bureaucracy bashing‖ by elected officials who use the 
bureaucracy as a convenient scapegoat for governance problems (Fredrickson 1996; 
Frederickson and Smith 2003).  Goodsell observes that American citizens enjoy a
bureaucracy that works far more often than not and the movement toward government 
service-cum-commodity good is driven more by political fashion than desire for good 
government.  Indeed, he asserts that the American bureaucrat serves to protect democratic
governance and practice (Goodsell 2004).  Lynn disputed the view of the American 
bureaucrat held by reinvention advocates, contending that it is a caricature of reality and 
that the bureaucrat is concerned with democratic governance, equality, and justice, not the
undermining, self-aggrandizing public servant often depicted in the budget maximizing
literature (Lynn 2001; Goodsell 2004). While the questions surrounding this schism
among ―traditionalists‖ and ―reinventionists‖ is important to the understanding of 
contemporary public administration, the more important questions regarding how 
governance decisions are made must continue to be addressed.  In reality, whichever side
of the debate scholars find themselves regarding reinvention, New Public Management v. 
―Old‖ Public Management, the one thing that remains clear is the need to understand the 
4
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
  
    
  
 
dynamics of instrument choice and the impacts of those choices on governance and public
management  (Salamon 2002a).  It is to this problem that this dissertation turns.
Statement of Problem
There is little understanding regarding how policy makers in the American States 
choose policy instruments.  These instruments constitute government‘s power with which 
to act, the power governments use to tax, spend, regulate or persuade.  Policy instruments 
are defined in the literature as ―a tool of public action‖ designed to address a public 
problem (Salamon 2002a).  They are distinguished from public policy in that they are
how a policy will be carried out not what the policy is or the goal.  The full complement 
of instruments is discussed below and a sampling of instruments include corrective taxes, 
economic and social regulation, information or public information instruments.  
Instrument choice impacts the effectiveness of government action, the 
management options available to the public sector, the form government takes, and the 
costs of doing government business (Peters 2000; Blair 2002).  Tools are commonly
defined as the processes and / or techniques through which a government structures and
constructs its actions (Salamon 1989; Blair 2002; Schneider and Ingram 1990).  In the 
western tradition, the first example of the use of an instrument of public action can 
arguably be found by examining the book of Genesis where one can see the use of 
sanction against Adam and Eve as God banishes them from the Garden of Eden for their
sin of disobedience.  Indeed, it may well be the ubiquity of instruments that has led to the 
inattention to them and to their impact on government management.  
5
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
There are at least two explanations outside of ubiquity for the lack of attention to 
instruments choice which will be addressed in detail in the following paragraphs.  First, 
the traditional, real or imagined, separation of politics from administration which 
encourages scholars to focus on institutions and internal organizational processes 
(Salamon 2002a; Schneider and Ingram 1990).  Second, the tension between the 
pragmatic approach of public policy practitioners and the desire to develop theory on the 
part of public policy analysts or as Kettl so aptly puts it, the tensions that are created 
between the pragmatic search for ―prescription‖ on the part of the public manager and the 
dogged pursuit of ―predictions‖ on the part of the academic (Kettl 2002).  
While there is still much debate and review of the record, one of the lasting
impacts of the traditional public administration thought is the politics and administration 
dichotomy.  For decades the instruments of governance were thought to be an outcome of 
the political process rather than integral component of the process (Kettl 1993; Gerth and 
Mills 1958; Wilson 1887; Henry 1987).  The development of the policy / politics 
dichotomy, scientific management techniques, principles of public administration, and 
structural associations are all attempts to disengage and to insulate administration from 
politics.  These approaches offer prescriptions as to how to arrange for efficient work 
processes, budget controls, types of employee controls to maximize performance, and 
structural organization of agencies (Gulick 1937; Fry 1998; Cleveland 1915).  These
efforts result in limiting scholars‘ abilities to understand the instruments used to develop 
public policy and the inherently political nature of policy formulation itself.  It also leads 
to the widespread belief that policy tools are just that, particularized instruments selected 
based on the problem to be addressed and as a result, there is no need to study policy
6
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
  
instruments or instrument choice (Lowi 1970; Salamon 2002a).  Finally, the traditional 
public administration paradigm‘s emphasis on limited span of control and centralization 
of authority views the appropriate and ideal type of government instrument as one that is
financed, staffed, and delivered by the government to the public (Salamon 2002b).
The work of Herbert Simon aptly demonstrates both the inherently political nature
of public administration and the impact of the dominant prescriptive approach through the 
middle of the twentieth century (Simon 1997, 1946).  Simon observed that the approach 
to public administration theory was not based on sound empirical observation and called 
for scholars to develop rigorous theoretical underpinnings for public administration 
theory.  During much of the latter half of the twentieth century public administration
scholars built an empirical base for public administration management practices, 
bureaucratic behaviors, institutional issues and the role of politics in administration.  
Scholars have become less reticent to embrace the study of policy instruments which 
straddles the politics and administration divide.  Even so, contemporary American public
administration scholarship focuses almost entirely on the processes by which policy has 
been made while very little effort has been expended on what tools are used to govern or 
the linkages between tools and governance (Schneider and Ingram 1997; Peters 2000;
Peters and Linder 1998). Indeed, one of the most influential contemporary policy process 
models describes policy instruments as ―choice opportunities‖ dumped into a garbage
can, stirred up and floated by decision makers on a vaporous cloud waiting to be chosen
by an invisible hand (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 2003).  Economists, rational choice
theorists consider policy instrument choice to be the final outcome of a policy process 
rather than an essential component of policymaking (Salamon 2002a).
7
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Another explanation that has been forwarded for this lack of attention is the 
theories popular among American scholars, particularly economists, rational choice
theory, principal agent theory, consider policy tool and policy instrument choice the final 
outcome of the process rather than an essential component of policymaking (Salamon 
2002a). 
Increasingly, scholars are seeing the choice of instruments as more important to 
the formulation stage of policy making and works more as the catalyst of the policy
process.  These instruments are thought to give rise to the groups, the politics, and the 
processes that dictate outcomes (Schneider and Ingram 1990; Blair 2002; Spitzer 1987).  
In 1953, Dahl and Lindblom stated that it was not the grand sweep of theory that often 
made the difference to public policy and social outcomes rather it was the more mundane
choice of ―social techniques‖ that often decided between the success and failure of public
policy (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Salamon 2002a).  
While there are many scholars that work to develop a classification schema of
public policy tools, there are those that deserve particular mention.  In the American 
tradition, Theodore Lowi is among the first to contend that policy drives politics or
instruments decide process, breaking from the traditional  politics-leads-to-policy
perspective (Lowi 1964).  He developed a policy typology that served as a foundation and 
an exemplar for subsequent policy instrument scholarship and is still included in 
introductory policy texts (Kraft and Furlong; Shafritz and Borick 2008).  A second 
scholar whose work has been key to the development of policy theory is Mancur Olson 
and his development of the public / private goods matrix and his explication of the ―free-
rider problem‖ in pluralist theory (Olson 1965, 1971).  The work of both Lowi and Olson 
8
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
    
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
comprises much of the theoretical foundations of American policy instrument theory and 
is embedded within the work of those scholars who have come after them.
Introduction of Model
This dissertation proposes a model of the policy process that can be understood 
mathematically as:
State level Policy Portfolio = ƒ(Economics, Political Interests, Political 
Culture and Ideology, New Public (Eq. 1)
Management Adoption)
While the full model will be discussed in detail later, it is wise to outline the major 
components of it here in order to understand the remainder of this dissertation.  Below in 
Figure 1 is the abbreviated model that does not include the specifics on the variables.  The
variables break down into four broad categories that are expected to impact the choice of 
policy instruments.  They are economic, political interest, cultural & ideological 
variables, and New Public Management (NPM) adoption.  Instrument theorists hold that 
policy instrument design and instrument choice is impacted by the economic and political 
environments into which they are introduced.  While this research framework adds the
unique combination of political culture and ideology and NPM reforms to the 
examination of instrument choice, to exclude the economic and political variables that 
have been found to be important to general policy research would result in model 
misspecification (Babbie 2004).  It is the case that political science and comparative
public policy scholars have examined these variables in relation to policy and the policy
process but it has not been used in conjunction with policy instrument choice and there is 
9
a paucity of research on the American states (Travis et al. 2004; Morris 1997).  As will be 
explained further, the independent variables are determinants of the policy instrument 
choice.  
Economic Variables 
Political Interest Variables 
Political Cultural & Ideology Variables 
New Public Management Adoption Index 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
State Policy Position
Portfolio Dimensions
Figure 1: Model of Instrument Choice
Instrument choice
The dependent variable is a measure created to capture the type of instrument 
choices made by policy makers in the fifty states.  The measurement is based on levels of 
coercion and directness.  Coercion measures the level of voluntary action an instrument 
allows a citizen in response to a state‘s policy.  Directness of instruments relates to how 
the instrument is delivered, whether instruments are funded and delivered entirely by the 
government or whether there are private sector actors involved (Salamon 1989).   
Economic variables
The economic variables have been chosen for specific reasons.  As is often the 
case, these variables are essential to the study of public policy and provide insight into the
policy process but no one has directly examined the economic impact on policy
instrument choice.  Measures of wealth, agricultural and business sector dependence as 
well as dependence on transportation fuels are all expected to impact the types of policy
10
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
instrument choices made.  For example, the economic variables are expected to indicate 
that there is a farm belt impact.  Those states whose economies are reliant on agricultural 
production and which are geographically and ecologically situated to produce biofuels, 
particularly corn, soybeans, and sorghum, will choose different policy instruments than 
those that are not so situated.  It is expected that these states will allow agriculture greater
latitude and offer greater direct support to biofuel market development through policy
instrument selection than those that are not so situated.  
Political interests
A great amount of research in political science has developed around the concept 
of political interest and around the policy process as well as policy development but little 
of it has directly examined policy instrument choice as defined above.  These variables 
have been used to explore issues of trust, voter behavior, budgeting practices, 
bureaucracy, bureaucratic representation, public opinion, policy liberalism, 
intergovernmental relations, and federalism, etc (Agger et al. 1962; Aberbach and Walker
1970; Abney and Lauth 1987, 1998; Erikson et al. 1993; Erickson and Tedin 2005).  The
concern of a variety of interest groups in biofuel policy and subsequent differences in 
policy instrument choice as well as the conflicting interest group goals with regards to 
that policy are expected to intersect to create specific types of biofuel policy instruments.  
For example, in states where environmental interest groups are in a stronger position than 
other groups such as business and agriculture should select policy instruments that are
more regulatory and allow less latitude than those states where business or agricultural 
interests dominate.
11
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
  
Political culture and ideology
The variables in this group are of particular importance to the model because each
represents a particular orientation of the state‘s citizens and elected officials toward 
government and its proper role in society.  Political culture is defined as a citizen‘s 
orientation toward government (Elazar 1994).  Political culture, while often difficult to 
conceptualize, is examined in a number of state level studies including policy liberalism, 
social welfare, minority voting behavior, adoption of initiative processes, and general 
family policies but again little has been done to examine instrument choice (Mead 2004; 
Taylor 2005; Tolbert 2002; Zimmerman 2003; Erikson et al. 1993).  The impact of 
political culture on the choice of instruments is expected to vary by the dominant state 
culture.  For example, in moralistic cultures that are oriented toward government 
intervention, instrument choice is expected by be more regulatory or direct and coercive 
in nature than either the individualistic or traditionalistic states (Elazar 1994). 
Political ideology is defined as those beliefs about ―the proper order of society
(Erikson and Tedin 2005).‖  Among the literature on ideology a few of the studies where
it is important includes state-level studies of voter behaviors, public opinion, and 
administrative responsiveness (Fossett and Thompson 2006; Brace et al. 2002; Frendreis 
et al. 2003).  Yet again, the literature is relatively silent regarding instrument choice.  It is 
expected that states whose political elite ideology is dominated by conservatives will have
biofuel policy instruments that are less direct and coercive than states that are dominated 
by liberals.
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New Public Management
The inclusion of the variables of the New Public Management (NPM) component 
is a unique component of this research.  The impact of the concentration of NPM reforms 
has not been researched in the context of the choice of policy instruments.  This context is
important to determine whether or not the instrument choices that are being advocated by
NPM are indeed those that are being adopted.  There is discussion in the literature
regarding this aspect of choice but little has been done to explore the issue particularly
within the American States (Salamon 2002b; Kettl 2002).  It is expected that those states 
adopting high levels of NPM reforms choose biofuel policy instruments that are more
coercive and less direct than those states adopting lower levels of NPM reforms.  
The idea that all of these variables, economics, politics, culture, and reform come 
together to build policy is not a new concept to public administration and has enjoyed 
extensive attention in the literature over the years.  However, bringing these variables 
together to examine policy instruments and how those instruments are chosen is new to 
the public administration field.  Economics, politics, culture and reform come together to 
create an environment into which policy instruments are created, live, die and are reborn.
Public administration scholars have just begun to focus their energies on understanding
policy instrument development and choice.  This dissertation constructs a unique 
framework for understanding policy instruments in the fifty states.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND - BIOFUEL POLICY
Biofuel policy offers a framework for understanding how state policy makers 
choose policy instruments for several reasons.  First, this policy takes advantage of many
aspects of the United States federal system of shared federal and state policy leadership 
state policy experimentation.  The federal structure allows this research to examine
biofuel policy variation juxtaposed against the New Public Management practices across 
the fifty states and each state‘s dominant political culture, allowing for a larger number of
cases.  Second, the biofuel policy arena is important to a number of policy actors across 
many sectors.  As has been discussed earlier, there is little understanding regarding how 
policy instruments are chosen and the number of actors involved in biofuel policy
provides a rich context for policy instrument research.  Also, the increasing importance of 
the energy market and security as well as the co-occurrence of global climate change
issues have every indication of creating an opportunity or policy window for further
biofuel policy development (Kingdon 2003).  Finally, the instrument choices made with 
regards to biofuel policy are rife with policy controversies and unforeseeable 
consequences as discussed at the end of the chapter.  These policy complications only
increase the importance of developing better theory regarding the choice of instruments in 
the hopes of being able to use this knowledge to predict potentially adverse outcomes. 
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This chapter addresses these aspects of biofuel policy development and how those
policies lend themselves to the investigation of policy instrument choice. 
Biofuels fuels are an emerging area of the United States‘ energy portfolio.  
Biofuels are part of a larger class of renewable fuels that generate power through means 
other than combustion of fossil fuels.  Renewable or alternative energy sources include 
energy that can be generated by harnessing wind, geothermal, fuel cells and tidal sources.  
The focus of this dissertation, however, is on the policies that pertain to biofuels which 
include ethanol and biodiesel fuels.  These fuels are created from agricultural and forestry
materials which include crops grown specifically for energy production and agricultural 
waste products such as corn stover or wood chips.  Current energy production 
technologies for these fuels hold promise for cleaner and cheaper sources of domestic
energy.  Coupled with traditional energies like coal and oil, biofuels offer the country a
secure and stable energy environment.  The biofuel holds potential as a source of 
renewable and secure energy, but its development is uncertain in a volatile world 
economy where new technologies must be created in a difficult and unstable marketplace
(Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 2008).  
In 2008, the United States Department of Energy celebrated its 30th anniversary, 
marking its creation during this country‘s first real energy crisis of the 1970s (Bodman 
2008).  This anniversary occurs during a period of highly unstable energy prices where
the average price of gas and diesel reached record highs during the summer of 2008 only
to drop by nearly $2.00 per gallon by the fall of 2008.  Supply chain problems, 
fluctuations in energy demands and consumption around the world caused by a stalling
global economy have converged to create serious instability in energy markets (Energy
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Information Administration Short-term Energy Outlook).  The Annual Energy Outlook 
2008 projected consumption of liquid fuels, natural gas, and coal to grow by nearly 16 
percent by 2030 which is projected to be offset by increased domestic production of 8.2 
million barrels per day to 10.4 million barrels of liquid fuels by 2030.  This projection 
was made before the current economic downturn but new projections of consumption 
indicate an expected rebound in demand as global commerce re-invigorates.  Further, the
Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the U. S. Department of Energy projects 
consumption of energy supplied by ethanol sources will rise from 2.50 quadrillion BTU 
in 2006 (approximately 2.5 percent of total U. S. energy consumption) to 5.51 quadrillion 
BTU by 2030, more than a two-fold increase in consumption of renewable fuel products.  
Over the same period the EIA estimates that biofuel production will more than double
from 2.94 quadrillion BTUs to 8.12 quadrillion BTU.  The total percentage of energy
production from biomass or bio-sources will rise from 4.1 percent of total energy
production in 2006 to 9.3 percent of the total by the year 2030 (U. S. Department of 
Energy 2008).  As a signal of the increasing importance of biofuels, Secretary of Energy, 
Sam Bodman, stated that in 2007, the Department of Energy spent $1 billion on the
development of a sustainable biofuels industry (Bodman 2008).  
The unstable energy prices have contributed to the nation‘s economic insecurity.  
The impact of this instability has been felt by citizens and anticipated by policy makers.  
In his 2007 State of the Union address, President Bush announced his ―Twenty in Ten‖
initiative that aims to reduce gasoline consumption by twenty percent over the next ten 
years while at the same time encouraging the use of alternative fuels (Bush 2007).  
President-elect Obama proposes an energy plan that includes $150 billion federal 
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investment ―to promote development of commercial scale renewable energy…advance
the next generation of biofuels and fuel infrastructure…‖ as well as mandating all new 
vehicles be produces as flexible fuel vehicles, and create federal policy tools to boost
production of  advanced biofuels to 60 billion gallons (Obama 2008).  
As the United States‘ dependence on imported oil is not likely to decrease, policy
makers have begun to look for ―non-traditional‖ ways to off-set the projected increases in 
energy costs over the next three decades.  In addition to biofuels, the non-traditional or
alternative fuels targeted for further development include expansion of wind capabilities, 
solar and geothermal projects and methane gas recovery projects targeted for electricity
generation (U. S. Department of Energy 2008; Energy Information Administration 2008a)
Important policy controversies of biofuel policy include potential environmental 
impacts, energy balance issues, and food chain impacts.  The environmental impact of 
biofuels on traditional pollution concerns is still controversial.  Wald in Scientific 
American questions the utility of ethanol because of the high energy inputs necessary to 
grow current ethanol feedstock, corn, and to distill it (Wald 2007).  Others counter that 
the development of second generation ethanol crops and production methods will mitigate 
energy input questions.  
Switching to less agriculturally intensive products such as switchgrass and fast-
growing trees may significantly reduce the direct production costs (Koonan 2006; English 
et al. 2006; Tolbert and Downing 1995; Common Purpose Institute 2007; Oak Ridge
National Laboratory 2001; Tilman et al. 2006).  There is evidence, though, that farmers 
are opting to take land out of conservation reserve programs in order to grow energy and 
food crops to cash in on the higher commodity prices that are related to both the biofuel 
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boom and increasing demands for western style food among wealthier developing
nations.  This movement does and should worry conservationists concerned about wildlife
(MacPherson 2008)
As discussed above, the country‘s choice of corn-based feedstock for biofuel 
concerns many that the impacts of increased use of insecticides, herbicides, nitrogen, and, 
in some cases, water, will only place more stress on the ecosystem (Bordetsky et al. 2007;
Pimental 2003; Environmental Working Group 2007).  It is argued by some that using
biofuels products in co-combustion processes with high emission producing, coal-fired 
electric plants will result in net air quality gains (Tilman et al. 2006).   Indeed, a report 
prepared by the Florida Energy Office and the Southeast Ethanol State and Regional 
Partnership, calls for a more thorough evaluation of all the possible impacts biofuels will
have on the environment through limiting use of ―price-volatile‖ fossil fuels, the value of
selling excess sulfur dioxide credits held by utilities as they convert to co-combustion 
processes, and expected increases in water quality (Southern States Energy Board 2005).  
In its ethanol energy factsheet, the Common Purpose Institute states that co-combustion 
of only three percent of energy crop fuels by a medium size electric plant would have the 
same impact on carbon dioxide emissions as ―taking 17,000 cars off the road…(Common 
Purpose Institute 2006a).‖
A second policy concern regarding biofuel production is the balance of energy
inputs to outputs.  It is here that a significant controversy rages that is a classic policy
analysis question:  how to set the metrics to calculate energy efficiency of biofuel 
production (Kraft and Furlong; Stone 2002).  A typical discussion along this line is the
point / counterpoint discussion in a recent issue of Chemical and Engineering News
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between Bruce E. Dale and David Pimental (Pimental and Dale 2007).  By examining one
set of metrics that include petroleum costs to produce gasoline, biofuels is a net energy
producer according to Dale.  However, according to Pimental, other variables should be
taken into account which push biofuels into an energy production loser (Pimental and 
Dale 2007).  These metric issues are policy debates that will be resolved in state 
legislatures and at the federal level but key to this debate as well are the potential 
technological developments and policies that support those developments.  As discussed 
above regarding the environmental impacts of biofuels, it is widely believed that second 
generation biofuels will be both cleaner and more energy efficient during the production 
process.  In an editorial by the chief scientist for BP, Steven Koonin, stated that 
agricultural practices that are tailored to energy crop production will significantly
improve energy input – output balance (Koonin 2006).  Production improvements are
being made as indicated by an analysis of ethanol production conducted at the Argonne
National Laboratory.  Ethanol yield from a bushel of corn was shown to be on the rise 
while total energy use and water consumption was shown to be decreasing (Wu 2008).
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More recently, concern has arisen regarding the diversion of food stocks to the 
production of biofuels as well as the potential for conversion of arable land into the
production of energy crops rather than food crops (Francis 2007; Mufson 2008; Simon
and Gerstenzang 2008).  Some policy makers have even called the use of food for energy
crops as ―a crime against humanity (Langer and Marks 2008).  Others, including
President Bush at a recent news conference, state that other factors are pushing up the 
price of food including world demand, production problems, and high oil prices 
(Associated Press 2008). One corn belt senator has even stated that the link between food
prices and ethanol has been ―a well-organized effort to discredit ethanol (Gale 2008).‖
Impact of the U. S. Federal System
The direction for policy development in biomass energy is shared between the 
states and the federal governments.  As has been investigated by many public
administration scholars, the Constitutional framework has fundamental impacts on the 
policy arena and policy processes (Derthick 2001b; Clark 1938; Dinan and Krane 2006; 
Bowman 2004).  
Federal, state, and local levels of government have specific powers that work to 
limit the influence of each level.  The national government is granted ―enumerated 
powers‖ which places limits on its power. These powers include those to declare and 
fight wars, regulate interstate commerce, to make treaties with foreign nations, to control 
immigration, and bankruptcy and the entry of new states into the Union as well as the 
determination of those states‘ borders (Derthick 2001a).  The power to regulate citizen 
behavior by the federal government has largely come as a result of the power to regulate
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interstate commerce but has evolved through other policy instruments particularly those 
based on financial inducements and education (Elazar 1984).  
In the early days of the republic, local governments were the agencies of choice to 
carry out the commonly accepted basics of government:  public health and safety, welfare
of the indigent, education of children, and the construction and maintenance of roads, 
bridges and transportation structures (Derthick 2001a).  In the colonial period, the local 
governments were created by the colonists and reflected their cultural and social diversity
(Wilson 1918).  Policy instruments developed out of the political cultures of the local 
governments resulting in a collage of policy instruments throughout the country.  As a
result, when examining the various policy instruments used to address the same public 
problem; it is common to find a variety of approaches.  As is shown in the examination of
biofuels policy below, it is evident that this cultural and social diversity is still strong in 
the development of local alternative policy instruments at different locations.  
States are capable of both playing the middle man between the federal and local 
governments as well as being the policy leader in a number of sectors (Derthick 2001a).  
Certainly as states became more professionalized and able governing bodies their role in 
the development of policy instruments has become more important.  Both roles are
apparent in development of biofuel instruments and environmental policies.  Vivid 
examples of this middle man role can be found in the area of states acting as the conduit
for federal incentives to develop biofuel capacity, offering state economic incentives to 
attract a biofuel cogeneration plant in Massena, New York, or the $25.2 million offered to 
construct two pilot facilities for the production of cellulosic ethanol in Northern New 
York (Virkler 2006; Office of Governor George E. Pataki 2006).  
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It remains largely true today that while the Congress and the President may
propose policy, it is largely left up to the states to dispose of that policy and they do so in 
a manner that is very much in line with their own political culture and social traditions 
(Agranoff 2001).  As states pass policy down to local government, they must rely on local 
government to implement federal policies as well as many of its own programs.  It is 
through this mechanism that local governments maintain a certain amount of autonomy
within the state.  Again, the development of economic incentives as cited above to attract 
biofuel industry to a location is a prime example of both the cooperation and autonomy
local and state governments are able to maintain (Winters 2006).  Additional evidence of 
the influence of the federal system and the important part local governments play in the
development biofuel policy and production is the potentially strong role for local biofuel 
cooperatives as the country develops renewable production capacity (Crooks 1997).
According to Elazar the role of local government is essentially ―...the means for
transmitting many of the services provided by state and federal governments to their 
citizens with appropriate local adaptations.‖  To achieve this end, local governments must 
rely on home-grown capacity that includes an ability to seek and to get outside help in the 
form of grants to implement programs within the community.  These local governments 
must adapt policies to the community in which they are to be implemented to secure
acceptance of the policy among community residents.  Also, the local government must 
act as ―an experimenter‖ to help adapt the new function or services locally.  All of these
things must be done by locales while the local government develops and maintains a
serious local voice in the state legislature and on the national plane (Elazar 1984).  The
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multiplicity of levels allows for multiple levels of input for citizens and for the training of 
new leaders at many levels 
Daniel Elazar outlines major public policy areas and delineates intergovernmental 
responsibilities for policymaking in those areas (Elazar 1984).  The matrix below in table 
1, is based on Elazar‘s work and outlines the responsibilities for some of the policy areas 
considered part of biofuels policy.  This table demonstrates how many of the
responsibilities for energy policy, biofuels and biofuel instruments overlap with very few 
of the important components being controlled by a single level of government.  As such it 
requires examination at all levels of policy. However, the delineation of responsibility
between the levels of government also demonstrates Salomon‘s contention that the
American federal system imposes limits on the federal level of government that then have
repercussions for the other levels.  These limits of federal power require that states and 
locales act with a certain amount of autonomy within the biofuel policy arena as well as 
other policy sectors which may explain much of the variety in the instrument choices 
made within the states (Salamon 2002a).  
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Table 1: Federal, State, and Local Responsibilities
Policy Area Federal 
1. Commerce
 diffusion of technology X
 transportation X
X new markets
2. Agriculture
 managing productivity research X
 productivity knowledge X
X
X
 Commodity prices
 Developing agricultural markets
X Use of excess agricultural production
 Promoting agricultural products
X
 Standards
3. Environmental regulations X
4. Energy regulation and development X
Level of Responsibility
State Local
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
(Elazar 1984)
The Rich Policy Making Arena
As stated earlier, many groups are interested in the development of biofuel
policies.  Indeed, the number is difficult to measure.  However, a brief examination of
some recent news coverage of biofuel in Lexus academic search finds that potential actors 
mentioned included policy makers such as President Bush, U. S. Senators, Congressmen, 
Governors and state legislators (Whitten 2006; Simon and Gerstenzang 2008; Carroll and 
Parker 2008).  Farmers are most assuredly potential actors as well as environmentalists, 
and small and large business owners (Mufson 2008). Some of the more ―invisible‖ actors 
interested in American biofuel policy found during this examination of news coverage
includes fertilizer manufacturers, small farmers in Asia, the United Nations, food 
scientists and investors  (Carroll and Parker 2008; Langer and Marks 2008; Bradsher and 
Martin 2008; Borenstein 2008).  This research focuses on the elected officials, farmer, the
environmentalists, and members of the business community because these groups have
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been the most visible in the discussion of biofuel policies.  Additionally, each group has 
distinct positions and preferences for policy instruments that should be apparent in states 
where the groups are most influential and / or effective.
The Elected Officials
Biofuel policies attract attention from elected officials at all levels, from President 
Bush to the Mayor of Aberdeen, South Dakota because of the potential economic
windfalls for rural areas of the country.  In its quick facts on Ethanol Energy Crops, the
Common Purpose Institute, states that if Florida‘s electricity producers were to substitute
two percent of its fossil fuel for Florida grown ethanol energy crops it would have an 
impact of $100 million on Florida‘s agricultural industry (Common Purpose Institute
2006b).  Also, in a report prepared by an economist at Nebraska Public Power District, it 
was estimated that the local impacts of a single 50 million gallon local ethanol plant to be
located in Ord, Nebraska included $74 million in annual revenue with an additional retail 
impact of $1.2 million.  The plant would create 33 full-time jobs for people who would be
directly employed by the plant and an additional 71 jobs throughout the community
(Petersan 2005).   Other local impacts part of an elected official‘s calculations are
dividend returns to local investors, the permanent jobs in the plant and temporary jobs 
during the construction of the plant as well as ethanol related manufacturing industries 
such as equipment that uses ethanol as a fuel source (Sneller and Durante 2006).  
State officials recognize that biofuel production has important state-wide impacts 
as well.  Minnesota state officials found that the fourteen ethanol plants in the state add 
$1.36 billion to the state economy, 5,300 jobs and provide an in-state market for one-sixth 
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of the corn produced in the state (Sneller and Durante 2006).  For elected officials outside 
of the Corn Belt, the potential is also impressive because of the presence of other
feedstock sources such as woody products.  In a study conducted by the Northeast 
Regional Biomass Program (NRBP) in 2003, the presence of forest products in the 
Northeastern states (Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Rhode, Island,  Maine, New 
York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania)  are perfectly positioned for
biomass production, particularly production of electricity (Abe et al. 2003). In a database
prepared by the Antares Group for the Northeast Biomass Regional Program, the
potential biomass production (includes all feed stocks:  corn, wood, straw, switchgrass, 
and short rotation woody products) for the states in the Southeast region of the United 
States is 7.3 billion gallons per year (Antares Group 2007).  
The American Farmer
The American farmer clearly recognizes that the impact of biofuels policy on 
United States‘ agriculture is massive.  At United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) 2007 Farm Bill Forums, the nation‘s farmers stated that renewable energy will
breathe new life into rural America and ―help propel a major renaissance of agricultural 
economic prosperity (U. S. Department of Agriculture 2008).‖  There is evidence of 
widespread support among farmers for a strengthening of the energy title in the 2007 
Farm Bill (U. S. Department of Agriculture 2008). In an earlier survey of farm producers 
conducted in 2006 regarding the 2007 Farm Bill priorities the highest nationwide priority
cited by respondents is ―…the role of agriculture in reducing the nation‘s dependence on 
non-renewable energy…(Lubben et al. 2006).‖  These same respondents suggest that a re-
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ordering of farm policy priorities should occur if necessary to accomplish this goal, 
indicating serious support among farm producers for ethanol and bioenergy programs 
(Lubben et al. 2006).  As a result of this support, the U. S. Department of Agriculture
recommends an expansion of funding for research focused on biofuels production and 
commercialization (U. S. Department of Agriculture 2008).  
While respondents to the same survey discussed above are not as quick to 
recognize the potential for rural economic development programs, other sources make the 
connection between biofuel production and rural economic development.  Increased 
United States production of ethanol from corn waste or stover could add nearly $9 billion 
in national industrial output and yield 76,000 permanent jobs (Common Purpose Institute
2006b).  
Switchgrass production for biofuels has been estimated to have the potential to 
raise United States‘ farm income by $6 billion.  A Department of Energy study suggests
that an ethanol facility capable of producing 100 million gallons of ethanol per year could 
create 2,250 jobs for its home community (Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2001).  
Researchers from the University of Tennessee, in conjunction with the 25 x 25 Work 
Group, find that the goal of twenty-five percent of fuels from renewable energy by 2025 
could mean additional net farm income of $180 billion, a total impact on the national 
economy of more than $700 billion and 5.1 million jobs (English et al. 2006).   
Concerns for environmental stewardship encompass the farm and rural interests as 
well as traditional environmental interests.  ―Bridge farming‖ is an agricultural technique 
that focuses on plantings used to transform less productive agricultural lands into more
productive lands by building up soil nutrients (Southern States Energy Board 2005).  
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Growth of biofuel can enhance agriculture through bridge farming.  Other environmental 
advantages of biofuel crop plantings are under investigation in many locations.  Among
the positive effects anticipated by large-scale plantings of high cellulose crops such as 
switchgrass or fast growing trees include lower levels of long-term erosion, improved 
wildlife habitat, and the reduction of chemical run-off from farm lands (Tolbert and 
Downing 1995).  
Concern regarding food security and food prices has recently become a more
salient issue on the public policy agenda.  There is concern among agricultural and food 
and hunger specialists about the impact of biofuel policy on the worldwide cost of food.  
The pressure of biofuel production demands is beginning to impact food prices though the 
exact impact is still a topic of debate between policy makers and economists.  Some 
contend that the increased use of corn for ethanol and the conversion to corn fields of land 
that had once been used for other crops is now causing ripple effects through the food 
supply chain pushing up production costs of beef, poultry, pork as well as increased 
prices for grains and oil crops such as wheat for flour and cooking oils (Alexander and 
Hurt 2007).  Others hold that while biofuels have had a small impact on the price of food 
and availability of products globally, the larger influence has been increased demand in 
developing countries for western style food and consumption patterns (Frazao et al. 2008)
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The Environmentalists
The environmental community has a variety of interests in biofuel policy across 
the states.  In a joint report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the
Western Resource Advocates, and the Pembina Institute, the view of the environment 
community regarding biofuels is stated rather succinctly as follows:
―North America stands at an energy crossroads.  With the world fast approaching
the end of cheap, plentiful traditional oil, we now face a choice:  to develop ever-
dirtier sources of transportation fuel derived from fossil fuels...or to set a course
for a more sustainable energy future of clean, renewable fuels (Bordertsky et al. 
2007).‖
This same report offers various recommendations which include stronger regulation 
regarding sustainable standards for greenhouse gases, a requirement for all vehicles to 
have flexible fuel systems, increasing fuel economy standards and investment in mass 
transit systems and transit use incentives (Bordertsky et al. 2007).  
While some environmental groups suggest that biofuels can reduce global 
warming pollution, it may be very difficult to develop appropriate biofuels policy.  Gallon 
for gallon, cellulosic ethanol has the potential of reducing global warming pollution by 88 
percent when compared to gasoline (Natural Resources Defense Council 2007).  Other 
environmental groups are concerned that the development of biofuels will result in net 
degradation of the environment if policies are not appropriately written.  The
Environmental Working Group (EWG) predicts that corn based biofuels will substantially
increase soil erosion and nutrient, herbicide, and pesticide pollutions as well as result in 
major water loss and water pollution.  The Defenders of Wildlife are concerned that 
increased production of biofuels through corn will threaten wildlife through the 
conversion of habitat to corn production.  They go further to offer concern that cellulosic
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ethanol could threaten wildlife if improper methods are used to plant or if harvesting of 
crops is done without regard to nesting birds and other wildlife (Defenders of Wildlife
2008).
Each group offers various biofuel policy recommendations.  EWG recommends 
the development of policies that include environmental safeguards, labeling and 
certification of fuels and the adoption of reduction standards for greenhouse gases 
(Environmental Working Group 2007).  NRDC recommends that biofuel policy become a
part of a comprehensive package of policies that include energy efficiency standards, 
requiring oil companies to reduce carbon sales produced by transportation by offering
transportation energy based on biofuels, electricity, hydrogen and natural gas (Natural 
Resources Defense Council 2007).  NRDC also suggests that a biofuels policy package
should include protection of wild places to prevent conversion into cropland, increasing
incentives and regulations regarding resources such as land, water, and soil used to 
produce biofuel feed stocks and ensuring that biofuel is ―technology neutral‖ in order to 
encourage innovation rather than developing policies that endorse a particular technology, 
for example programs that favor ethanol production (Natural Resources Defense Council
2007). In addition to many of the policy recommendations cited above, the Sierra Club‘s 
legislative priorities include 100 percent adoption among the states of renewable 
electricity standard of 20 percent by 2020 (Sierra Club 2008).  A renewable electricity
standard is a standard for the production of electricity through renewable sources such as 
biofuels, solar, wind, and geothermal sources (Energy Information Administration 
2008b).
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The Business Community. 
The National Association of Manufacturers estimates that higher energy costs 
result in the loss of 3 million jobs.  Increased energy prices cost specific private sector 
industries billions of dollars and force the closures of mills and manufacturing plants 
(McCoy 2007).  Volatile energy prices impact American commerce by increasing the cost 
of manufacturing, freight, and transportation and it is increasingly dependent on the
trucking industry to move goods around the country.  Business dependence has doubled 
in terms of truck miles travelled since 1980 to 2005 (Federal Highway Administration 
2008).  It is clear that American business has a stake in energy policy as a whole as well
as biofuel policy in the United States.  Its focus is broader than that of the farmer and 
even the environmental groups.  The primary focus, in contrast to American farmers and 
environmentalists, is in secure and predictable energy costs and on the economics of 
alternative fuels and fuel prices is quite clear.    
An examination of the energy policy goals of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce
indicates this concern.  Energy policy goals include the development of traditional 
domestic petroleum sources such as those in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) and development of cleaner coal resources as well as the development of
alternative forms of energy (United States Chamber of Commerce 2008).  The Institute
for 21st Century Energy supports strong federal action that would help America develop 
clean energy sources and ―a comprehensive, common-sense energy strategy (Coyne
2008).‖  An affiliate of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Institute supports 
alternative fuel development from biomass as well as other non-traditional 
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sources such as coal, wind, solar, and geothermal. It supports the development of a
strong market based approach to ensure industry viability and a self-sustaining market 
that acts ―in the best interests of consumers and taxpayers (Institute for 21st Century
Energy 2008).‖
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) supports energy policy that 
promotes public - private partnerships for research, development and deployment of 
alternative fuels as well as a reduction in energy intensity or ―the amount of energy
necessary to produce a given unit of economic output (McCoy 2007).‖  NAM also 
supports increased educational efforts with regards to energy use and efficiency as well as 
the ―rationalizing of existing statutes and regulations‖ in order to make manufacturing
and business environment less complicated and more productive (McCoy 2007).
The choice of biofuel policy as the framework with which to examine policy
instrument choice was made because of the factors mentioned in this chapter.  First, 
biofuel policies and instruments are being developed nation-wide and there is interest in 
instrument development across all levels of government.  The federal system and the
state‘s position in the biofuel policy arena create a rich arena for examination. The varied 
interest groups with diverse goals also allow for an investigation into the impact of each 
group on policy instrument choice.
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CHAPTER III
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This dissertation has used New Public Management (NPM) reforms and political 
culture as well as variables known to impact the policy process such as economics and
political interests to create a theoretical framework with which to explore the public 
policy instrument choices made by state policy makers in the biofuel policy arena.  
Resting on these theoretical ―legs‖ or perspective, this literature review provides 
background on each of these perspectives and finishes with a synthesis of how these fit
together into a research program to examine policy choice.
Policy Instruments
How does the new public manager choose the policy tools or instruments with 
which to do government‘s business?  Without knowledge about policy instruments and 
the decision calculus used by policy makers, academics require public administration 
practitioners to operate by ―trial and error‖ with little or no understanding of the impact of 
policy instruments (Linder and Peters 1984).  Basic understanding of the choice
instruments and processes must still be developed. Lascoumes and LeGales contend that 
public policy instruments are still treated as ―a purely superficial dimension‖ of 
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government action or as an inferior component of the governance equation.  They call for
the development of a clearer understanding of policy instruments and policy
instrumentation must be developed (Lascoumes and LeGales 2007).
First, what are policy instruments?  How are they defined?  This section first 
offers a definition of policy instruments from extant instrument theory.  It then turns to an 
examination of the traditional place of tools in public administration scholarship, how 
they are described in the literature, and how their roles are conceived in the policy making
process by various theoretical frameworks.  
The common definition of instrument is a means to an end or a device used to 
achieve some pre-conceived outcome (Merriam-Webster 2008).  This is similar to the
definition that Lester Salamon uses for a policy instrument.  It is ―a tool of public action‖
whose aim is to address a public problem or ―collective action‖ problem (Salamon 
2002a).  Policy instruments carry with them dimensions that are identifiable and 
structured or institutionalized, and instruments display patterns of characteristics can be
distinguishable through observation (Salamon 2002a).  
The ―end,‖ while relatively undefined by Salamon, is more precisely defined by
other policy instrument scholars.  In their discussion of the behavioral aspects of policy
instruments, Schneider and Ingram define policy instruments as ―techniques the 
government uses to achieve policy goals (Schneider and Ingram 1990).‖ In this 
definition, the ―end‖ is defined as a change in behavior on the part of the citizens.  They
expand this definition further in a later work by adding that instruments are:
―...the elements in policy design that cause agents or targets to do something they
would not otherwise do with the intention of modifying behavior to solve public
problems or attain policy goals (Schneider and Ingram 1997).‖
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This definition demonstrates that the intent of government is to control targeted 
behaviors of citizens in order to change a social situation or to solve a social problem.  
The definition also describes other significant elements.  The first element worth noting in 
the definition is that of the agent and of the target. The agent is the implementer of the
policy, either as the agency or the individual bureaucrat.  The targets of the policy are
generally thought to be either the bearers of the policy burdens or the recipients of the 
policy benefits (Ingram et al. 2007).  The agent and the target can be the same but more
commonly, the agent and the target are two different entities.  
An often overlooked element in the definition is behavioral change and the impact 
of those behaviors on the public problem of interest. This may well be a result of public
administration‘s discomfort with the Machiavellian recognition by public servants of the 
goal of policy as shaping behavior or simply not understanding the impact of policy on 
citizen behavior (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Salamon 2002a).  Additionally,
overlooking behavioral impacts of policy could well be the result of the traditional 
framework‘s focus on internal agency aspects of behaviors rather than the outcomes of 
policy (Frederickson and Smith 2003).
Lascoumes‘ and LeGale‘s understanding of policy instruments adds further
nuance to the definition of instruments by arguing that from the perspective of political 
sociology, policy instruments are institutions in the sense that they are stable sets of rules 
and frameworks.  Instruments carry with them a history of use, scope, and social meaning
that can be used as ―a means of orienting relations between political society and civil 
society.‖  These authors further contend that the choice of policy instrument is a 
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fundamental policy making choice because of the history and social constructions 
attached to the instruments (Lascoumes and LeGales 2007).  
This definitional examination of policy instruments is helpful to understand the 
role the policy instrument concept plays in traditional public policy paradigms. 
Lascoumes and LeGales (2007) among others suggest that instruments traditionally play a
very minor role in the development of public administration scholarship (Lascoumes and 
LeGales 2007; Ingram et al. 2007; Kettl 2002).  However it is more appropriate to say
that the focus of many of the sentinel public administration and public policy theories is 
concerned with how to control the bureaucracy as a policy making body or how the
systems function rather than on the instruments available in the bureaucracy‘s arsenal to 
influence citizen behaviors.  
In 1981, before the publication of Osborne and Gaebler‘s Reinventing 
Government, Lester Salamon stated the need to ―rethink public management‖ in terms of 
theory building in the area of the instruments used by government (Salamon 1981).  Why
did Salamon and others call for this shift to a different unit of analysis? Well before the
call for reinvention, governments began to shift toward third party government and the 
impact of third party government on management techniques was not well understood 
(Salamon 2002a).  Indeed in his examination of American Federalism, Elazar discussed 
the early collaboration of the federal government, state governments, and private entities.  
He contends that early ―reinvention‖ occurred during the 1800s to encourage the growth 
and settlement of the country.  This collaboration was an early form of indirect 
governance that has been largely overlooked by contemporary political scientists (Elazar 
2001, 1984).
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Instrument theorists argue the unit of analysis should not be the management 
processes, institutions or bureaucratic behavior, rather the unit of analysis should 
―concentrate instead on the generic tools of government action, on the ‗techniques of
social intervention‘ (Salamon 1981).‖  This is not the first call for examining the 
instruments of the public management trade.  Dahl and Lindblom (1953) suggest that the
quickly developing area of instruments is the ―greatest revolution‖ in contemporary
public management (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Salamon 2002a).  Christopher Hood 
advocates for a ―generic‖ approach to policy tools and instruments in 1981 that examines 
the use of instruments based on governmental information gathering that is intended to 
allow the researcher to examine policy instruments across time and space and free of the
encumbrances of technology and institutions (Hood 1983, 2007).   
Instruments in traditional public administration literature are divided into various 
types or classifications.  Lowi is one of the first scholars to offer a typology of policy
instruments with his four part classification of regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and 
constituent policy types (Lowi 1972). This ―chestnut‖ of public administration is still 
taught in classrooms today as an important step forward in policy analysis research (Kraft 
and Furlong; Shafritz and Borick 2008).  Others have offered typologies in the literature
including Mancur Olson, James Q. Wilson and Christopher Hood (Wilson 1980; Hood 
1983; Olson 1965, 1971).  
The typology approach has its attractive characteristics for researchers as well as 
its inherent problems that are fundamental classification issues.  A typology is understood 
to be a classification scheme that is both multidimensional and conceptual (Smith 2002;
Bailey 1994). Consider for a moment Lowi‘s typology of policies.  The
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multidimensionality criterion is met through the idea of coercion having both an 
applicability dimension – does the policy come into effect as a result of individual 
behavior or a group of individuals – and a likelihood dimension - coercion as being
immediate or remote (Lowi 1972).  The Lowi typology is conceptual as well with the
resulting policy types of regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituent 
representing internal government policies and processes.  The typological approach offer 
the advantages of description and ordering that is necessary to inquiry in both the social 
and physical sciences (Smith 2002; Bailey 1994).  Typological ordering helps bring
organization to a subject and reduce complexity while identifying unique characteristics 
of variables.  
Fundamental to the typology approach is the criteria of categories that are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  The exhaustive characteristic provides researchers 
with a comprehensive foundation and inventory of the unit of analysis being investigated 
(Bailey 1994).  These criteria are the source of much of the criticism or the disadvantages 
of typologies discussed in the literature.  Many policy instruments are too complex to be 
sorted into simple categories and if categories are created for each instrument the
typology becomes irrelevant or does not provide the necessary clarity for research (Smith 
2002; Greenberg et al. 1977).  Rather than develop rigid typologies, Steinberger and 
others suggest that policies should be understood from a phenomenological perspective.  
Researchers should attempt to understand the meanings, interpretations, and sociological 
constructions that define policy instruments (Steinberger 1980; Schneider and Ingram 
1997).  Since typologies are fundamentally conceptual, as suggested by Bailey, this 
approach seems to be both an obvious solution and completely appropriate (Bailey 1994).
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Another issue relative to the typological approach in policy analysis is that it is 
often criticized for being static or  synchronic rather than dynamic or diachronic (Bailey
1994). Indeed this is a major criticism raised regarding Lowi‘s typology of instruments.  
Placing any single policy into a single category becomes difficult as the policy process 
stretches out over time and as more participants enter the policy arena (Greenberg et al. 
1977).  Bailey counters that this criticism is somewhat specious since most social science
research is static or cross sectional and rarely becomes dynamic (Bailey 1994).
Smith argued that many of the criticism of typologies could be skirted if 
researchers opted to use a taxonomical approach rather than the typological approach 
(Smith 2002).  Taxonomies are different from typologies in that they are empirically
based, generally hierarchical and change over time.  Cluster analysis is a taxonomic
technique (Bailey 1994).  Smith contends that taxonomic techniques have never been 
used in policy classification since policy instrument focus has been on behavioral 
conceptions.  It is common for social scientists to operationalize social concepts or 
individual characteristics into empirical models.  An example Smith uses is ideology, the 
problem of moving from construct to something quantifiable is surmountable (Smith 
2002).  
In his book, The Tools of Government, Salamon attempts to circumvent the 
inherent problems of the typological approach by developing a taxonomy and his work is 
central to the research here.  He discusses policy in terms of the evaluative criteria and the 
dimensions or characteristics that are chosen on the basis of theory (Salamon 2002a).  
These criteria are used to measure policy instruments based upon the four traditional 
criteria discussed in many introductory public policy text books:  effectiveness, 
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efficiency, equity and political feasibility (Kraft and Furlong; Peters 2004).  Salamon uses 
rough analogues or ―analytics‖ to these four criteria that he describes in terms of the 
policy dimensions of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility.  Coercion and 
directness will be defined in detail below.  Automaticity is defined as ―...the extent to 
which a tool utilizes an existing administrative structure for its operations rather than 
creating its own special administrative apparatus.‖   Visibility refers to issues of
instrument transparency, are the instruments clearly outlined in governmental budgets 
(Salamon 2002b).  
Coerciveness is the degree to which a policy attempts to change or restrict an 
individual‘s or group‘s behavior (Salamon 2002a).  It attempts to create effectiveness in 
policy outcomes and is a basic building block for all policy tools because at its core, a
policy instrument is what government uses to get ―...people to do things that they might 
not have done otherwise (Schneider and Ingram 1990).‖  All instrument typologies have
some element of coerciveness built into them.  Lowi, and others who adapt the Lowi 
typology, measure coercion in terms of the likelihood for a penalty or sanction to be
applied as a result of action or inaction (Lowi 1972; Spitzer 1987).  
The behavioral perspective taken by Schneider and Ingram, emphasizes that 
coercion is much more subtle but important nonetheless.  These scholars describe five
behavioral tools:  authority, incentive, capacity, hortatory, and learning.  The first two 
tools are the essence of coercion.  Authority tools are described as the oldest and most
common governmental tools and they rely on ―...the legitimate authority of the 
government that grant permission, prohibit or require action under designated 
circumstances...(Schneider and Ingram 1990).‖ Incentive tools offer benefits that at first 
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blush do not seem to be coercive, but as has been discovered in the studies of federalism 
and federal grant activities, contain implied or overt sanctions (Derthick 2001b; Cho and 
Wright 2001).  Sanctions can be implied or overt, either a direct sanction or the 
opportunity cost for NOT complying.  An example of an incentive with an implied 
sanction is the offer to a citizen an inducement to behave in a certain manner, for example
insurance rates will be lowered for those who quit smoking or the offer to use the less 
congested car pooling lanes to reduce traffic and encourage more fuel efficiency for those
people who carpool or who use hybrid vehicles.  Both of these policy instruments carry
with them the implication of sanction, that if the citizen does not comply it will cost more
to get insurance or it will take longer to get to work.  
Coercion is less obvious, though still present in the other three tools (capacity, 
hortatory, and learning tools) described by Schneider and Ingram.  Capacity tools are
those that build citizens‘ skills, learning, training, and enable them to participate more
fully in society or the policy arena.  The classic capacity building tool in American public
policy is the development and deployment of the Cooperative Extension Service in the
th th19 and 20 centuries (Zimmerman 2001; Browne 2001; Elazar 1964).  While the 
Extension Service could not exist without the foundation of the Morrill Act and the Hatch 
Act, it was created by the Smith Lever Act in 1914 to support rural Americans and farmers 
through the dissemination and provision of information, education, and research (North 
Carolina State University 2008).  The coercion of capacity building is very subtle in that a
citizen may assume that not participating in the opportunity to enrich himself or herself 
will disadvantage them or make them less competitive in the marketplace or with their 
neighbors.  
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Symbols, exhortations, and cajoling are examples of hortatory tools used by
officials to control citizen behavior.  The use of these tools assumes that citizen behavior 
is based on an internal motivation to do what is correct or right.  Hortatory tools are
meant to persuade or ―encourage compliance‖ through the use of images and labels 
(Schneider and Ingram 1990).  As an example of the use of hortatory tools, the 
connection of ethanol to symbols of patriotism, feelings of security through domestic
production of energy, and the provision of benefits to worthy citizens, the American 
farmer, rather than to big oil interests act as hortatory tools to persuade citizens to support 
biofuel policy (Ingram et al. 2007).  And though coercion in this instance does not seem 
to be present, it is.  If to coerce means to ―compel to an act,‖  the exhortations of public 
officials are acts of coercion as they compel citizens to use ethanol fuels or willingly
support research and development through taxes and spending (Merriam-Webster 2008).  
Learning tools are those collaborative efforts to develop an understanding of
public policy by citizens and officials in the hopes that this knowledge will allow 
participants to problem solve.  These tools are considered to be on the lower end of the 
coercion scale with no overt attempts to compel change and are thought to change
behavior based on the rational choices made to select better policies (Schneider and 
Ingram 1990).  The literature offers as an example of the learning tools citizen advisory
committees.  If one considers for a moment fundamental group dynamics, coercion 
cannot be ruled out from the use of even seemingly benign learning tools (Kraft and 
Furlong; Schneider and Ingram 1997).  Much of the foundational work conducted by
group theorists demonstrate the potential for coercion within groups, see for example
42
  
  
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
   
     
 
    
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
Irving Janis‘ examination of Kennedy and his cabinet in Groupthink or the work of 
Solomon Asch on group pressures and behavior (Asch 1951; Janis 1972).  
Directness is the extent to which government is involved in the financing, 
management, and delivery of a public program.  Directness of a policy instruments relates 
to the policy criteria of efficiency.  Table 2 below demonstrates this concept based on the 
dimensions of finance and delivery.  
Table 2:  Matrix of Directness
Finance
Delivery Public Private
Public Direct Partnerships
Private rd3 Party, Contracts Private
Source:  adapted from Salamon 2001
Within the ideal type public administrative paradigm, all programs are highly
directed with financing and delivery thought to be most effectively done by a centralized 
government authority (Weber 1958; Salamon 1981).  The ideal type is used by public
choice theorists and other economics-based public administration theorists to describe the 
problems inherent in monopolistic government programs where authorization, funding, 
staffing, and delivery of services is believed to be widespread and inefficient (Blair 2002; 
Ostrom 1989; Salamon 1981).  On the other side of the spectrum from the ideal type, 
much of the contemporary reform focuses on private finance and delivery of public
services
Why use the two characteristics of coercion and directness?  A research design 
dictum states that theory dictates design.  In this case, New Public Management reforms 
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are primarily concerned with the creation of a more effective and efficient government 
through less government (Osborne and Plastrik 1997).  This emphasis should translate
directly to less direct government intervention with lower levels of coercion.  Regardless, 
the focus of this instrument research is appropriately placed on the dimensions of 
coercion and directness over any other policy instrument dimensions that may be
available.  
Traditional Public Administration Theories 
In The Public Administration Theory Primer, Frederickson and Smith offer three
paradigms that are the core of public administration theory:  bureaucratic, institutional 
and management theories (Frederickson and Smith 2003).  While it is these three
viewpoints do not represent the full scope of public administration theory, this analysis
will use them as a springboard to explicate the instruments perspective.  Briefly, the 
bureaucratic paradigm encompasses theorists that view the policy making processes from 
the lens of the bureaucracy, its behavior, and attempts to control that behavior.  While the 
list of these scholars is extensive, among those who have created a body of work from 
this perspective include Allison and his Model III of bureaucratic behavior, Niskanen‘s 
utility maximizing bureaucrat, James Q. Wilson‘s classic on bureaucracy, and Terry
Moe‘s work on congressional control of the bureaucracy (Frederickson and Smith 2003;
Moe 1989; Niskanen 1991; Wilson 1989).
The institutional theorists look at public policy from the perspective of the
organizations in which the policy develops.  This perspective‘s emphasis is a clear 
descendent of Weberian tradition of organizational focus (Weber 1958; Frederickson and 
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Smith 2003).  Scholars who have produced excellent examples of work from this 
perspective include March and Olsen, with their garbage can model of government and 
New Institutionalism, and Lynn‘s explorations of the work and interactions of 
government organizations, and Vincent Ostrom and public choice theories (Cohen et al. 
1972; Lynn 2001; March and Olsen 1984; Ostrom 1989).
Management theorists examine processes and techniques that guide public 
organizations which includes the New Public Management (NPM) and the reinvention 
movements discussed below.  The management perspective also has a clear pedigree in 
public administration theory as the progeny of the scientific management movement.  
While the focus has taken a behavioral turn in its research, it is still very much concerned 
with the development of processes, organizational cultures or leadership techniques that 
maximize the efficient, effective, and equitable delivery of public service (Peters 2000).  
Each of these robust theories are distinct and view the role of policy instruments 
differently in the policy making process.  These theories shape the world view of public
administration scholars and certainly meet the definition of Kuhn‘s paradigm (Kuhn 
1962).  They also differ from instrument theorists along a number of fundamental 
characteristics.  The discussion below reviews these paradigms through the lens of the 
instrument approach and discusses the following characteristics:  unit of analysis, 
behavioral, individual, inter-relational, and structural foci, source of legitimacy and 
authority, accountability, public / private orientation, and finally preferred instruments.   
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Bureaucratic Theories
The literature in the tradition of bureaucratic theories and bureaucratic theorists 
has as its basic unit of analysis the government agency, bureaucrat or public official.  It 
works to spotlight behaviors of the internal agent, agency head or the bureaucrat and / or
the external political agent of the elected official as that official relates or controls the
activities of the agency.  It generally does not make any distinction between bureaucrats 
or elected officials, for example see Niskanen‘s classic and blanket description of the 
budget maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1968, 1991) . Its inter-relational focus is often 
on the antagonistic relationship between bureaucrat and public official and appears as a 
struggle for control through the bureaucrat‘s superior policy knowledge and the public 
official‘s democratic representation of the public will (Wilson 1989; Meier and O'Toole
2006; Moe 1989).
Bureaucratic theorists are concerned with the presence or absence of hierarchy
within the agencies‘ structural contexts.  The early traditional public administration 
scholars emphasize hierarchy as the ideal type with a great deal of research conducted on 
issues of administrative span of control, command and control or top-down decision 
making (Weber 1958; Gulick 1937; Meier and Bohte 2000, 2003). 
This perspective also emphasizes the centralization of power under an 
administrative executive in order to achieve control and maintain democratic 
accountability.  Accountability through the lens of bureaucratic theorists is achieved 
through responsiveness to the elected public official and requires attention to effective
and efficient use of public resources and attention to issues of equity (Behn 2001; 
Schneider and Ingram 1997). Legitimation of action or the bureaucracy‘s source of 
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legitimacy and authority is acquired chiefly through constitutional and statutory sources 
(Frederickson and Smith 2003).
From the early days of public administration and continuing through the 
reinvention and New Public Management (NPM) movements of today, bureaucratic
scholars often advocate for the adoption of private sector management instruments and 
methods for the public sphere (Salamon 2002a; Kettl 2002).  Management scholars view 
the private sector and its management techniques as consistently more effective and 
efficient than those of the public sector (Goodsell 2004).  The tools that are most often 
selected for study, and as a result appear to be most dominant within public agencies from 
the bureaucratic perspective, are focused on control of the bureaucracy through budget, 
personnel, and statute (Moe 1989).
Institutional Theories
Institutional theorists define the unit of analysis as public, private, and non-profit
organizations.  Rather than focus on individual behaviors as the bureaucratic theorists do, 
theorists from this perspective examine the rules, norms, and mores of organizations and 
inter-group and inter-institutional relationships.  This emphasis on inter-group 
relationships also allows the institutional theorist to distinguish between types of public 
servants with various examinations of executive / street-level interdependencies and 
behavior, public / private differences, and the behaviors of elected and non-elected 
officials.  This stands as stark contrast to bureaucratic theories that view bureaucracies 
more as an amorphous group than as being comprised of individual agents with 
differentiated behaviors (Frederickson and Smith 2003).   
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This view tends to examine the behaviors of groups and people within 
organizations and view these as forms of deviancy or pathology , see for example Irving
Janis or James Q. Wilson (Janis 1972; Wilson 1989).  This view results in a more
normative emphasis and an embrace of symbolic interpretations, shared meanings, and 
constructed social orders to understand behavior than earlier paradigms.  These symbolic 
understandings and the constructed social order created by the larger society are the 
foundation for the group‘s legitimacy and authority according to institutional theorists 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993; Ingram et al. 2007).  For institutional theorists, 
responsiveness to elected officials, citizens, and the private sector is the mark of
democratic accountability for the public sector (Moe 1989; Behn 2001).  And unlike the
theorist of the bureaucratic paradigm discussed above and the management theorists 
discussed below, the subscribers to the institutional perspective view the public sector and 
private sectors as two distinct entities and recognize that not all private sector practices 
are appropriately transferrable (Goodsell 2004; Rubin 1994).  
The instruments of choice promoted by these theorists are public private 
partnerships, decentralization of authority to lower level employees, interagency and 
inter-sectoral cooperation (Sabatier 2007).  Comparing the tool perspectives of 
institutionalists to bureaucratists, one can see that institutionalists push authority down the
agency structure, out to the edges of the organization, and even out of the public sector to 
the private sector where bureaucratic theorists maintain central command control.  The
institutional theorists‘ instrument choices are much more difficult to manage and to 
maintain accountability (Sabatier 2007).
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Management Theories
Management theorists again differ significantly on the unit of analysis from the 
prior two paradigms discussed.  New Public Management (NPM) theories are
representative of this perspective and are discussed in detail below.  It is important to 
discuss these theories here to develop a general contrast with the other traditional theories 
and the instruments perspective.    
Management scholars tend to be either process-oriented or leader-oriented. 
Researchers that focus on the process examine them in light of various evaluative criteria
including efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and political feasibility (Frederickson and 
Smith 2003).  There is a large body of scholarship that examines the role of the public 
manager as leader and the inter-relationship between the manager and the worker (Ott et 
al. 2003).  There does appear to be a schism among management theorists around the 
1950s with the focus shifting from what some might term a mechanical process focus to a
behavioral process focus (Ott et al. 2003).  This schism is epitomized by the focal 
differences between Frederick Taylor and the scientific management movement and the 
behavioral perspective of Herbert Simon (Frederickson and Smith 2003).  Taylor 
explicates the managerial responsibility of providing the appropriate instruments for the 
employees and the creation of efficient work processes (Ott et al. 2003).  Simon, on the 
other hand, launched the management movement in behavioral terms, discussing the 
impact of human limitations on work processes and management ability to account for 
and control those limitations (Ott et al. 2003).  
From the managerial perspective, the source of government‘s legitimacy and 
authority springs from leadership authority derived from expertise.  Democratic
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accountability to citizens is achieved through the development of efficient government 
processes and stewardship of public resources.  As epitomized by New Public 
Management, private sector practices are always considered superior to public sector 
practices and should be substituted for public sector practices in all cases (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik 1997).  Tools of choice from theorists and 
practitioners of the managerial perspective include performance measures, the reduction 
of ―red-tape‖, contracting out, privatizations and other tools with a particular focus on 
efficiency (Kettl and DiIulio 1995a; Osborne and Plastrik 1997).
New Public Management
Command and control, authority, centralization, standard operating procedures are
descriptions for the traditional instruments of government in public administration.  These
are also objects for reform of the New Public Management (NPM).  Reform is standard 
fare for the public sector and is increasingly the focus since the publication of Osborne
and Gaebler‘s book Reinventing Government:  How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector in 1992. Some of the efforts to reform government and 
the success of those efforts are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. However, the real 
impact of reform is largely underexplored, particularly in reference to the instruments of 
public action (Salamon 1989). To fill this gap in the theoretical knowledge regarding
policy instruments it is important to offer an outline of the history and evolution of
American public administration reform, the basic NPM tenets.  Also important is an 
understanding of the  motives discussed by scholars for NPM reforms as well as literature
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regarding the types and scope of reforms at the state level and how NPM scholars have
specifically addressed policy instruments.
If there is one constant in American public administration, it is reform.  Reform 
began early in the history of the republic.  It has evolved through a number of phases with
the first phase being that of ―government by gentleman,‖ whereby public employees were
chosen based on ―good character.‖  The spoils system was the next phase.  It required a
potential public servant to have good connections and jobs were offered as rewards for
political favors.  The transformation to government by the most able during the 
Progressive Movement came as a result of the excesses of the spoils system and 
emphasized government by apolitical public servants with employment coming as a result
of merit not connections.  The business model of government by managers and/or 
administrators appeared during the first half of the twentieth century as an extension of 
the Progressive Movement but emphasized the adoption of business management models 
for the public sector.  The concept of the neutral public servant is eventually abandoned 
for that of the public facilitator that spans both the political and administrative spheres 
(Kettl 2000; Henry 1987; Rubin 1994).
Why so much reform in public administration? Many scholars have discussed that 
very issue.  Some say that administrative reform is simply the result of political rhetoric, 
that it is the ―domain of rhetoric, trading, problematic attention, and symbolic action‖
and that real reform is elusive (March and Olsen 1983).  Charles Goodsell (2004) finds 
support for the position of March and Olsen (Goodsell 2004).  He states that as 
disillusionment after a series of events such as Vietnam and Watergate, citizens and 
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politicians alike began to use the bureaucracy as a ―handy scapegoat.‖  Politicians at all
levels of government campaign on platforms that include reform of the wasteful, 
fraudulent bureaucracy (Goodsell 2004).  While Goodsell uses contemporary examples 
that cause disillusionment that result in reform, these types of events can be seen 
throughout the history of American public administration and linked to historical reform 
periods.  
Christopher Hood suggests that the push for reforms is based on four 
―administrative ‗megatrends‘‖ which include movements to slow and/or reverse the 
growth of government, move services into the private sector through privatization, the 
increasing impact of information technology on the work processes of public agencies 
and finally ―the development of a more international agenda‖ (emphasis included) (Hood 
1991). He sees the reforms as a ―fusion‖ resulting from two different sources: economics 
and managerialism.  The economic approach advocates user choice to break government 
monopolies, creation of incentives for better performance and through behavior 
modification.  The concept of managerialism and the focus on the promotion of private 
sector management techniques to the public sector, increased discretion for managers, and 
the latitude to develop more supportive entrepreneurial agency cultures is a result of the
shift to managerialism (Hood 1991).  
Donald Kettl takes a different perspective, one that is more critical of the field 
itself.  He argues that reform results from the inherent tension between opposing forces 
within the field of public administration itself.  These opposing forces are the need for 
theory about public problems juxtaposed against the need for solutions for public
problems.  On the one hand, academics try to develop parsimonious theories that answer 
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specific questions and leave little theoretical uncertainty in its wake.  These theories may
or may not be practical for application in the field.  Practitioners are more accepting of 
ambiguity when addressing unknowns, readily acknowledge that policy making is a 
complicated process and accept solutions that have certain levels of risk but appear to 
address the public problem (Kettl 2002). Unlike other reform movements such as the 
early twentieth century Progressive Movement, New Public Management (NPM) is a
movement that is taking place almost entirely through the efforts of public managers and 
not with the ―intellectual or moral support from academia (Kettl 2002).‖ It is the bottom-
up efforts of public managers that Kettl sees as really sparking the NPM reform 
movement, a movement that uses ideas that are not ―written down‖ and are sometimes in 
conflict with each other (Kettl and DiIulio 1995b).  Support for this contention can be
found anecdotally if one considers that the ―founders‖ of NPM, David Osborne and Ted 
Gaebler, are not academics.  Osborne is a journalist and Gaebler is a former practitioner, a
city manager.  Kettl also notes that unlike the Progressive Movement reforms, the reforms 
of NPM have global roots, with reforms taking place in New Zealand, Great Britain and 
Canada before beginning in the United States (Kettl and DiIulio 1995b).
The New Public Management reform movement is the result of reform on all
levels of government which began to take hold in the 1990s.  There are several reports 
that mark this round of reforms including the National Performance Review (NPR) with 
an initial focus of creating a federal government that ―works better costs less (Kettl and 
DiIulio 1995b).‖  This initiative by the Clinton administration was presented to the public
in 1993 and is best known for Vice President Gore‘s leadership in trying to reduce the
53
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
rules by which public managers operated in order to free them to become more
entrepreneurial (Kettl 1994).  
The Winter Commission issued its report on the need for state and local reforms in 
its report Hard Truths / Tough Choices: An Agenda for State and Local Reform 1993 
(The National Commission on the State and Local Public Service 1993).  This report was 
presented to President Clinton and made major recommendations calling for:
1. The development of stronger executive leadership at the state and local 
level;
2. The encouragement of government  responsiveness through the creation 
of a flatter bureaucratic structure with fewer managers,  streamlined 
personnel and procurement systems;
3. The creation a ―high-performance work force‖ through employee
development and pay that reflects their development as well as ―new style 
of labor-management communication;‖
4. The removal of barriers to citizen participation and involvement in 
governance;
5. The reduction of fiscal uncertainty for the states.(The National 
Commission on the State and Local Public Service 1993).
The central theme of the Winter Commission report is the assertion that the ―path 
to high performance government is based on the trust and lead strategy...Give leaders the
authority to act (The National Commission on the State and Local Public Service 1993).‖
The greatest impact of the Winter Commission‘s report appears to be on public personnel 
systems with calls for personnel system decentralization, fundamental changes to hiring
procedures such as testing criteria, seniority, job preferences and the ―rule of three‖ to 
allow managers more latitude in hiring as well as streamlining job classifications and 
employee removals (Thompson 1994).
There have been a number of reforms that have resulted from NPM within the 
states.  The literature cites changes in budgeting processes to move to performance
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budgeting, the adoption of tax and expenditure limitations (TELS), movements to 
increase citizen participation in budgeting and changes to capital planning processes   
(Chan 2004; Alm and Skidmore 1999; Bradley 2006; Ebdon and Franklin 2004).  
Reforms have occurred across the board in state governments in the form of changes 
throughout all state agencies in basic human resource functions or within single policy
sectors such as performance measure adoptions in higher education (Battaglio and 
Condrey 2006; Franklin 2002; Douglas 1999).  
Regardless of the source of reform, the fact remains that reform in public
management changes the way public agents perform public business.  The basic tenets of 
New Public Management (NPM) can be described in a deceptively simple statement:  
government should become more entrepreneurial and should ―steer and not row (Osborne
and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik 1997).‖ To do so, NPM advocates ten different 
strategies that can be consolidated into process reforms, internal agency reforms, and 
external control reductions.  Process reforms are those that change how an agency does 
business.  NPM strategies that relate to process reforms include service outsourcing; 
reduction of personnel, budgeting and organizational rules; decentralize processes and 
authority through participatory management, teamwork, and employee development.  
Internal agency reforms include changing the agency culture to view agency
clients as customers and to encourage competition and to develop public sector profit
centers by allowing public agencies to offer services that are supported through user fees 
and enterprise funds.  An additional internal agency reform includes a shift from 
centralized, command and control methods to decentralized, market based structures.  
Finally, external controls should be reshaped to allow agencies to operate in a more ―for-
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profit‖ mode.  This would allow agencies to retain end-of-year funds and creating
performance based funding mechanisms for public agencies (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; 
Goodsell 1993).
Political Culture
The concept of political culture plays essential roles in the context of this 
dissertation.  It provides the defining environment through which public policy is made
(Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997).  Despite the essential character of political culture to 
the development of policy instruments, it has not been studied extensively in the context 
of instrument theory.  This section outlines definitions and extant literature for political 
culture concepts and discusses the literature surrounding the impact of culture on policy
choices.  It then discusses the potential impact of political culture on the selection of
biofuel policy instruments.  
It is important to distinguish between the concept of political culture and the
concept of political ideology in terms of this research, which examines both.  The
difference is subtle and often confused by scholars who sometimes use the terms 
interchangeably.  Here they are treated as two separate concepts.  Political culture is 
understood as a group or societal concept, one that includes beliefs, rules, and values of a
society while ideology is understood as an individual phenomenon or belief system.  The
concept of political culture represents the orientation of the community while ideology
represents the orientation of an individual (Erikson et al. 1993).  
Sociologists and anthropologists understand culture as ―a system of symbols, 
beliefs, and values.‖    Culture is embedded in society and reflects the needs of that 
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society (Peacock 1981).  Political culture is understood in much the same way though it is 
limited to particular activities or actions.  Daniel Elazar describes culture in terms of 
shared political beliefs and patterns of behaviors, values and traditions (Elazar 1994).  It 
represents the orientations of citizens toward government, acceptable government 
activities and action and ―…the historical differences in habits, perspectives…attitudes 
that influence political life in various states... (Elazar 1994).‖  Kincaid (1982) defines 
political culture as: 
―...a persisting set of shared explicit and implicit beliefs, values and traditions 
about politics which constitutes a general framework of conceptions, plans, rules, 
recipes, instructions, and understanding about the conduct of political life
(Kincaid 1982).‖
Elazar‘s work offers a political culture framework of the United States that is 
useful.  He uses historical analysis to develop a theory of political culture that ties culture
geographically to specific areas of the United States.  In the context of the policy making
process, there is a split on the value, empirical basis, and applicability of political culture
to the study of public policy and its processes.  Some research indicates that Elazar‘s 
framework is an effective predictor of policy formulation while others have found no 
effect at all.  Elazar‘s framework and the relevant research is discussed in detail in the 
following paragraphs.  This section proceeds first by outlining Elazar‘s framework.  It 
then turns to the arguments for the inclusion of political culture in the study of public
policies made by various scholars as well as the arguments for and against its utility
(Elazar 1984).
Elazar introduces a three-part typology of political culture that is both simple and 
theoretically rich.  His typology is discussed in terms of historical migrations that impact 
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regions of the states differently.  The three categories he introduces are moralistic, 
individualistic, or traditionalistic cultures.  He contends that the three distinct political 
cultures are reflections of how members of that political society or state have dealt with 
issues of ―the marketplace and the commonwealth‖ or individualism and society and the 
ways the states react to federal initiatives and programs that reflect its engrained political
inheritance.  
The moralistic cultural type sees politics as an honorable calling whose
practitioners are professional and are striving for the great society.  According to Elazar, 
this type is found predominately in the northern tier of the United States and those states 
settled by settlers from the original New England colonies (Erikson et al. 1993; Elazar 
1994).  As pioneers from New England migrated westward, the states they settled 
reflected the moralistic culture of the native New Englanders (Elazar 1984).  In this 
culture, politics is a very public and communal undertaking.  Citizens of moralistic
cultures believe in government intervention, and the regulation of the social fabric of the 
state and their attitudes are tipped toward the use of the commonwealth.  It is expected 
that in those states that have political cultures that are predominantly moralistic, public 
policies are more direct, exhibit direct intervention through government staffing of 
government agencies, and more coercive with highly regulatory biofuel policies such as 
labeling requirements and production standards.   
Individualistic states emphasize the marketplace of ideas and products.  The
citizens of these states view government as a ―…strictly utilitarian…‖ function.  Rather
than being perceived as a higher calling, as in the moralistic political culture, 
individualistic culture views politics as a way for a citizen to ―improve‖ his or her social 
58
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
standing and economic position.  Within this culture, politics is thought to be a necessary
evil and a naturally dirty business.  Public officials from individualistic cultures are not 
change agents unless forced by public opinion.  As public opinion pushes for action, 
officials from individualistic cultures give the citizens what they want in order to 
maintain their political positions.  The original or founding states with individualistic
political cultures are grouped in the Middle Atlantic States.  The descendants of the 
emigrants that moved westward through Indiana, Illinois, and Nevada still exhibit the
original individualistic culture prevalent within the Middle Atlantic States.  It is expected 
that within Individualistic states, public policies reflect the political culture through the 
selection of policy instruments that are more market oriented and include third party
participation through the direct loans and loan guarantees.  At the same time, it is 
expected that biofuel policies will be less coercive than those policies found in moralistic
states.  
Traditionalistic political culture is concentrated in the old South.  The role of
government in the traditionalistic culture is the ―…maintenance of the existing social 
order…‖  Political power is concentrated in the hands of the social elite who in turn 
recruit candidates for public positions.  Once elected, these candidates work diligently to 
maintain the status quo. The role of both political leaders and government in the
traditionalistic society is to insulate the culture from change and support change or 
government programs only if it benefits the elite group.  Public policies that proliferate 
within the traditionalistic political culture are those that favor the state‘s dominant interest 
group or elite group. For example, those traditionalistic states which have strong farm 
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organizations are expected to deploy biofuel policies that favor those groups by creating
policies that are less direct and less coercive.  
An issue that needs to be addressed is whether or not political culture is a variable 
worth investigating within any context.  The literature provides various levels of 
empirical support for political culture.  Erikson, Wright, and McIver examine political 
culture in their study of public opinion and state-level policies.  While their work finds 
other variables as important predictors to policy liberalisms within states, they suggest 
that their research offers ―strong support – sometimes startlingly strong support – for
Elazar‘s formulation (Erikson et al. 1993).‖  They suggest that Elazar‘s classifications 
should be treated as defining characteristics rather than as causal ones (Erikson et al. 
1993).  
Kinkaid suggests that political cultures impacts state level adoption of the Equal 
Rights Amendment with moralistic and individualistic states adopting it at higher levels 
than traditionalistic states.  He also maintains that political culture impacts participation, 
quality of life issues, and corruption.  He cautions, however,  that it is not possible to 
predict the impact that modern media, communications and the transitory nature of the
states will have on political culture in the future (Kincaid 1982).
Fitzpatrick and Hero demonstrate that moralistic, individualistic, and 
traditionalistic cultures behave differently across a number of variables.  First they
confirm their hypothesis that there is more interparty competition among parties in 
moralistic states than among traditionalistic states and that this competition is more
focused upon policy outcomes.  They also find that policy in moralistic states is more
innovative and there is less income inequality in moralistic states indicating that policy
60
  
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
 
   
 
 
makers in these states are more concerned with the commonwealth than those in state of
other political cultures (Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988).  
There are those authors who are skeptical of Elazar‘s conception of political 
culture and its relevance to policy making.  Lowery and Sigelman examine the impact of
political culture on four measures derived from the 1978 American National Election 
Study.  These measures are respondents‘ perceptions of external efficacy, governmental 
responsiveness, sense of citizen duty and self reliance (Lowery and Sigelman 1982).  
They find little support for Elazar‘s formulation but do not reject his model completely.  
While this research is interesting, it does not treat political culture as Elazar originally
conceptualized.  Lowery and Sigelman use survey data from individual responses and 
connect them to the state in which each respondent grew up and measure that against the 
variables cited above.    Elazar‘s political culture is conceived as a larger social 
phenomenon.  This is essentially measuring individual attitudes not social attitudes and 
should be considered as ―state-to-state variation in political culture‖ and not political 
culture (Erikson et al. 1993).   
The Synthesis of Instrument Policy, New Public Management, and Political Culture
What are the common themes that pull these three literatures together? Why is it 
important to consider these in unison?  First, consider political culture and instruments.  
Political culture represents historical and long-held attitudes of citizens toward 
government.  These attitudes shape the types of instruments that are deemed appropriate 
and necessary for efficient functioning of government (Schneider and Ingram 1997).  
Schneider and Ingram link these together in a dynamic system of instrument design that 
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also includes other elements discussed by this research.  The figure below is a 
representation of the policy instrument environment adapted to biofuel policy research 
from Ingram et al. (2007).  It outlines important components of the instrument process 
investigated in the context of this research (Ingram et al. 2007).  This research is an 
attempt to closely examine the impact of political culture on biofuel policy.
Institutions Target populatio 
Political Culture
Public & elite opinion
Political resources
Farmers
Business Organizations
Environmentalists
Society: Democratic Values, Citizenship, Problem-solving capacity 
justice
Policy Making Dynamics
Past Biofuel Policy
Instruments
Future Biofuel Policy Instruments
Incentives, Labeling, Production,
Regulation, etc.
Adapted from Ingram, Schneider, & DeLeon, 2007
Figure 2: The Policy Instrument Environment
It also is an attempt to juxtapose instrument research and NPM reform efforts to 
examine how those reforms translate into instrument selection.  The reforms favored by
NPM should translate directly to instrument adoption reflecting less direct and more third 
party government.  Therefore, in states that have had wide adoption of NPM reforms, 
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instrument form selection should favor tools such as contracting, loan guarantees, 
production, and use credits that are indirect and non-coercive over the selection of highly
regulatory policies.  
The role of interest groups and the influence they wield is also an important factor 
in the context of this research.  As the figure above suggests, target groups, defined as 
interest groups, should exert their own influence on the policy process.  Where some
groups are favored by the state‘s citizens and political elite, the policy instruments 
selected should reflect that favoritism.  This reflection does not translate into instruments 
that are automatically less direct and coercive for the favored group.  Rather it should 
translate into unique instrument positions according individual target group expectations.  
For example, while it might logically be assumed that farmers, like business people, 
prefer indirect, non-coercive instrument which allow them to maximum latitude it is 
likely an incorrect assumption.  Farmers, unlike business people, have a long tradition of 
very direct government services through mechanisms like the Extension Service, the land 
grant university system and subsidy programs (Browne 2001; Key 1996).  It is likely that 
the policy instruments they favor are highly directed while employing the minimum 
amount of coercion possible.  Environmental groups, on the other hand, would favor 
highly directed and coercive instruments for many of the same reasons as farm groups.  
Environmental policy instruments are, for the most part command and control instruments 
that are highly direct and coercive (Klyza and Sousa 2008; Bosso 2005).  
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
This chapter introduces the general model and proposed hypotheses with which 
the central research question of policy instrument choice is explored.  It begins with an 
outline of the general model.  It then moves to methodological information regarding the 
data for the dependent variable, biofuel policy group membership, how that data are
collected, operationalized as well as the use and outcomes of cluster analysis in order to 
develop the group membership dependent variable.  It then moves on to introduce and 
discuss the choice and use of multinomial logistic regression.  It then turns to a discussion 
and operationalization of the independent variables, why these variables were chosen for
use, their source and collection as well as the type of data each independent variable 
represents.
The General Model
The general model is outlined below in Figure 3. Very few of these variables 
have been used to examine policy instrument choice and their use is unique to this 
research.  Also, the application of these variables to state-level research is not addressed
in the literature.  This model focuses exclusively on state level policies while the extant 
instrument literature is discussed chiefly in the federal or international context.  It 
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contributes to public administration theory by adding to the discipline‘s knowledge of the 
interaction in the policy making environment of the American states and the choice of 
policy instruments by policy makers.  
The general model outlined in figure 3 delineates four groups of independent 
variables that are expected to impact the choice of policy instruments on the two 
dimensions of coercion and directness.  Each independent variable grouping has been 
explored in earlier public policy research but they have not been explored in the context 
of instrument choice and the dimensions of coercion and directness.  Figure 3 is a 
representation of the proposed general model. In figures 4 and 5 the expected 
relationships are designated as either + or – indicating the expected sign of the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
Economic Variables 
Political Interest Variables 
Political Cultural & Ideology Variables 
New Public Management Adoption Index 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
State Policy Position
Portfolio
Figure 3: Full Model of Instrument Choice
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Figure 4: Full Model of Instrument Choice – Coercion Dimension
Economic Variables
- State per capita income (SPCI) ( - ) 
- Percent of gross state product derived from agricultural production (PCTGSPA) ( - )
- Percent of gross state product derived from manufacturing production (PCTGSPM) (- )
- Per capita gasoline use (PCGU) ( + )
- Per capita special fuel use (PCDU) ( + )
- Per capita feedstock production (PCSP) ( - )
- Percent of state employment agriculturally based (PCTEMPAG) ( - ) 
- Percent of state employment manufacturing based (PCTEMPMAN) ( - )
Political Interest Variables
- State level influence of agricultural interest groups (IGATH) ( - )
- State level influence of manufacturer interest groups (IGMTH) ( - )
- State level influence of environmental interest groups (IGETH) (+ )
- State level elite opinion on Agricultural issues  (EOAI) ( - )
- State level elite opinion on Business/Commerce issues (EOBC) ( - )
- State level elite opinion on Environmental issues (EOEN) ( + )
- Farm Bureau Membership per capita (FBMEM) ( - )
- Businesses per capita (BUMEM) ( - )
- Environmental Group Memberships per capita (EVMEM) ( + )
Cultural & Ideological Variables
- Elazar Political Culture (EAPC) ( + )
- State Elite Ideology (ISCD) ( + )
- Ranney Index of Unified party control (UPC) ( + )
New Public Management Adoption
- Administrative Reform Indices  (ASAPI 1 & ASAPI 2) ( + )
- Pew Government Performance Project, Overall (GPP) ( + )
- Pew GPP, Money (GPP_Money) ( + )
- Pew GPP, People (GPP_People) ( + )
- Pew GPP, Infrastructure (GPP_Infra) ( + )
- Pew GPP, Information (GPP_Info) ( + )
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Economic Variables
- State per capita income (SPCI) ( - )
- Percent of gross state product derived from agricultural production (PCTGSPA) ( + )
- Percent of gross state product derived from manufacturing production (PCTGSPM) ( - )
- Per capita gasoline use (PCGU) ( + )
- Per capita special fuel use (PCDU) ( + )
- Per capita feedstock production (PCSP) ( + )
- Percent of state employment agriculturally based (PCTEMPAG) ( + )
- Percent of state employment manufacturing based (PCTEMPMAN) ( - )
Political Interest Variables
- State level influence of agricultural interest groups (IGATH) ( + )
- State level influence of manufacturer interest groups (IGMTH) ( - )
- State level influence of environmental interest groups (IGETH) (+ )
- State level elite opinion on Agricultural issues  (EOAI) ( + )
- State level elite opinion on Business/Commerce issues (EOBC) ( - )
- State level elite opinion on Environmental issues (EOEN) ( + )
- Farm Bureau Membership per capita (FBMEM) ( + )
- Businesses per capita (BUMEM) ( - )
- Environmental Group Memberships per capita (EVMEM) ( + )
State Policy
Position –
Directness
Dimension
Cultural & Ideological Variables
- Elazar Political Culture (EAPC) ( - )
- State Elite Ideology (ISCD) ( + )
- Ranney Index of Unified party control (UPC) ( + )
New Public Management Adoption
- Administrative Reform Indices  (ASAPI 1 & ASAPI 2) ( - )
- Pew Government Performance Project, Overall (GPP) ( - )
- Pew GPP, Money (GPP_Money) ( - )
- Pew GPP, People (GPP_People) ( - )
- Pew GPP, Infrastructure (GPP_Infra) ( - )
- Pew GPP, Information (GPP_Info) ( - )
Figure 5: Full Model of Instrument Choice – Directness Dimension
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Dependent Variable:  State Level Biofuel Portfolio
This research used cross-sectional data that were secondary in nature and 
developed a unique data set from government and private data sources (Babbie 2004).  It 
sought to examine factors that impacted how policy instruments were chosen and what 
influenced the choice of coercive or direct biofuel policy instruments by state level policy
makers.  The dependent variable was conceptualized as unique groupings of states based 
on the coercive or direct dimension of biofuel policies enacted in each state.  
The dependent variable could have been developed through the creation of a
survey It would have been possible to survey public administrators responsible for biofuel 
policy and which would have allowed for an intimate picture of the state-level biofuel 
policies there were some serious impediments to this approach when applied to state-level 
biofuel policies.  First, biofuel policy was underdeveloped in many states, there simply
was not enough extant literature discussing its development within the state-level context.  
Therefore, it would be difficult at this point to develop a meaningful instrument without
an understanding of the important questions to ask.  The second issue of concern was that 
with a maximum of fifty state administrators, a poor response rate would seriously
compromise the validity of the survey (Babbie 2004).  
Developing the dependent variable through the use of existing data appeared to be 
the most appropriate choice for this research.  Fortunately, there was a valuable resource
available that was both reliable and valid.  The United States Department of Energy, the 
National Renewable Energy Lab, and the Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicle Data 
Center (AFAVDC) collected data on biofuel policies at the state level.  This federal 
database offered a comprehensive listing of state level alternative fuel policy in the nation 
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and these data provided a detailed portrait of the condition of biofuel polices in the fifty
states and biofuel policy instruments were easily distinguished from other alternative fuel 
policies.
Initial data development
The process to collect and develop the dependent variable progressed through 
various stages and finished with the use of a cluster analysis techniques.  The first stage
was to gather the information for each state from the federal database and encode it into a
database created for the purpose of this research.  As discussed above, the data were
drawn from the Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center (AFAVDC) 
administered by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, a department within the 
United States Department of Energy.  The data were accessed through an online database
that was found at www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/ (Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles 
Data Center 2008).  The database included all active biofuel policies (biodiesel and 
ethanol) policies within each of the fifty states and included a total of 451 separate biofuel 
policies.  
The timing of the data collection could raise concerns of temporality issues for
this research.  Temporality was deemed not to be an issue for a number of reasons, 
however.  Biofuel policies were used to understand the type of policy choices each state 
typically made and which states made similar choices.  These data were used to 
manufacture the dependent variable and were not used in an attempt to establish the
relationship between dependent variable A and independent variables X, Y, and Z.  It did 
not attempt to assert causality, only that each variable existed in the presence of the other
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or they do not.  Since it was not examining either causality or, as the case often is in 
policy research, diffusion, temporality was of less concern.  Second, establishing a time 
when the policy process begins was a commonly cited problem in policy analysis
literature.  As Kingdon described the process in his stream theory model, policy ideas 
often float in the policy stream for quite some time before rising to the agenda and being
enacted.  Policies can also evolve across long periods of time through a number of 
mechanisms with no real clear beginning (Kingdon 2003).  This being the case, it was 
logical that if a biofuel policy was effective after 2003 then it should be included in the 
analysis (Kingdon 2003; Mayhew 2005).  Finally, if a legislature or governor wished to 
amend or end statute or policy during any particular legislative period they can do so and 
the presence of that policy in statute may well be interpreted as an indication that the 
political will is not there to change the policy.  
After data collection, the 451 state level biofuel policies were classified according
to the taxonomy developed by Salamon (Salamon 2002b).  The specific taxonomy was 
presented in table 4 on page 80.  In order to do so, the list of instruments by state was 
evaluated based on the descriptions given to the policy from the AVAFDC website.  This 
process was done in two stages.  Stage one identified the policies that could be described 
as ―the low hanging fruit‖ or the ones that were easily categorized into a single policy
instrument group.  Approximately 85 percent of the biofuel policies were categorized at 
this stage.  
The second stage involved a careful re-examination of the biofuel policy title and 
description.  If the policy was not clearly defined by the description, the actual statute was 
identified at state government websites and reviewed to discern policy type.  After this 
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process was complete, only one biofuel policy was left unidentified by the procedure and 
it was excluded from analysis.
While Salamon and the other authors did not directly source the method they used 
to identify the basic instruments, the instrument types did appear to roughly correspond to 
the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance program from the United States General 
Services Administration (United States General Services Administration 2008).  It was 
during this first classification stage that a number of data problems regarding instrument 
type were discovered and had to be addressed. 
There appeared to be an additional instrument that was not accounted for in the 
literature.  This policy instrument involved actions taken by state governments to 
encourage the use of biofuels by state agencies themselves.  These internal rules, or as 
Lowi called them constituent rules, set renewable fuel standards (RFS) for state
governments that required a certain level of renewable fuel to be used by the state by a
certain date (Lowi 1972).  While these standards had a number of internal impacts on 
state government operations, they also have the external impact of encouraging biofuel 
market development by guaranteeing a certain level of fuel purchases by state 
governments while a general consumer market developed.  These instruments acted to 
offer a stable market environment to a developing biofuel market.  Lowi‘s constituent 
type of policy had a restricted focus but did not recognize the impact of state business 
practices on private markets and Salamon did not acknowledge Lowi‘s constituent policy
types or instruments.  However the potential impact of state actions on biofuel markets 
could not ignored and it was necessary to include an instrument of this type into the 
analysis.  As a result, this instrument was identified as market development and based on 
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the evaluative criteria used by Salamon et al, the instrument was classified as high in 
directness and low in coercion (Salamon 2002b).
An additional issue addressed was how to deal with biofuel policies that contain 
language for more than one policy instrument type.  For example, how should a policy
that provides for both a grant and a loan be categorized?  The best solution to this 
problem appeared to be to duplicate these policies to include them in both of the
instrument categories.  There were twenty-six policies among eighteen states that 
appeared to be ―double duty‖ biofuel policies.  The policy instrument types impacted by
these types of statutes included grants and loans, public information, social regulation, 
and market development.  These policies were duplicated in order to be represented in 
both categories of policies.
Finally, an issue regarding the level of impact of the policy instrument had to be 
addressed.  Since this research was concerned with state-level activity, it was necessary to 
examine only state level policies.  There was little concern over co-mingling of federal 
policies with states as those were excluded from the original data gathering process.  
However, the data from AVAFDC included local level policies that needed to be 
excluded from examination for this research.  In order to so, each policy was analyzed 
based on its impact in the state.  If the impact was state-wide, applying to citizens or 
governments regardless of geography, it was classified as a state level policy. If it had a
localized impact such as for a single county or city within a state it was classified as a 
local level policy.  There were nine local level policies excluded from the analysis.  The
outcomes of the work discussed above are finalized in table 3 below.  It outlines the types 
of biofuel policy instruments, sample of policy instrument titles, the number of policies in 
72
  
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
    
 
  
 
 
  
      
      
   
    
  
  
 
      
      
   
  
  
 
 
  
   
  
  
  
   
  
 
   
  
     
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
    
     
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
   
  
    
   
    
  
those categories and the number of states that enacted each of the policies. The
instrument type used most widely among the states was the information / public
information type of policy instrument with a total of 80 policy instruments in 39 different 
states.  Only one state each adopted contracting, direct government or government 
corporation type policy instruments.  
Table 3: Sample biofuel policy instruments and number of instruments and 
number of states that have enacted them
Totals of:
Instrument Type Samples of Statute Titles Instrument States
(Abbrev.) Type w/in Type
Contracting (CN) Biofuel Production Contracts 1 1
Corrective taxes (CT) Alcohol Fuel Tax Exemptions, Alternative Fuels Tax, 60 31
Biodiesel Fuel Tax Exemption, Biofuels Production
Tax Credits, Biofuel Retail Tax Exemption, Cellulosic 
Ethanol Production Incentive
Direct government Vehicle (HEV) Acquisitions and Loans 1 1
(DG)
Direct Loans (DL) Alternative Fuel Grant & Loan Program, Infrastructure 16 11
Loans, Alternative Fuel (AFV) Vehicle Loans, Biofuels 
Production Incentive
Economic regulation Alternative Fuel Definition, Alternative Fuel License, 58 30
(ER) Alternative Fuel Production Subsidy Prohibition,
Alternative Fuel Taxicab Regulation
Government Fleet Biodiesel Fuel Use Incentive 1 1
corporation (GC)
Grants / Grants-in-aid Alternative Fuel & Fueling Infrastructure Grants, 57 27
(GR) Alternative Fuel & Vehicle Promotion, Alternative Fuel 
Bus Funding, Alternative Fuel Research &
Development, Alternative Fuel Vehicle Grants, Biofuel 
Fueling Infrastructure Funding
Information / Public Agricultural Economic Development Plan for Biofuels, 80 39
information (PI) Alternative Fuel Labeling Requirement, Alternative 
Fuel Promotion, Alternative Fuel Technical Assistance,
Technician Training, Global Warming Mitigation
initiative, E85 Promotion and Education, Regional 
Biofuels Promotion Plan
Market Development Alternative Fuel Use, Alternative Fuel Development 68 35
(MD) Support, Vehicle (HEV) Acquisition Requirements,
Biobased Products Purchase Requirement
Social regulation (SR) Vehicle (HOV) Lane Exemption, Energy-Efficient 30 21
Vehicle Acquisition Requirement, Clean Fuel Diesel 
for Heavy-Duty Equipment
Tax expenditures (TE) Biodiesel Production Equipment Tax Credit, 66 33
Alternative Fuel Vehicle (AFV) Sales Tax Rebate,
Alternative Fuel Vehicle (AFV) Conversion Tax Credit
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The next phase in the derivation of the dependent variable was to assign levels of 
coercion and directness to each policy instrument.  The levels of these instrument 
dimensions were derived directly from the work of Salamon et al (Salamon 2002b).  Each 
instrument was rated by these scholars as low, medium, or high in levels of coercion and 
directness.  These levels were converted to numeric values to create an index to help to 
determine group membership.  Each state‘s instruments were rated as either low in 
coercion or directness and received a score of one, two or three for low, medium or high 
respectively.  The ratings of each instrument in an individual state‘s portfolio were
summed and divided by the total number of biofuel instruments to create an index of both 
coercion and directness.  These indices were used below in the cluster analysis to 
establish group membership.  The two dimensions of coercion and directness, as 
discussed earlier, were important here because they were likely to capture important 
reform characteristics of New Public Management (NPM) and interest group preferences 
as well as cultural and ideological influences.  
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Table 4:  Instruments and Measures of Coercion and Directness
Coercion Directness Coercion DirectnessInstrument Type Level Level Index Index
Contracting M M 2 2
Corrective taxes M M 2 2
Direct government H H 3 3
Direct loans M H 2 3
Economic regulation H H 3 3
Government corporation M H 2 3
Government-sponsored enterprises M L 2 1
Grants / Grants-in-aid M L 2 1
Information / Public Information L H 1 3
Insurance M H 2 3
Labeling requirements M M 2 2
Loan guarantees M L 2 1
Market development L H 1 3
Social regulation H M 3 2
Tax expenditures L M 1 2
Vouchers M L 2 1
The cluster analysis
The next phase in the creation of the dependent variable was to conduct a cluster
analysis on biofuel policy instruments of the 50 states to determine appropriate groupings 
for analysis in the general model.  The groupings that resulted from cluster analysis 
represented ―homogenous‖ groups of states based on characteristics of state level policy
instruments (Obinger and Wagschal 2001).  In order to conduct a cluster analysis of the
policy instruments of the states, the defining group characteristics based on instrument 
coercion and directness were identified from the biofuel policies collected from 
AFAVDC (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Bailey 1994).  These policies defined the 
approach an individual state takes to address the public policy issue of biofuel policies.  
The instrument characteristics that captured the state level approach and which were used 
to define the clusters included the overall number of policies, the number of each policy
type (contracting, corrective taxes, direct government, direct loans, economic regulation,
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government corporations, grants / grant-in-aid, information / public information, market 
development, social regulation and tax expenditures), and finally each state‘s policy
portfolio index described above on the coercion and directness dimensions of biofuel 
policy instruments.  These characteristics uniquely identified each state‘s policy
instrument choices in a number of ways.  First, they indicated how much each state chose
to intervene through the overall number of policies to demonstrate the fundamental 
philosophy of government intervention.  Second, these characteristics demonstrated the
exact instrument choices made and how often policy makers returned to the same
instrument to solve a public problem.  Vital to understanding policy choice was not just 
what tools were chosen but how often they were chosen.  Finally, these characteristics 
demonstrated each state‘s philosophy regarding the appropriate action of the state in 
intervening in a public problem either through direct or indirect methods and the levels of 
coercion each state is comfortable applying.  
To conduct the cluster analysis and properly operationalize the variables used for
the analysis the first decision to be made was whether to use standardized scores on the
variables in the analysis.  While there was substantial discussion in the literature
regarding the use of standard scores for the operationalization of the variables, some 
scholars contend that standardization can mask the intergroup differences that existed and 
that were fundamental to clustering homogonous cases (Everitt 1979; Schaffer and Green 
1996) Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) argued that if the measurement of variables was 
substantially different, the cluster analysis would likely benefit from standardization 
procedures.  However, if the variables were measured on the same scale, it was not
necessary, or even desirable, to standardize the variables (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 
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1984).  The variables selected to define the groups were the numbers of each type of 
variables and the index were measured on similar scales.  Any differences captured by the 
cluster analysis would represent real group differences, therefore it was not necessary to 
transform the variables into standardized scores.
The actual cluster analysis was conducted using Ward‘s method, a hierarchical 
agglomerative method of cluster analysis through SPSS (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 
1984). The small sample size (N= 50 states) mades Ward‘s method the most appropriate 
choice for analysis.  To measure the distance between group centroids or means, the
squared Euclidian distance measure was used.  SPSS produced an agglomeration 
schedule, a vertical icicle graph and a dendogram that graphically represents the clusters 
or groups.  The initial analysis and resulting dendogram resulted in the development of 
four clusters.  The dendogram in figure 6 below provides visual confirmation for this 
cluster solution. While the dendogram indicated how the states were grouped within the 
clusters, it was still necessary to test the clusters for reliability and validity (Obinger and 
Wagschal 2001; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003).  Was the ―right‖ number of clusters 
created by the clustering technique?  An accepted method of validating the results of the
cluster analysis was through the identification of the ―elbow‖ of the distance coefficient, 
the point at which the within-group difference becomes dramatically larger, on the 
agglomeration schedule (Castles and Obinger 2008; Mazzocchi 2008; Obinger and 
Wagschal 2001). To do so, the distance coefficient from the Ward‘s linkage
agglomeration schedule was inputted to a spreadsheet and a scree chart was created to 
help identify the elbow point.  The elbow point falls at step 46 in table 4 below and was 
identified in the scree chart in figure 7 below.
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Figure 6: Dendogram of Cluster Solution
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Table 5: Change in Distance Coefficient to Identify Elbow Point
Distance Gross Incremental Distance Gross Incremental 
Stage Coefficient Change Change Stage Coefficient Change Change
1 1.0112 26 79.9541 8.1747 1.0710
2 2.0668 1.0556 27 88.8011 8.8470 0.6722
3 3.1918 1.1250 0.0694 28 98.1465 9.3454 0.4985
4 4.9001 1.7083 0.5833 29 107.9698 9.8232 0.4778
5 6.9075 2.0074 0.2990 30 119.0284 11.0587 1.2354
6 8.9214 2.0139 0.0065 31 130.1962 11.1678 0.1091
7 10.9352 2.0139 0.0000 32 141.5378 11.3416 0.1739
8 12.9552 2.0200 0.0061 33 153.6900 12.1522 0.8105
9 15.0015 2.0463 0.0262 34 168.3644 14.6744 2.5222
10 17.0605 2.0590 0.0128 35 184.3068 15.9424 1.2680
11 19.1300 2.0694 0.0104 36 201.5196 17.2128 1.2704
12 21.1994 2.0694 0.0000 37 219.8649 18.3453 1.1325
13 23.5667 2.3673 0.2979 38 238.9563 19.0915 0.7462
14 25.9834 2.4167 0.0493 39 259.0615 20.1052 1.0137
15 28.4093 2.4259 0.0093 40 284.1521 25.0906 4.9854
16 31.1705 2.7612 0.3353 41 310.9978 26.8457 1.7551
17 34.1829 3.0123 0.2512 42 342.8256 31.8279 4.9822
18 37.5208 3.3380 0.3256 43 379.6098 36.7841 4.9563
19 41.2895 3.7686 0.4307 44 430.7914 51.1816 14.3975
20 45.1630 3.8735 0.1048 45 484.5932 53.8019 2.6203
21 49.1883 4.0253 0.1518 46 541.0616 56.4684 2.6666
22 53.6589 4.4707 0.4454 47 730.5020 189.4404 132.9720
23 58.6619 5.0030 0.5323 48 1167.8448 437.3428 247.9024
24 64.6757 6.0139 1.0109 49 2065.9794 898.1346 460.7918
25 71.7794 7.1037 1.0898
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  Elbow point
Figure 7: Scree Plot
The appropriate number of clusters was confirmed at this point by subtracting the 
stage at which the change between group means becomes larger from the total number of
cases which represented the stage at which the agglomeration process began to join 
groups that were less alike and therefore homogeneity was diminished.  The clusters were
confirmed for this data by the formula below. 
Elbow point = No. of cases – Stage of Elbow = 50 – 46 = 4. (Eq. 2)
The number of states in each cluster and exact cluster membership was outlined in table 
6.
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Table 6: Cluster membership
Cluster N = Members
1 13 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming
2 20 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia
3 6 California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, Washington
4 11 Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin
Castles and Obinger (2008) recommended following the hierarchical cluster 
process with a k-means clustering process to help confirm the cluster solution and verify
the variables that were important to it.  Specifying a four cluster solution from the Wards 
method above, k-means cluster analysis was conducted and the ANOVA table was 
selected for output.  Table 7 below outlined the cluster means and the significant 
variables from the analysis.  The variables significant to the solution were the total 
number of biofuel policies, the presence (or absence) of the following policy instruments:
contracting, corrective taxes, economic regulation, grants or grants in aid, information /
public information, market development, and tax expenditures.
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Table 7:  Cluster Variable Centers
Variable (K = 4) Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
No. of Biofuel Policies* 4 18 24 11
State Policy Portfolio - Coercion 1.732 1.779 1.750 1.673
State Policy Portfolio – Directness 2.361 2.296 2.333 2.428
Contracting* 0 0 0 0
Corrective taxes* 0 2 1 2
Direct government 0 0 0 0
Direct loans 0 1 0 0
Economic regulation* 1 3 5 1
Government corporation 0 0 0 0
Grants / Grants in aid* 1 4 3 1
Information / Public information* 1 2 3 2
Market Development* 1 4 3 2
Social regulation 0 1 2 1
Tax expenditures* 1 2 7 2
*Denotes those instruments that were significant to the creation of the clusters.
Notes: Cluster membership remained the same from the Hierarchical to the k-means test
Variables with asterisks are significant to the p ≤ .05 level on an ANOVA F-test. 
Table 8 below identified the policy instruments that act as distinguishing
characteristics for each cluster.  They offer insight into the policy instruments a state
chooses to conduct its business and how much intervention each state was willing to 
make in the biofuel policy arena, what instruments it preferred and its philosophy
regarding the appropriate role for state government in the biofuel policy arena.  While
there were a number of characteristics introduced into the cluster analysis those that 
proved to be important distinguishing characteristics included the total number of
policies, the relative absence of contracting (only one state, Washington, used that 
instrument), the use of corrective taxes, economic regulation, grants / grants-in-aid, 
information / public information, market development, and tax expenditures.  The average
number of instruments per state in each cluster is also available in table 8.
The weighting scheme discussed above was applied to each group / cluster. 
Recall that it converts the high, medium, and low directness and coercion scale of each 
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instrument as assigned by Salamon and multiplies that times the number of instruments of 
the particular type.  The resulting index allows allowed comparisons to be made between 
clusters on the dimensions of coercion and directness.  The results were outlined below in 
table 8.  The paragraphs that follow detailed each cluster and how the results indicate the
approach to biofuel policy taken by states within the cluster.
Table 8: Cluster Characteristics
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Total
Instrument N % N % N % N % N %
CN* 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 1 0%
CT* 3 8% 18 12% 9 8% 31 23% 61 16%
DG 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 1 0%
DL 2 5% 6 4% 3 3% 5 4% 16 4%
ER* 4 11% 23 15% 20 17% 11 8% 58 15%
GC 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0%
GR* 3 8% 21 14% 24 21% 9 7% 57 15%
PI* 7 19% 28 18% 14 12% 32 24% 81 21%
MD* 8 22% 21 14% 21 18% 18 14% 68 17%
SR 6 16% 13 8% 7 6% 4 3% 30 8%
TE* 4 11% 23 15% 17 15% 22 17% 66 17%
37 9% 154 39% 116 30% 133 34% 440 100%
Ave. # of policies 2.85 7.7 19.3 12.1 8.8
per state
Instrument D++ C++ D C D C D C D C
CN* 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
CT* 6 6 36 36 18 18 62 62 122 122
DG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ER* 12 12 69 69 60 60 33 33 174 174
GC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GR* 3 6 21 42 24 48 9 18 57 114
PI* 21 7 84 28 42 14 96 32 243 81
MD* 24 8 63 21 63 21 54 18 207 68
SR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TE* 8 4 46 23 34 17 44 22 132 66
Ave. Directness / 2.49 1.73 2.38 1.77 2.29 1.78 2.44 1.58 2.38 1.71
Coercion Level 
* denotes those instruments significant to the cluster analysis
++D = Directness;  ++C = Coercion
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Cluster characteristics
Cluster 1 included the thirteen states of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming.  The states in this cluster accounted for only 37 policies or
9% of all state level biofuel policies, an average of nearly three policies per state.  Though 
the number of policies per state was the smallest of the four clusters, the states‘ portfolio 
indicated they have chosen to use instruments that are more direct than the other clusters.  
There was a variety of evidence to support this claim.  First, the instrument directness 
index for cluster 1 is the highest among all the clusters and lies above the mean for all
instruments.  The second point of evidence was that of the eight types of instruments used 
in this cluster, four were highly direct instruments (market development, information /
public information, economic regulation, and direct loans).  Instruments in cluster 1 were
market development, information / public information and economic regulation and are
high in the directness dimension.  The fourth instrument, social regulation, is only
moderate on the directness dimension 
There were differences in coercion levels within the instruments chosen in each 
cluster.  Cluster 1 had the second lowest index for coercion at 1.73.  Three of the eight 
instruments in cluster 1, market development, information / public information, and tax
expenditures, were categorized as having low levels of coercion and constitute a little 
over half of the cluster‘s portfolio (n= 9) (Salamon 2002b).  
What did this package of policy instruments mean for biofuel policy making in 
this cluster of states?  It appeared to indicate a willingness on the part of the policy
makers to intervene directly in the market while not applying direct coercive pressure to 
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the interested parties.  The total number of instruments would also indicate an awareness 
of the need to develop biofuel policies for each state in the cluster.
Cluster 2 was the largest of the clusters with twenty states.  These states included 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.  It had slightly more than one-third of the policy
instruments but only averaged approximately seven instruments per state.  Michigan was 
the state in the cluster with the most policies in its portfolio with a total of eleven.  The
states with the fewest policies were Ohio and Louisiana with five each.  Information /
public information instruments accounted for 28 percent of the policies in the portfolio of 
this cluster.  Tax expenditures and economic regulation each accounted for 15 percent of 
the portfolio. These instruments were followed closely by grants / grants-in-aid and 
market development at 14 percent each.  The only two instruments that were not included 
in this cluster‘s portfolios were contracting and direct government.  This cluster was at 
the mean for levels of instrument directness at 2.38 and only slightly higher than the mean 
on the dimension of coercion at 1.63.  While only two instrument categories were not 
used by states in this cluster, the cluster presented a picture of preferred instrument 
choice.  Fifty percent of the instruments fell within the top three categories:  information /
public information, economic regulation and tax expenditures.  This indicated that the
policy makers in the states in this cluster did not appear to be as willing to experiment 
with policy instruments as those in the other clusters.  They appeared to find the
instruments that worked well for them and used them consistently.  Whether, as some
instrument literature maintains, this was ideological in nature remains to be seen (Peters 
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and Linder 1998; Schneider and Ingram 1990).  It did appear to present a distinct pattern 
in this cluster, however.  
Cluster 3 was the smallest cluster with only six of the fifty states and consisted of
California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, and Washington.  Five of the six states 
came together in the first step of the clustering process with Indiana, the state with the 
most biofuel policies in the nation at 24, appeared to be an outlier and came in at the next 
stage of the analysis.  Outliers in cluster analysis were not considered detrimental to 
analysis because their position may represent real differences in the groups that should be
included (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Bailey 1994).  The total number of policy
instruments in this cluster was 116 creating an average number of instruments in each 
state‘s portfolio that is the highest of all the clusters at slightly over 19 instruments per
state.  It appeared that the cluster algorithm relied heavily on the number of policy
instruments within the portfolio as well as the policy instruments of grants / grants-in-aid, 
market development, economic regulation, and tax expenditures.  These instruments 
made up nearly 71 percent of the total policies in this cluster‘s portfolio.  Only two 
instruments, direct government and government corporations, were not included within 
the policy portfolio of this cluster.  Cluster 3 had the highest level of coercion among the 
four clusters at 1.78.  Directness of its portfolio was the lowest among the clusters at 2.29.  
Cluster 3 included a diverse group of instruments within the portfolio, the relatively high 
level of coercive instruments and the low level of direct instruments indicated a tendency
of the policy makers to prefer lower levels of direct government intervention while 
relying on incentives and inducements common to coercive instruments to modify
behavior of interested biofuel policy parties.  
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Cluster 4 had the second highest number of instruments in its biofuel policy
portfolio with 133 instruments and included the eleven states of Kansas, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin.  The average number of instruments in the portfolios of 
the eleven states was slightly over twelve per state.  Twenty-four percent of the cluster‘s 
portfolio consisted of information / public information instruments.  Corrective taxes 
made up 23 percent of the portfolio followed by tax expenditures which makes up another
17 percent of the cluster‘s policy portfolio.  Market development and economic regulation 
instruments were 14 percent and 8 percent of the portfolio respectively.  The portfolio of 
cluster 4 was the second most directed cluster of the four just behind cluster 1.  The
coerciveness of its instruments is the lowest among the four clusters and is well below the 
mean of all instruments.  It appeared that the states in this cluster preferred direct 
intervention over behavioral change of citizens and they relied heavily on public
information as a biofuel policy mechanism.  
In order to make the interpretation of the models below more straightforward and 
to clarify the results conceptually, each cluster was named.  The label given was 
representative of the characteristics of each group.  The characteristics of cluster 1 
indicated that it is comprised of a group of 13 highly conventional adopters that have a
preference for both less government intervention (as demonstrated by the number of 
instruments) as well as a preference for instruments that allowed for direct intervention 
with little or no coercion.  Cluster 1 was therefore labeled the conventional group in the
multinomial regression analysis.  
87
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
Cluster 2 presented characteristics that included preferred instrument choice and a
middle-of-the-road approach to government intervention and coercion.  Each state in the 
cluster had a moderate number of policies with an average of seven per state.  Because of 
the preferred instrument choices and moderated approach to intervention, states in cluster 
2 were labeled as ―non-experimenters.‖
Cluster 3 was the group of states that clearly prefers behavior modification over 
direct intervention.  The states in this cluster relied on inducements to change behaviors 
and they did not appear to have traditional or clear instrument preferences.  They were
more reliant on market approaches than the other clusters.  The states in cluster 3 were
labeled as ―experimental inducers‖ for each state‘s willingness to experiment with 
different instruments and their reliance on behavioral inducements.  
Finally, states in cluster 4 were those with a preference for direct intervention of
government in the biofuel policy arena.  The evidence presented for this above indicated 
that these states tended to intervene directly through both the number and types of 
instruments.  This tendency among the states in this cluster led to the label of ―direct 
interveners.‖
These four groups of states served as the dependent variable upon which the
impact of the independent variables was examined.  The groupings represented distinct 
groups of like-minded policy states which were expected to exhibit different instrument 
choices based on the dimensions of coercion or directness of instruments.   
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Independent Variables
The independent variables fell into four categories intended to measure the
variables‘ potential impacts on instrument choice.  Each variable is discussed in the order 
of appearance in the model.  The order represented a decision to arrange the variables in 
order of those that were traditional variables explored in public administration and public
policy literature such as economic and political variables to those that were not as 
traditional and not well explored, the political culture and ideological variables and the 
New Public Management variables.  These variables were examined independently and 
then as part of the group.
Economic Variables 
Economic variables were selected for inclusion because they measured both a
state‘s capacity for policy making and the impact of particular economic sectors in a 
state‘s economy.  Much of the policy research conducted to date has found that states that 
are wealthier have higher policy making capacity than those states that are less wealthy, 
see for example work by Dye, Hwong and Gray or Daley and Garand (Hwang and Gray
1991; Daley and Garand 2005; Dye 2001, 1966).  To attempt to understand the policy
instrument choice without including economic variables internal to each state would have
led to serious misspecification of the proposed model.  Additionally, the economic
variables specifically related to the underlying theories of this research because they
shaped the policy making environment, helped to determine who would receive policy
benefits and shaped those benefits through available fiscal resources.  While the policy
instrument literature referred to economics as having an impact on the development of 
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tools, no work had been done to examine those variables in the context of state policy
making until now.  The hypothesized negative relationship appears to fly in the face of 
past research in policymaking which found that states with higher policy capacity as 
measured by state wealth also had more policies.  However, it is assumed here that states 
with higher capacity choose instruments that are less traditional and therefore less 
coercive and less direct.  As such, this model included a measure of state wealth, state per 
capita income (SPCI).  The source for these data was the United States Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and the year was for 2003 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008).  The
hypotheses that relate to this variable follow:  
H1C = States with higher per capita income will have biofuel policies that are
lower in coercion than states with lower per capita income.
H1D = States with higher per capita income will have biofuel policies that are
lower in directness than states with lower per capita income.
As is discussed below in the section on the multinomial regression procedures, this 
variable was converted to the natural log of per capita income (LnSPCI) in order to 
correct for the non-linearity of the variable.
States that were dependent upon certain economic sectors for wealth production 
were expected to develop instruments that were favorable to those sectors whereby
members of favored sectors received the policy benefits and those members in disfavored 
sectors often bore the burdens of a policy (Schneider and Ingram 1993).  To measure this 
effect, therefore, the model included the percent of the gross state product (GSP) derived 
from both agricultural production (PCTGSPA) and manufacturing (PCTGSPM).  These
variables were calculated by dividing the total sectoral GSP by the state‘s total GSP.  The
source for these data is the U. S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Bureau of Economic
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Analysis 2008).  The year used in the calculation was 2003.  The hypotheses related to 
these variables were as follows:
H2C = States with a higher percent of Gross State Product (GSP) derived from 
agricultural production will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion 
than states that have a lower percent of GSP derived from agricultural 
production.
H2D = States with a higher percent of Gross State Product (GSP) derived from 
agricultural production will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness 
than states that have a lower percent of GSP derived from agricultural 
production.
H3C = States with a higher percent of GSP derived from manufacturing production 
will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states with a lower
percent of GSP derived from manufacturing production.  
H3D = States with a higher percent of GSP derived from manufacturing production 
will have biofuel policies that are lower in directness than states with a lower 
percent of GSP derived from manufacturing production.  
The circumstances of transportation within each state were expected to impact the
types of biofuel instruments adopted.  States that had higher transportation pressures, as 
measured by high per capita gasoline or diesel consumption were expected to have highly
directed and coercive policy instruments which represent strong, direct state efforts to 
address the need for alternative fuels.  This was expected to result from a number of
factors including environmental stresses and commuting issues.  Two variables were
included to measure this usage, per capita gasoline and per capita special fuels such as 
diesel by state, PCGU and PCGD respectively.  These data were for 2003 and the source
for them was the U. S. Department of Energy, the Energy Information Agency (EIA).  
The hypotheses for these variables were as follows:
H4C = States with higher per capita gasoline use will have biofuel policies that 
are higher in coercion than states that are lower in per capita gasoline use.
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H4D = States with higher per capita gasoline use will have biofuel policies that 
are higher in directness than states with lower in per capita gasoline use. 
H5C = States with higher per capita diesel use will have biofuel policies that are
higher in coercion than states that are lower in per capita diesel use.
H5C = States with higher per capita diesel use will have biofuel policies that are
higher in directness than states with lower in per capita diesel use. 
Biofuel production in the United States is dependent upon three sources types of 
feedstock:  corn, sorghum, and soybeans.  States that produced large amounts of those
crops were expected to have biofuel policies that were favorable to farmers and biofuel 
producers in order to take greater economic advantage of these crops by adding
production value.  The extant instrument literature indicated that because these groups 
were favored within these states they should derive more benefit than burden within the 
policy making environment of the state (Ingram et al. 2007).  Additionally, a review of 
policy goals favored by farmers and farm groups indicate strong support for energy tax
incentives that favor small to large producers of renewable fuels and research into second 
generation biofuel production facilities (American Farm Bureau Federation 2008).  The
tax expenditure instrument is identified by Salamon as being low in coercion and 
moderate in direct government delivery.  Because these particular instruments are favored 
by the economic sector that produces the feedstock, it is expected to manifest in biofuel 
instruments that are both higher in directness and lower in coercion.  As a result, a
variable was included to capture this information, per capita feedstock production which 
was the total of bushels of corn, sorghum, and soybean production divided by state
population (PCSP).  The sources for this variable was the U. S. Department of 
92
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Agriculture 2002 Agriculture Census and 2002 state population per the U. S. Census 
Bureau (United States Department of Agriculture 2008; United States Census Bureau 
2008).  The hypotheses for this variable were as follows:
H6C = States with a higher per capita feedstock production will have biofuel 
policies that are lower in coercion than states with lower per capita corn 
and sorghum production.
H6D = States with a higher per capita feedstock production will have biofuel 
policies that are higher in directness than states with lower per capita corn 
and sorghum production.
The percent of state employment derived from the agriculture (PCTEMPA) and 
manufacturing (PCTEMPM) sectors was expected to influence biofuel policy instruments 
choice.  Those states with higher dependence on either sector for economic growth should 
have chosen policy instruments that favor those industries.  Again, according to Ingram 
and Schneider, the target groups upon which an individual state relied on as an economic
driver should have policies favorable in terms of benefits to those groups (Ingram et al. 
2007).  As discussed in regards to the feedstock variable, those states that are dependent 
on agricultural employment are predicted to choose instruments that favor that sector, 
particularly those that are lower in coercion and higher in directness than states less 
dependent on agricultural employment.  
The relationship between biofuel instrument choice and manufacturing
employment was predicted to differ somewhat from agricultural employment.  The
National Association of Manufacturers have proposed specific policy instruments that are
less coercive and encourage private development of an alternative energy market (McCoy
2007).  The U. S. Chamber of Commerce also supported a strong market approach to 
biofuel development.  Therefore the relationship of manufacturing employment to both 
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coercion and directness was expected to be negative.  The source for these variables was 
information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the data were from the year 2003.  
The hypotheses for these variables follow.
H7C = States with higher percentages of state employment that are based on 
agriculture will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states 
with lower percentages of employment based on agricultural production.
H7D = States with higher percentages of state employment that are based on 
agriculture will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than 
states with lower percentages of employment based on agricultural 
production.
H8C = States with higher percentages of state employment based on 
manufacturing will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than 
states with lower percentages of employment based on manufacturing
production.
H8D = States with higher percentages of state employment based on 
manufacturing will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than 
states with lower percentages of employment based on manufacturing
production.
Political Interest Variables
Political interest groups were expected to have strong influences on the types of 
policy instruments chosen.  The influence of interest groups has long been seen as an 
integral part of the policy process (Kingdon 2003; Dye 2001).  Each group discussed in 
relation to this research had particular policy instrument choices.  Agricultural groups, as 
represented by legislative goals of the American Farm Bureau, favored biofuel policy
instruments such as tax expenditures that are low in coercion and moderate in direct 
government intervention.  The business interests appeared to favor market based policy
instruments that are less direct and coercive than the agricultural policy instruments.   
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Environmental groups favor economic and social regulations, and labeling instruments 
which are higher along both dimensions of coercion and directness.  
State-level structures such as the legislatures and bureaucracies, elite opinion, and 
citizen membership in interest groups should impact policy instrument choice because 
these groups had different goals for biofuel policy and different strengths in the 
statehouses (Erikson et al. 1993).  Therefore, variables to measure these impacts were
included.  The structural variables included a measure of state level interest group 
influences from Thomas‘ and Hrebenar‘s study of interest groups in the fifty states 
(Thomas and Hrebenar 1999, 2008).  This survey asked state level experts, primarily
political science professors, to identify the most influential and effective interest groups 
in each state.  These same experts were asked to rank each group on effectiveness, 
creating categories of most effective and effective.  A dummy variable was used that 
indicated whether agricultural (IGATH), general business (IGMTH), and environmental 
(IGETH) organizations were among the most effective.  Each interest group had distinct 
policy instrument choices and as a result the influence of the more powerful group should 
result in relationships that demonstrate that group‘s instrument preferences along the 
coercion and directness dimension.  The hypotheses related to the variables follow.
H9C = States where agricultural interest group influence is identified as most 
effective will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states 
where agricultural interest group effectiveness is not ranked as most 
effective.
H9D = States where agricultural group influence is identified as most effective
will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than those states 
where agricultural interest group effectiveness is not ranked as most 
effective.
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H10C = States where manufacturing interest group influence is identified as most 
effective will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states 
where manufacturing interest group effectiveness is not ranked as most 
effective.
H10D = States where manufacturing interest group influence is identified as most 
effective will have biofuel policies that are lower in directness than states 
where manufacturing interest group effectiveness is not ranked as most 
effective.
H11C = States where environmental interest group influence is identified as most 
effective will have biofuel policies that are higher in coercion than states 
where environmental interest group effectiveness is not ranked as most 
effective.
H11D = States where environmental interest group influence is identified as most 
effective will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than states 
where environmental interest group effectiveness is not ranked as most 
effective
State level elite opinion of interest group priorities was also expected to impact 
the types of biofuel instruments chosen.  Elite policy makers rely upon the input and 
guidance of policy communities such as interest groups, particularly in technical areas 
like biofuels (Moe 1989; Kingdon 2003; Peters 1995).  To measure elite opinion, voter
scorecards for three interest groups were used:  the American Farm Bureau Scorecards, 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the League of Conservation Voters.  
The elite opinion of agriculture (EOAI) variable was selected to represent the
support for agriculture and was measured by the scorecard from the American Farm 
Bureau from the 108th Congress which included the votes for the 2003 and 2004 sessions.  
This scorecard presented the percentage of votes by a representative in support of the
American Farm Bureaus‘ policy positions.  These scores were averaged for each state‘s 
delegation and represented overall support for agriculture among the state elite.  The
agricultural elite opinion hypotheses follow.
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H12C = States with higher average elite opinion regarding agricultural issues will 
have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states with lower elite 
opinion regarding agricultural issues.
H12D = States with higher average elite opinion regarding agricultural issues will 
have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than states with lower 
elite opinion regarding agricultural issues.
The U. S. Chamber of Commerce scorecard represented how each member of 
nd thCongress voted during the 2 session, year 2004, of the 108 Congress (U. S. Chamber 
of Commerce 2006).  This elite opinion business community (EOBC) variable was the 
average percentage of each member‘s support for a state‘s delegation or when the 
representative voted to support the Chamber‘s position on particular bills.  The higher 
average delegation percentage represents higher levels of support by the delegation for 
positions of business and commerce. The hypotheses for this variable follow.
H13C = States with higher average elite opinion regarding business / commerce
issues will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states with 
lower elite opinion regarding business / commerce issues.
H13D = States with higher average elite opinion regarding business / commerce
issues will have biofuel policies that are lower in directness than states 
with lower elite opinion regarding business / commerce issues.
The elite opinion on environmental issues (EOEN) variable was also represented 
by a voter scorecard.  Elite support for environmental issues was developed from the
League of Conservation Voters scorecard (League of Conservation Voters 2006).  Similar 
to the Chamber of Commerce and American Farm Bureau scorecard, the score presented 
represented the percentage of votes in support of League issues.  LCV votes for the years 
2003 and 2004, which included both sessions of the 108th Congress, were used to 
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calculate an average of each state delegations support for environmental issues.  The
hypotheses pertaining to elite environmental support follow.
H14C = States with higher average elite opinion regarding environmental issues 
will have biofuel policies that are higher in coercion than states with lower
elite opinion regarding environmental issues.
H14D = States with higher average elite opinion regarding environmental issues 
will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than states with 
lower elite opinion regarding environmental issues.
The concentration of interest group membership among state citizens was 
expected to impact the biofuel policy instruments chosen within each state because it has 
long been held that higher concentrations of interest group members represented stronger 
influences on policy making (Gray et al. 2004; Olson 1965, 1971).  As a result, variables 
regarding those memberships were included in the model.  Each year in November, the 
American Farm Bureau printed each state‘s membership in its bi-monthly magazine, FB 
News.  The Farm Bureau‘s membership data for each state was collected from the FB 
News for the year 2003 is used to create a variable (FBMEM) to measure this impact.  
This variable was calculated on a per capita basis by dividing the membership number by
the state‘s 2002 population estimated from the U. S. Census Bureau.  The hypotheses for
this variable follow.
H15C = States with higher levels of Farm Bureau memberships per capita will have
biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states with lower per capita
Farm Bureau memberships.
H15C = States with higher levels of Farm Bureau memberships per capita will have
biofuel policies that are higher in directness than states with lower per 
capita Farm Bureau memberships.
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The level of business concentration (BUMEM) by state is expected to influence
the types of biofuel policy instruments chosen by state level policy makers.  There was no 
data for membership in Chamber of Commerce available because of the independent 
structures of state-level Chamber organizations.  As a proxy for this measure, the number 
of employer firms by state was collected from the Small Business Administration office
of advocacy for the year 2003. This data represent all employer firms, regardless of size
or sector, within each state.  This variable was then divided by the state‘s per capita
income from the U. S. Census Bureau to create a per capita measure.  The hypotheses for
this variable were as follows.  
H16C = States with higher levels of business concentration per capita will have
biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states with lower per capita
business concentration.  
H16D = States with higher levels of business concentration per capita will have
biofuel policies that are lower in directness than states with lower per 
capita business concentration.  
The levels of membership in environmental groups (EVMEM) were expected to 
have a different impact on the choice of biofuel policy than membership levels of 
agriculture and business concentration because of its members‘ particular goals.  The 
process for calculating this variable used 2003 membership data from the Sierra Club for
each state which was divided by that state‘s population.  The hypotheses for
environmental membership per capita follow.
H17C = States with higher levels of environmental group membership per capita
will have biofuel policies that are higher in coercion than states with lower
per capita environmental group membership.  
H17D = States with higher levels of environmental group membership per capita
will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than states with 
lower per capita environmental group membership.    
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Political Culture Variables
Political culture variables are discussed first and then followed by the ideological 
variables.  This research used Elazar‘s three-part framework of Moralistic –
Individualistic – Traditionalistic cultures to measure political culture.  (Elazar 1966, 
1984).  A series of dummy variables (EAPC) were used to represent the three variables 
and moralistic culture was used the reference groups.  Daniel Elazar hypothesized that in 
states whose dominant political culture was moralistic, there should be evidence of a
policy making environment that is more amenable to direct, strong government 
intervention in public policy problems.  As a result, the relationship hypothesized 
between political culture and policy instrument choice based on the two dimensions of 
coercion and directness was predicted to indicate Elazar‘s hypothesis.  States with a
political culture was predominantly moralistic should favor biofuel policy instruments 
that are both more coercive and direct than states whose predominant political culture is 
individualistic or traditionalistic.  The hypotheses to investigate this possibility follow.
H18C = States whose political culture is traditionalistic will have biofuel policies 
that are lower in coercion than states whose political culture is ranked as 
moralistic.  
H18D = States whose political culture is traditionalistic will have biofuel policies 
that are lower in directness than states whose political culture is moralistic.
H19C = States whose political culture is individualistic will have biofuel policies 
that are lower in coercion than states whose political culture is moralistic.
H19D = States whose political culture is individualistic have biofuel policies that 
are lower in directness than states whose political culture is moralistic.
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Political Ideology Variables
A measure of political ideology was necessary to develop a picture of the state
policy making climate and explore the relationships between policy instrument choice
and ideology.  It is widely held that liberal states enact more policies than conservative
states because the political environment is favorable to government intervention.  If this is 
true, then this phenomenon should translate to the instrument choice dimensions as well
with liberal states choosing more coercive and direct instruments than conservative states.
While party has sometimes been used to characterize a public official‘s 
ideological position, a more complete picture of the state‘s political ideology was 
necessary.  One measure that has been used was to examine data from state Congressional 
data based on the National Journal‘s annual ranking of members of Congress‘ ideology as 
a proxy for state political ideology (National Journal 2006).  However, the assumption 
that these rankings were valid measures of state level ideology may not be true.  As 
suggested by Berry et al, the rankings relied upon the idea that there was a strong
relationship between state party and individual Congress members‘ actions and activities 
(Berry et al. 1998).  With evidence to counter the contention that a strong link existed 
between state ideology and Congressional ideology, Berry et al developed a measure of 
state elite or state government ideology (Berry et al. 1998; Arnold 1990).  These data on 
state level elite ideology (ISCD) were collected from the Institute for Policy and Social 
Research (IPSR) of the University of Kansas (Lindquist 2007).  This variable is on a scale 
of 0 to 100 with 100 equal to the most liberal position and 0 equal to the most
conservative position (Lindquist 2007).  The hypotheses for this variable are as follows.   
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H20C = States whose elite ideology is more conservative will have biofuel policies
that are lower coercion than states whose elite ideology is more liberal.
H20D = States whose elite ideology is more conservative will have biofuel policies
that are lower in directness than states whose elite ideology is more liberal.
Unified Party Control (UPC) of the state policy making system was expected to 
create a policy making environment favorable to the use of either coercive policy
instruments or instruments of direct government control.  The states with unified 
Republican Party control were expected to favor less direct and less coercive than states 
with unified Democratic Party control.  While there were a variety of measures that could 
have been used, the most comprehensive and reliable measure is the Ranney Index (Gray
and Hanson 2008; Ranney 1965).  The original index was introduced in 1965 and 
accounted for length of control, amount of electoral success as well as divided legislative
control.  The index was updated by Gray and Hanson for the period of 2003 - 2006 and 
was collected from the IPSR of the University of Kansas (Lindquist 2007; Gray and 
Hanson 2008).  The index runs from 0 (complete Republican control) to 1 (complete 
Democratic control) with 0.50 equal to evenly split control.  The hypotheses for unified 
control are as follows.
H21C = States whose policy making system is under unified Republic Party
Control will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states 
whose policy making system is under unified Democratic Party Control.  
H21D = States whose policy making system is under unified Republic Party
Control will have biofuel policies that are lower in directness than states 
whose policy making system is under unified Democratic Party Control.  
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New Public Management Adoption Measures
The mantra of the NPM movements is more steering and less rowing.  This was 
understood to mean that the role of government was to act as partner and not as direct 
intervener when addressing public problems.  As discussed earlier, whether or not this has 
translated to actual instrument choice has remained relatively unexplored.  The
relationship between NPM adoption and biofuel policy instruments is expected to be
negative because high NPM adoption should reflect the basic NPM ―stering‖ philosophy
and result in biofuel instrument choices that require less coercive and direct government 
intervention
Two sources are used to examine the impact of New Public Management (NPM) 
adoption by individual states.  Much of the literature that addressed instrument theory and 
NPM reforms suggested that there should be a distinct pattern in the types of policies 
adopted by states with high levels of NPM reforms (Kettl 2002; Peters 2000).  The first 
variable (ASAPI) was derived from the American State Administrators Project survey
and was an index created in a study by Brudney, Hebert, and Wright (Brudney and Hebert 
1998).  This index ranged from a high of 1, indicating that all state level managers agreed 
that their state was involved in NPM reforms to a low of  0.14 indicating that only 14 
percent of the state level managers agreed that the reforms were implemented (Brudney et 
al. 1999).  Subsequently, states whose NPM reform index is high should have biofuel 
policies that are higher in coercion and lower in directness than those states whose NPM
reform index is much lower.  The hypotheses follow.  
H22C = States whose administrators perceive the state as having widely adopted 
New Public Management (NPM) techniques will have biofuel policies that 
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are higher in coercion than those states whose administrators do not 
perceive wide adoption of New Public Management (NPM) techniques.
H22D = States whose administrators perceive the state as having widely adopted 
New Public Management (NPM) techniques will have biofuel policies that 
are lower in directness than those states whose administrators do not 
perceive wide adoption of New Public Management (NPM) techniques.
Also created from the American State Administrators Project by Brudney, Hebert 
and Wright was a second index (ASAPII) from the American State Administrators project 
which captured the adoption of  eleven key reinvention components including customer 
service training programs, customer satisfaction measures, TQM or total quality
improvement systems, the development and establishment of  programmatic benchmarks, 
strategic planning, changes in human resource rules, increased procurement flexibility
and discretion, privatization of programs, flexible fund management, decentralized 
decision making, and flattened hierarchical structure.  This measure was an additive index
of policy adoption and was found to be related to the first by Brudney but not perfectly.  
It served as a secondary measure of  NPM adoption within the state for this research 
(Brudney et al. 1999).  It was expected that those states with higher levels of adoption of
specific NPM components have biofuel policies that were both more coercive and less 
direct than those states with lower level of component adoption.  
H23C = States whose NPM component adoption scale is higher will have biofuel 
policies that are more coercive than those states whose NPM component 
adoption scale is lower.
H23D = States whose NPM component adoption scale is higher will have biofuel 
policies that are less direct than those states whose NPM component 
adoption scale is lower.  
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An important note to make regarding these data is that the indices date from an article
published in 1999.  This was the oldest data used. It was decided to examine it to see if it 
was influential to the model and to add a second measure of NPM reform to confirm any
reform effects.
The second measure of NPM reform by states selected was performance grades 
assigned to states of the Government Performance Project (GPP), a study sponsored by
the Pew Center on the States which assessed the quality of state management across four
categories including money, people, infrastructure, and information.  These categories 
were assessed across various NPM criteria of budget process transparency, balance, 
effective contracting and procurement processes, managing employee performance, 
capital planning, and public access to e-government (Government Performance Project 
2005). The expectation was that states that embraced the NPM tenets and adopted NPM 
practices as indicated by higher scores on the GPP scales were more likely to adopt the
types of biofuel policies that resemble those NPM tenets including policies that are less 
directed and coercive than those states who have lower levels of tenet adoption.  The
overall score and sub-scores were included here in case particular categories of adoption 
proved to be more influential than other categories.  The scale used by the GPP employs 
grades ranging from A to F including minuses and pluses.  The numeric coding for these
grades are outlined in the table below.  However, as is discussed in the section on the
multinomial regression analysis, the converted grading scale could not be used and the 
scores had to be grouped in low, medium and high categories of reform.
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Table 9:  Coding for Government Performance Project Variables
Grade Numeric Code
A 12
A- 11
B+ 10
B 9
B- 8
C+ 7
C 6
C- 5
D+ 4
D 3
D- 2
F 1
The five variables, overall, money score, people score, infrastructure score and 
information score were expected to impact the types of instruments chosen in a similar 
manner as ASAPI, in that those states that whose performance was rated higher on the
five variables were expected to have instruments that were more coercive and less direct 
as reflected in the hypotheses below.  
H24C = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project (GPP) 
Overall Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that are
higher in coercion than those states whose GPP score is lower.
H24D = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project Overall
Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that are lower in 
directness than those states whose score is lower.
H25C = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project Money
Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that are higher in 
coercion than those states whose GPP score is lower.
H25D = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Money
Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that are lower in 
directness than those states whose score is lower.
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H26C = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project People 
Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that are higher in 
coercion than those states whose GPP score is lower.
H26D = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project People 
Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that are lower in 
directness than those states whose score is lower.
H27C = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project 
Infrastructure Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies 
that are higher in coercion than those states whose GPP score is lower.
H27D = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project 
Infrastructure Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies 
that are lower in directness than those states whose score is lower.
H28C = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project 
Information Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that 
are lower in coercion than those states whose GPP score is lower.
H28D = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project 
Information Performance measure is higher will have biofuel policies that 
are lower in directness than those states whose score is lower.
Bivariate correlations of the independent variables
The number of proposed independent variables introduced in the model is large
and it is expected that there would be significant relationships among the independent 
variables.  As a method to develop a stronger understanding of the proposed independent 
variables and their interrelationships, bivariate correlations were run among the variables.  
This was a  necessary step to eliminate some independent variables to develop both model 
parsimony and eliminate collinearity issues that may arise during the model building
phase.  A table of the complete bivariate correlations is presented in Appendix A.  
During the bivariate correlation analysis, a number of relationships indicated that 
these variables were well chosen for their likely impact on biofuel policy.  Agricultural 
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variables had significant relationships, correlations significant to the 0.05 level on a two 
tailed test, both within the economic variables as well as with the political interests, 
cultural and ideological variables.  The expected correlations and relationships were
found in states where per capita feedstock was high between the percent of agricultural 
gross state product, percent of agricultural employment, agricultural interest group 
influence and dominance.  Surprisingly, there were no relationship between per capita
feedstock production and per capita farm bureau membership while the relationships 
between farm bureau membership and other agricultural variables were positive and 
significant.  This finding likely indicated that those states that were heavily agricultural, 
such as the south and west, and that have high farm bureau memberships were not 
producing the traditional feedstocks of corn, sorghum, and soybeans that were associated 
with biofuel production.  Only agricultural variables had significant and positive 
correlations with per capita gasoline and diesel usage, significance was at the 0.05 level 
on a two tailed test.  This relationship may indicate agricultural dependence on these
products but more importantly, it should result in biofuel policy instruments within 
agricultural states that are more direct and coercive than in other states as predicted by the 
hypotheses in Chapter IV.  A surprising link between agriculture and manufacturing was 
also indicated by the Farm Bureau membership variable which was positively and 
significantly related to percent GSP manufacturing even though there appeared to be few 
other significant correlations between agriculture and manufacturing in the data.  States 
that are rural and in which agriculture is a dominant economic sector, state per capita
income is often lower than in non-agricultural states (Browne 2001).  Indeed there was 
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evidence for that with a strong and inverse relationship between agriculture and per capita
income with correlations significant at 0.05 level on a two tailed test.  
The business and manufacturing variables generally held the same patterns among
the variables as expected with a few interesting deviations.  States with higher gross state
product in the manufacturing sector had lower state per capita incomes overall indicating
perhaps a wage gap for states that were reliant upon manufacturing compared to those 
states that have a more diverse economic base.  Conversely, states with high levels of 
business concentration had positive and significant relationships to state per capita
income.  While business concentration was significantly correlated with GSP
manufacturing it exhibited a negative relationship with manufacturing.  The percent of 
state employment due to manufacturing and interest group dominance was negatively
related to the 0.05 level.  However, there was a positive relationship between percent 
employment in manufacturing and business interest group influence.  Finally, business 
interest group influence was strongly but negatively related to states that are classified as 
individualistic according to Elazar‘s typology.
Elite opinion on the environment was the only one of the elite opinion variables 
that was positively and significantly related to state per capita income.  Both elite opinion 
for agriculture and business were strongly related to state per capita income but both were
in the negative direction indicating that states with stronger environmental support were
also states with the wealthier citizens overall.  The remaining political interest variables 
indicated significant and expected relationships.  Agricultural interests dominated in 
states where agricultural activity was high and the same was true for manufacturing and 
business interests.  In states where business concentration was higher, as measured by
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firms per capita, the state per capita income was also significantly higher however the
gross state product derived from manufacturing was significantly and inversely related to 
business concentration.  
Daniel Elazar‘s political culture variables have their most consistent relationship 
to the state per capita income.  States that were classified as individualistic had 
significantly higher state per capita incomes than moralistic or traditionalistic states, 
significant to the 0.001 level.  This may offer support to Elazar‘s contention that 
individualistic states were more attuned to and driven by market forces than other states 
(Elazar 1994).  In contrast, the traditionalistic states had significantly lower per capita
incomes than other states, significant to the 0.001 level.  Traditionalistic states were
largely the southern states that were thought to be highly dependent on agriculture and 
manufacturing which could explain the correlation.  If that were the case, it would be
expected that the Traditionalistic indicator would be significantly related to the 
agricultural and manufacturing variables, which it was not.
The NPM reform variables indicated very few significant relationships except 
within the reform variables themselves.  There is a significant and positive relationship 
between the State Administrators Project Reform Index 1 which measures state managers 
perception of reform to state per capita income.  The Government Performance Project 
measure of human resource planning and administration reform was moderately
significant and positively related to business interest groups influence, significant to the 
.039 level.  There appeared to be no other significant relationships between any of the
NPM reform variables and the ideology variables indicating that the reforms taking place
in the states were independent of conservative or liberal ideologies.
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This examination of the bivariate correlations indicates strong interrelationships 
between the independent variables.  This leads to the conclusion that many of these
variables may well be measuring the same or similar phenomenon.  As a result, some of 
the variables can be eliminated from consideration in order to improve model parsimony
and reduce collinear effects.  Variables that are likely candidates for exclusion are the per 
capita gasoline use and per capita special diesel fuel use because they are highly
correlated with agricultural activity and their elimination will have little to no impact on 
the underlying theoretical model.
Multinomial Regression Analysis
As explained above, the dependent variable was developed through the cluster 
analysis technique which resulted in a non-ordered nominal or categorical dependent 
variable.  Since the dependent variable was not an interval measure, it was not appropriate 
to use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques.  The appropriate technique for
analyzing nominal data of this type was logistic regression analysis for dichotomous data 
in the case of two groups or, as was the case here with four groups, multinomial logistic 
regression analysis techniques for more than two groups.  Each technique compares the 
likelihood of group membership in a reference group versus the comparison group 
(Menard 2002).  Multinomial regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to produce
the probabilities of group membership based on the various independent variables 
(Borooah 2002; Garson 2008; Agresti 2002).  
The null hypothesis for a general logistic regression model was that there was no 
difference between the model with the intercept only or with no additional information 
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and the model with the additional independent variables (Borooah 2002; Menard 2002).  
This section offers a discussion of multinomial regression analysis with the general 
statistical forms of the regression equations that are produced, the diagnostic tools used to 
test for substantive importance and statistical significance of the model and variables.  
The rationale for the choice of reference group, a necessary decision for logistic
regression, was offered before moving to the issues of collinearity, linearity, and 
additivity that impact multinomial methods in a similar manner as ordinary least squares 
methods. Other issues unique to logistic regression techniques such as matrix issues or 
quasi-complete and complete data separation issues and the recommendations to address 
these issues were examined.  The procedure used to determine the variables for the final 
model and the reasons for this procedure were discussed. 
General forms of multinomial regression
Logistic regression procedures and statistics help researchers understand the
probability of one event occurring over another (Menard 2002).  The general statistical 
form of the simple logistic regression model as outlined by Peng et al is described below 
in equation 1 (Peng et al. 2002).
ln(P/(1-P)) = log(odds) = logit = α + βx (Eq. 3)
In this research, the specific statistical method of multinomial logistic regression 
helped to determine the probability of a state being a member of a group that chooses 
biofuel policy instruments that were more coercive over more direct biofuel instruments.  
This research had four groups as the dependent variable that were developed from the
cluster analysis:  the conventional, the non-experimenters, the experimental inducers and 
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the direct interventionists.  Multinomial logistic regression sets one group as the reference
group resulting in three separate equations to compare the impact of the independent 
variables on the probability of membership in one group over another.  The first decision 
that was necessary before proceeding to model development and selection was which of
the clusters to use as the reference group?  The literature provided little guidance in 
making this decision.  The choice could be made to use the cluster with the largest 
number of cases in it or to examine the group that allowed for theoretical exploration of
the research questions.  Both techniques are common for reference group choice in OLS
with dummy variables and multinomial logit methods (Hardy 1993; Borooah 2002).  
This research was concerned with understanding instrument choice based on the 
two dimensions of coercion and directness and not concerned with factors that may be
common to the largest group and the smaller groups.  It was appropriate, therefore, to 
look at the characteristics of each cluster‘s biofuel policies in order to make the decision 
with regard to reference group choice.  The cluster characteristics outlined in table 8 
offered the tool with which to make this type of choice of reference groups because it 
compares coercion and directness levels between clusters as well as average number of 
instruments chosen by each cluster.  
Based on the index of coercion and directness levels calculated for each cluster, 
the group of states that had the highest level of coercion was cluster 3 or the experimental 
inducers group (EI).  Cluster 1, the conventional (CO) group, had the highest level of 
directness.  Either one of these groups of states would make appropriate choices for the 
reference group.  The conventional group, however, has the lowest average number of 
policies per state of all four state groups indicating perhaps, as stated earlier, little 
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movement to adopt biofuel policies. The remaining two groups, the non-experimenters 
(NE) and the direct interveners (DI), are decidedly middle of the road among the groups 
of states.  Neither has the highest or lowest levels of coercion or directness as measured 
by the average coercion / directness index and the states within each group have not 
enacted large numbers of policies overall.  
The experimental inducers appeared to rely on more coercive instruments than the 
other clusters and the direct interveners, while their index on directness of portfolio was 
lower than that of the non-experimenters, the number of instruments in its portfolio was 
higher than the non-experimenters.  While the experimental inducers cluster was the 
smallest cluster of the four groups with only six states in the group, its reliance on 
coercive tools proved to be the most interesting because of the comparatively low 
numbers of coercive tools used in the other groups.  By examining the other groups in 
reference to the experimental inducers group, it was possible to draw conclusions
regarding both instrument dimensions.  As a precaution to ensure this choice did not
impact the results too much, however, once the variables were selected for the final 
model, analyses using different reference groups were conducted to see if the model is 
relatively stable between reference groups.  The results of those efforts are available in 
appendix B.  The parameter estimates were found to be stable regardless of the reference
group chosen.
The reference group of the experimental inducers was the group with the most 
coercive biofuel policy instrument portfolio.  The examination of the hypotheses outlined 
above required that the questions of coercion be examined through a comparison of the 
conventional states, non-experimenters, and direct interveners to the reference group of
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experimental inducers.  However, hypotheses dealing with questions of instrument 
directness were addressed through an examination of the relationships between those
states in the direct interveners and the experimental inducers group.
The general forms for multinomial regression equations are outlined below.  Each 
of the comparison groups will have a separate equation in the following general forms:
GConventionals = logit (the probability of a state being
in the Conventional group versus the (Eq. 4)
experimental inducers group.
Gnon-experimenters = logit (the probability of a state being
in the non-experimenters group versus the (Eq. 5)
experimental inducers group.
Gdirect interveners = logit (the probability of a state being
in the direct interveners groups group (Eq. 6)
versus the experimental inducers group.
Model development and diagnostics
The multinomial regression modeling procedure began by including all 31 
variables in the regression equation.  The output indicated that there were ―unexpected 
singularities in the Hessian matrix.‖  Multinomial regression output relies on the 
inversion of the Hessian matrix, which is the second derivative of the regression function 
(Survey, Statistics, and Psychometrics 2008) In order for the process to continue the 
resulting matrices that are calculated must be greater than zero or non-singular (Weisstein 
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2008b, 2008a).  The recommendation when this error was encountered was to build the
model from as few variables as possible or to use a manual stepwise procedure to develop 
the model  (Survey, Statistics, and Psychometrics 2008).  Therefore, the procedure here
was to build the final model through examining each group of variables, economic, 
political interest, cultural and ideological, and New Public Management to determine
which variables were significant within that group.  Then these variables were carried 
forward and combined to create the final model.  The inclusion criterion was based on the 
significance of each variable in the likelihood ratio test.  If a variable was insignificant to 
the model it was eliminated from consideration and the process continues until an 
acceptable model was developed.
A second issue to be addressed during the multinomial regression procedure was 
that of quasi-complete separation that indicated definitional overlaps in one of the
variables used in the calculation.  The recommendation to correct for this error is to 
isolate and identify the variable that was the cause and then to collapse the existing
categories into a smaller number of groups (Garson 2008).  The introduction of the
Government Performance Project variables was found to be the source of error.  To 
correct for this, the overall variable was eliminated and the remaining variables were
restructured into three categorical variables rather than the scale score given to it earlier.  
The format for this conversion is provided in table 10 and the final state results are in 
Appendix C.
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Table 10:  Recoding format for GPP Variables
Range Code Money Infrastructure Information People
Low 1 3 -7 3 – 7 3 – 6 4 – 7
Medium 2 8 8 7 8
High 3 9 – 12 9 – 12 8 – 11 9 - 17
As the model developed, the logistic regression diagnostics recommended by
Menard were conducted (Menard 2002).  Additional tests for collinearity among the 
variables that survived the stepwise procedure were done using the standard procedure of 
running the potential models through an ordinary least squares procedure with the
collinearity diagnostics in the SPSS output.  Any variable with a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) greater than four or tolerance score of less than 0.25 was examined in light of the 
theoretical model for possible exclusion (Fox 1991).  None of the remaining variables 
appeared to have problems with multicollinearity and remained in the final model.
Issues of nonlinearity were also addressed as recommended by Menard.  He
suggested in his multinomial regression diagnostics protocol the use of the standard Box-
Tidwell test of nonlinearity.  Here, issues with nonlinearity of data were addressed in the 
same manner as collinearity issues.  As the variables moved through the stepwise
procedure described above, tests for linearity are conducted.  Nonlinearity was found for
a number of the variables including state per capita income, percent of state employment 
based on agriculture and manufacturing.  These variables were corrected using the 
standard method of using the natural log of all those variables associated with 
nonlinearity.  Those variables were renamed LnSPCI, LnEmpAg, and LnEmpMan and 
included in subsequent models. While there was no reason to suspect additivity issues 
among the variables, the variables were examined for possible additive impacts by
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multiplying any likely variables and using the resulting product in the equation.  The
subsequent model was not found to be significantly better than the original therefore
additivity was not an issue with the model.   
Chapter V explicates the stepwise procedures used to develop the final model.  It 
then examines the resulting final model and its parameter estimates.  Finally, it discusses 
the impact of the variables on instrument choice along the coercion and directness 
instrument dimensions.  
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This research uses multinomial regression analysis to examine the variables that 
influence biofuel policy instrument choice based on the instrument dimensions of 
coercion and directness.  The results offer a better understanding of the policy process 
and the factors guiding policy instrument choice.  The variables that influence the types 
of instruments chosen by state policy makers chosen are state wealth, specific economic
sectors, ideology, and reform.  This chapter demonstrates the process by which this
conclusion is reached.  It is done so through a series of multinomial regression equations 
which identify important variables within variable groups.  These model-building steps 
culminate in the development of a final model which is introduced.  After the final model 
is introduced, the parameter estimates of the various regression equations are introduced 
and the likelihood ratios are calculated.  The chapter ends with a detailed discussion of
the new insights that result from this research.
The process used to develop the final model is to examine the variables by the 
major variable groups and the last table brings together all the remaining significant 
variables into the final model.  This procedure is necessary for multinomial regression 
because of the matrix issues discussed in Chapter IV.  The sections and tables that follow 
outline the results of this iterative process.  To ensure that the excluded variables are not 
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important to subsequent models, they are moved in and out of nominal regression 
procedures for the integrated model and are not found to be significant in any subsequent 
analyses.  In addition, the model building steps taken below are repeated using a different 
group as the reference group to examine whether the final model was stable regardless of 
the reference group. Using the conventional group as the references, the final model 
included the same variables as with the experimental inducers group as a reference.  The
results of this effort are available in Appendix B.  
The parameter estimates and standard errors, in parentheses, are included for each 
variable in the tables that outline the parameter estimates (tables 11 through 15). 
Conventional states (CO), non-experimenters (NE) and direct interveners (DI) states are
each evaluated separately against the states in the experimental inducers (EI) group.  The
significant variables for each of the groups are included in the last section of table 15 
below under the fully integrated model.  The final model is the reduced integrated model 
which includes the variables of the natural log of state per capita income (LnSPCI), the
natural log of the percentage of agricultural employment (lnPctEmpAg), state elite 
opinion (ISCD), percentage of manufacturing employment (LnPctEmpMan) and the 
dummy variables for the human resource reform variable from the Government 
Performance Project and is discussed in detail below.
Economic Variables
The first set of variables examined is the economic variables.  The economic
model has four variables that are significant to the reduced economic model:  the natural 
logs of state per capita income (LnSPCI), the percent of agricultural employment 
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(LnPctEmpAg) in the state, and the percent of manufacturing employment 
(LnPctEmpMan) as well as the percent gross state product attributable to manufacturing.  
The -2 log likelihood statistic for both the full and reduced economic model was 
significant to the 0.05 level and the Pseudo R2 (McFadden) statistic indicated that 24 
percent and 23 percent of the variance was accounted for by the full and reduced 
economic models respectively.  The proportional reduction of error achieved by the 
model, an important measure for multinomial regression, indicates a 33 percent reduction 
of error for the null model, or the intercept only model.  Both the full and reduced 
economic model represents a substantial improvement in the reduction of error at 60 
percent for each model. The equation for the general test for model improvement 
indicates that the full model is not significantly better than the reduced model and the
deletion of both feedstock and the percent of gross state product derived from agriculture
does not impact the understanding of the instrument choice calculus.  
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Table 11:  Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Regression Model, Economic
Variables
Full Economic Model Reduced Economic Model
Variables CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI
Constant 238.028 104.772 141.606 236.810 102.791 113.296
LnSPCI -21.427** -9.900 -12.965 -21.316** -9.795 -10.109
(7.619) (6.906) (7.599) (6.964) (6.166) (6.607)
PCTGSPA 2.746 -12.858 -20.354
(56.466) (46.481) (46.531)
PCTGSPM -78.747** -24.135 -41.154 -79.476** -23.802 -34.323
(31.551) (24.099) (26.920) (29.459) (21.438) (24.362)
LnPctEmpAg -2.583* -1.053 -0.322 -2.610** -1.227 0.018
(1.509) (1.347) (1.475) (0.997) (0.839) (0.907)
LnPctEmpMan 6.556* 0.637 1.370 6.594* 0.689 1.409
(3.926) (3.266) (3.443) (3.818) (3.147) (3.342)
LnFeedstock -.095 -0.030 0.346
(.440) (0.369) (0.416)
-2 log likelihood 98.781** 100.499**
2χ 31.648 29.930
2Psuedo R (McFadden) 0.243 0.229
Reduction of Error 60% 60%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
31.648 – 29.930 = 1.718
dff – dfr = 18 – 12 = 6
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
The variables that remain are only significant for the states in the conventional 
group and as such can only be interpreted for comparisons between the conventional and 
the experimental interveners.  They do not say anything about the instrument choices 
made by the non-experimenters and direct interveners versus the experimental inducers. 
For the conventional group only, as the levels of wealth, agricultural and manufacturing
employment increases the likelihood of a state being a member of that group decreases in 
comparison to membership in the experimental inducers.
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Political Interest Variables
Variables that remain significant across the full and reduced political model are
Elite Opinion of Agriculture (EOAI), Elite Opinion of Business (EOBC), Elite Opinion of
Environment (EOEN), per capita Farm Bureau Membership (FBMEM) and per capita
Environmental Membership (EVMEM).  The full political model is not statistically
significant and the reduced model statistics indicate that the model is slightly significant;
the -2 log likelihood is significant to the 0.10 level.  However, since the variables that 
survive this step will be merged into a larger model it is not surprising to find that a step 
in the building process results in an insignificant finding.  It is expected that the surviving
variables will be significant.  There is a significant reduction in error, however, 
represented by the political interest variables.  These variables reduce the error by 52 
percent and 46 percent respectively, null model error reduction is equal to only 23 
percent.  The general test for model improvement again indicates that the deletion of the
non-significant variables does not impact the ability to understand biofuel policy choices.  
It is therefore the more parsimonious model and is the better choice.  The preliminary
parameter estimates indicate that the impacts of elite opinion of either agriculture or the
environment are positive across the three comparison groups but they are significant only
for comparisons of the non-experimenters and direct interveners versus the experimental 
inducers.  If these values hold for the final model, the positive value would indicate that 
for those states in the non-experimenters and direct interveners groups, as the elite 
opinion of agriculture or of the environment increase, the likelihood of membership in 
either of those groups compared to the experimental inducers also increases.  
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The parameter estimates are significant for the farm bureau per capita membership 
and the environmental group per capita membership for non-experimenters group and 
direct interveners as well but the relationship is negative.  If this relationship holds in the
final model, as membership levels within a state increases, the likelihood of that state 
being a member of either non-experimenters or direct interveners decreases when 
compared to the experimental inducers group. These relationships are not significant for 
the states in the conventional group therefore they say nothing about the relationship 
between that group and the reference group.
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Table 12:  Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Regression Model, Political 
Interest Variables
Full Political Interest Model Reduced Political Interest Model
Variables CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI
Constant -47.323 -43.145 -41.630 -55.817 -51.863 -50.311
EOAI 142.757** 141.744** 144.928** 158.447 155.225** 161.398**
(70.053) (69.800) (70.061) (73.820) (73.699) (73.881)
EOBC -66.301* -68.769** -74.821** -67.405 -68.709** -75.099**
(35.115) (34.934) (35.179) (33.395) (33.245) (33.525)
EOEN 48.202* 44.919* 43.889* 58.719 55.312** 55.542
(26.282) (26.191) (26.430) (28.116) (28.011) (28.264)
FBMEM -116.393* -103.494 -119.694* -141.541 -127.782** -144.061
(64.341) (63.612) (64.851) (63.787) (62.959) (34.122)
BUMEM 190.434 139.426 224.577
(316.962) (312.188) (317.935)
EVMEM -2266.359* -2012.302 -2499.531* -2266.051 -2021.05** -2463.679**
(1253.153) (1244.899) (1276.609) (1041.935) (1027.081) (1067.243)
AgIntDomi -0.075 -0.670 -0.305
nance (0.622) (0.609) (0.631)
BusIntDom -0.526 -0.033 -0.100
inance (0.833) (0.834) (0.850)
-2 log 100.189 107.367*
likelihood
2χ 30.241 23.063
2Psuedo R 0.232 0.177
(McFadden 
)
Reduction 52% 46%
of Error
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
30.241 – 23.063 = 7.178
dff – dfr = 24 – 15 = 9
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
Political Culture Variables
The single political culture variable that proves significant across both models is 
the Elite Ideology variable (ISCD).  The full political culture model and the reduced 
political culture model are both significant to the 0.05 level.  The full and reduced 
political culture models produce similar levels of reduction in error at 50 percent and 48 
percent respectively, compared to the null model reduction of approximately 17 percent.  
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The model improvement statistics are calculated below for the full and reduced model 
and again there is no significant difference between the full model and the reduced model 
indicating that the removal of the non-significant variables does not affect the power of
the model.  The parameter estimate for elite ideology is negative and significant for each 
group.  This indicates that as the state becomes more liberal, the higher value, the less 
likely it is that the state will be a member of any of the three groups when compared to 
the states in the experimental inducers group.
Table 13:  Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Regression Model, 
Political Culture Variables
Full Political Culture Model Reduced Political Culture Model
Variables CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI
Constant 2.742 5.040 5.998 4.382 4.801 5.512
ISCD -0.091** -0.063 -0.076* -0.071** -0.069** -0.083**
(0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
URPC 5.948 -1.286 -2.147
(6.116) (5.768) (6.586)
Individual 0.562 0.801 -1.302 1.004 0.761 -1.352
Dummy (1.353) (1.241) (1.585) (1.164) (1.090) (1.400)
Traditional 1.077 2.014 1.559 1.823 1.846 1.278
Dummy (1.643) (1.524) (1.629) (1.376) (1.293) (1.356)
-2 log 109.108** 113.531**
likelihood
2χ 21.322 16.899
2Psuedo R 0.163 0.130
(McFadden)
Reduction of 50% 48%
Error
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
21.322 –16.899 = 4.423
dff – dfr = 12 – 9 = 3
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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New Public Management
The only variables that survive the modeling procedure below are the NPM 
reform measure are both variables from the American State Administrators Project and 
the GPP variables for Human Resources reform.  The reduction of error for either NPM 
model is better than the null model at 68 percent for the full model and for the reduced 
model is 54 percent.  The reduction of error for the null model is 47 percent.  Regardless, 
both models are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The full model accounts for 37 
percent of the variance while the reduced model only accounts for approximately 20 
percent.  The model improvement statistics indicate that the elimination of the 
government performance project reform variables of money, infrastructure, and 
information does not significantly impact the model and therefore those variables can be
safely eliminated.  
Of the remaining variables only RC_People_Low and ASAPI_2 are significant 
and only when comparing the non-experimenters with the experimental inducers.  If this 
relationship holds for ASAP_2 in the final model, it indicates that as the levels of reform 
rises, the likelihood that a state will be a member of the non-experimenters group rather
than the experimental inducers decreases.  
The interpretation for the dummy variable, RC_People, is somewhat different than 
the ASAP_2 variable and is discussed in detail later in this chapter.  Briefly, however, this 
variable should be interpreted as the change in the odds of a state being in the comparison 
group versus the reference group.  If, as is the case here, the significant variable is 
negative (-2.382 for the non-experimenters group), and this holds for the final model, that 
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means the odds of a state being in the non-experimenters group versus the reference
group decrease at lower levels of NPM reform.  
Table 14:  Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, 
New Public Management Variables
Full NPM Model Reduced NPM Model
Variables CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI
Constant 16.832 5.209 -8.417 6.954 3.015 -3.191
ASAP_1 8.985** -3.875 -.632 3.164 -1.434 -1.813
(4.467) (3.328) (3.365) (2.903) (2.603) (2.879)
ASAPI_2 -1.026** -.052 .365 -0.410 -0.014** 0.216
(.412) (.245) (.277) (0.252) (0.213) (0.235)
RC_Money_Low -23.499*** 3.688 -1.021
(1.404) (2.099) (2.100)
RC_Money_Med -24.355 2.101 .107
(.000) (1.788) (1.927)
RC_Infra_Low 3.309 -.658 1.113
(2.491) (1.922) (1.922)
RC_Infra_Med 1.820 1.037 2.502
(2.629) (2.289) (2.383)
RC_Info_Low .849 -2.703 -.138
(1.994) (1.971) (1.716)
RC_Info_Med 1.711 .339 .393
(1.643) (1.469) (1.597)
RC_People_Low 21.469*** -4.990 -1.230 1.314 -2.382** -0.999
(2.248) (1.761) (1.738) (1.261) (1.210) (1.243)
RC_People_ Med -3.699 -.466 1.834 -0.407 0.403 1.046
(2.554) (1.510) (1.657) (1.587) (1.174) (1.254)
-2 log likelihood 81.235** 103.900**
2χ 49.195 26.529
2Psuedo R 0.377 0.203
(McFadden)
Reduction of Error 68% 54%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
49.195 – 26.259 = 22.936
dff – dfr = 30 – 12 = 18
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Fully Integrated Model
All of the variables that survive the manual step-wise procedure are introduced 
into the multinomial regression to develop the final model.  The Hessian matrix error that 
indicates collinearity issues arises when all surviving variables are included in the model.  
Variables are selected for elimination based on the likelihood ratio test which helps to 
identify the variables whose removal impacts the model the least (Garson 2008).  The
variables excluded include elite opinion variables for agriculture (EOAI), business 
(EOBC), and the environment (EOEN) and the two reform variables from the American 
State Administrators Project (ASAP_1 and ASAP_2).  The remaining variables in the
fully integrated model are the natural log of state per capita income (LnSPCI), the natural 
log of the percent of state employment of agriculture (lnPctEmpAg), state elite ideology
(ISCD), the natural log of the percent of state employment of manufacturing
(lnPctEmpMan), and the government performance project for human resource reform 
variable (RC_People_Low and RC_People_Medium).
Table 15 contains the parameter estimates for the fully integrated model and the 
final reduced model.  The variables that are significant to group membership are selected 
for the reduced integrated model and the remaining variables are excluded.  Both models 
are significant to the 0.001 level.  The percentage of variance explained by the model as 
indicated by the Pseudo R2 (McFadden) which is 51% for the full model and for the
reduced model it is 38%.  The equation for model improvement indicates that the full
model is not significantly better than the reduced model and removal of the two 
membership variables (FBMEM and BUMEM) does not impact the understanding of 
biofuel policy choice.  All remaining variables offer insight into instrument choice and 
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are significant for each of the comparison groups except for manufacturing and the 
Government Performance Project HR variable.  These two variables are significant only
for comparisons with the reference group and the non-experimenters and direct 
interveners.  These variables do not say anything about the relationship between the states 
in the conventional group and experimental inducers.
Table 15:  Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, 
Fully Integrated and Reduced Integrated Models
Fully Integrated Model Reduced Integrated Model
Variables CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI CO v. EI NE v. EI DI v. EI
Constant 496.225 286.192 309.403 320.561 278.734 280.735
LNSPCI -52.936** -30.573** -31.623** -33.233** -28.744** -28.616**
(16.212) (15.197) (15.387) (12.409) (12.339) (12.527)
LnPctEmpAg -10.730** -7.132** -4.783 -6.078** -5.100** -3.990*
(3.612) (3.452) (3.491) (2.231) (2.185) (2.209)
LnPctEmpMan -3.664 -7.704** -7.880** -4.238 -4.670* -4.942*
(3.316) (3.215) (3.227) (2.731) (2.727) (2.763)
FBMEM 44.775 78.014* 21.742
(45.656) (42.479) (44.963)
BUMEM 404.743 -106.283 -210.038
(263.160) (211.864) (220.234)
ISCD -0.164** -0.170** -0.187** -0.157** -0.150** -0.163**
(0.076) (0.074) (0.075) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062)
RC_People_ Low -2.819 -7.758** -6.889* -1.092 -4.326** -3.719*
(3.568) (3.408) (3.461) (2.212) (2.186) (2.263)
RC_People_ 0.658 0.576 0.388 0.152 0.308 0.490
Medium (2.318) (1.910) (1.961) (2.015) (1.748) (1.810)
-2 log likelihood 63.867*** 80.257***
2χ 66.562 50.173
2Psuedo R 0.510 0.385
(McFadden)
Reduction of Error 66% 64%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
66.562 – 50.173 = 16.389
dff – dfr = 24 – 18 = 6
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Discussion of Equations and Results
The remainder of this chapter examines the proposed hypotheses and the results of 
the model with regard to state group membership and policy instrument choice.  As the 
original model narrows to the five significant variables, many of the hypotheses can be
eliminated when the associated variables do not prove to be significant.  However the
impact of the remaining variables offer public administration scholars important insights 
into the influences on choice of policy instruments and the choice calculus used by
biofuel policy makers.  They allow for a nuanced understanding of the influences on 
policy instrument choice and the results represent an important addition to public 
administration scholarship. 
None of the political interest variables are significant determinants of group 
membership.  Few political interest variables rise to the level of significance at the
intermediate level of the model building process where the groups of variables were
evaluated.  These variables exhibit very little predictive value for the types of biofuel 
policy instruments chosen.  Does this mean that political interests have no influence on 
instrument choice?  That is unlikely.  One possible conclusion for their absence is that 
there are so many interests involved in the development of biofuel policies at the state
level that the impacts are difficult to isolate.  This research examines the most likely
interest group participants in the biofuel policy arena and it is unlikely that many groups 
beyond those examined here have more than a localized presence and influence.
It could also mean that the interest groups at the state level are so closely aligned 
with the political culture and elite ideology that the presence of significant ideological 
interests simply overwhelms the influence of interest groups.  Evidence for this 
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conclusion should be visible in high inter-variable correlations with the relationships 
between the interest variables and elite ideology but these relationships are not present.  
This result does indicate there was little evidence of an obvious linkage between strong
interest groups and the types of biofuel policies that are created.  Regardless of the
conclusions, the absence of significant variables from the interest group arena indicates 
that the biofuel policies that result at the state level do not appear to be overly influenced 
by farm or business lobbies.
What follows is the discussion of the multinomial regression equations of the
significant variables which include the level of state wealth, the percent of agricultural 
employment and the percent manufacturing employment, the elite ideology of the state
and New Public Management reforms adopted as measured by the Government 
Performance Project and the impact of this equation on the remaining hypotheses and on 
group membership. It first offers the variable from the model and ties that variable to 
specific hypotheses.  Recall that the reference group of the experimental inducers 
represents both the group of states that have chosen instruments that are highest in 
coercive instruments and lowest in directness.  As such, comparisons of the hypotheses, 
the coercive dimension and the directness dimension are made.  Below the practice is to 
provide equations for each of the three contrast groups that show the variable of interest 
at both the highest and lowest value and calculate the odds of group membership based on 
those equations. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables that are used are in 
the equations are provided in Appendix E.
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State Wealth Measures
Hypotheses 1C and 1D propose the relationships between state wealth and state
level policy instrument choices regarding coercive or direct instruments.  These
hypotheses propose that the states with higher per capita income would have biofuel 
policies that are less coercive and less direct than those states with lower per capita
income.  They are re-stated below:
H1C = States with higher per capita income will have biofuel policies that are
lower in coercion than states with lower per capita income.
H1D = States with higher per capita income will have biofuel policies that are
lower in directness than states with lower per capita income.
The experimental inducers group was selected as the reference because the states 
that compose this group have chosen policy instruments that are both the most coercive 
and least direct of all groups.  Hypothesis 1C and 1D propose that states with higher per 
capita income choose biofuel policies that are lower in coercion and directness.  In the 
reduced integrated model, per capita income is indeed a significant determinant of group 
membership in all groups to the 0.05 level on a two-tailed test.  The sign of the parameter 
estimate for per capita income is negative which indicates that as the state per capita
income increases the likelihood of a state being in the comparison group versus the 
reference group decreases.  Since the reference group is the most coercive group, the
negative sign indicates that the hypothesis is not supported for the coercive instrument 
choice because as income increases the state is more likely to be in the highly coercive 
group. However, hypothesis 1D is supported because the experimental inducers group is 
also the group of states whose portfolio of policy instruments is the least direct of the four 
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groups.  Therefore as state per capita income increases, the likelihood that the state will
be in the group of states that chooses less direct policy instruments increases, making it
less likely that the state will be in a group of states that chooses direct policy instruments. 
State wealth and the likelihood of conventional group membership
Equation 6 shows the relationship of membership in the conventional group 
versus the experimental inducers group.  To demonstrate the impact of LnSPCI on group 
membership, its value was set at its maximum, 10.673,  while holding all other variables 
at their mean values and the reform measure to low.  The odds of being in the 
conventional group rather than the experimental inducers group was only 0.061% when 
the state per capita income was at its highest value.
Y6 = 320.561 – 33.233 (LnSPCI) 
– 6.078 (LnPctEmpag) – 0.157 (ISCD) – 4.238 (LnPctMan)
– 1.092 (RC_People_Low) + 0.152 (RC_People_Medium)
Y6 = 320.561 – 33.233(10.67297) – 6.078(-4.074) (Eq. 7)
– 0.157 (48.428) – 4.238(-2.517) – 1.092(1) + 0.152(0)
Y6 = -7.397
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.00061
The relationship between LnSPCI and membership in the conventional versus the
experimental inducers held when the LnSPCI level was replaced with its lowest value, 
10.0625. Equation 7 below outlines the results of this substitution 
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Y7 = 320.561 – 33.233 (LnSPCI) – 6.078 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.157 (ISCD) – 4.238 (LnPctMan) 
– 1.092 (RC_People_Low) + 0.152 (RC_People_Medium)
Y7 = 320.561 – 33.233(10.0625) – 6.078(-4.074) (Eq. 8)
– 0.157 (48.428) – 4.238 (-2.517) – 1.092(1) + 0.152(0)
Y7 = 12.891
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = .999
With odds ratio equal to 99 percent, these results indicate that a state that has low relative 
state per capita income will almost certainly be in the conventional group of states versus 
the experimental inducers group.  These results do not uphold hypothesis 1C but do 
support hypothesis 1D.
State wealth and the likelihood of non-experimenters group membership
The impact of per capita income is similar for membership in the non-
experimenters group as it is for the states and the conventional group. As Equation 8 
shows, as the state per capita income increases the odds of being in the non-experimenters 
group as opposed to the experimental inducers group decreases and vice versa.  Equation 
8 demonstrates this relationship for non-experimenters group membership by setting per 
capita income to its maximum level.
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Y8 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.15 (ISCD) -4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) + 0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y8 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.673) – 5.1 (-4.074) (Eq. 9)
– 0.15 (48.428) -4.67 (-2.517) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y8 = -7.105
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.00082
With all variables held constant at their means except for state per capita income 
which is set to its maximum value and the people reform scale of the GPP is low, the
odds of a state with high per capita income being in the non-experimental group versus 
the experimental inducers group is less than one percent.  
By substituting low state per capita income for the highest level of income, the 
relationship between SPCI and group membership was reinforced.  Equation 9 below 
demonstrates this relationship.
Y9 = 278.734– 28.744 (LnSPCI)–5.1 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) + 0.308 RC_People_Medium)
Y9 = 278.734– 28.744 (10.0625) – 5.1 (-4.0744) (Eq. 10)
– 0.15 (48.423) – 4.67 (-2.157) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y9 = 10.442376
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.999
Again, this equation is interpreted to mean that if a state has low SPCI, it is almost 
certainly a member of the non-experimental group of states rather than the direct 
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interveners indicating that its biofuel policies chosen by the less wealthy states are less 
coercive in nature.
State wealth and the likelihood of direct interveners group membership
The effect of state per capita income is the same for membership in the direct 
interveners group as for the other two groups and therefore is the same for choice of 
coercive or direct policy instruments.  As the value of LnSPCI increases, the likelihood of
a state being in the direct interveners group decreases to less than one percent as 
demonstrated by the equation 10 below.  
Y10 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y10 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.673) – 3.99 (-4.074) (Eq. 11)
– 0.163 (48.428) – 4.942 (-2.517) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y10 = -7.598
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.000501
These results indicate that if a state has higher levels of per capita income, the
likelihood that it would be a member of the direct interveners group as opposed to the
experimental inducers shrinks to under one percent.  State income has the same impact on 
direct instrument choice as it did for coercive instrument choice above.  
At low levels of state wealth, the results mimic the results for the other two groups 
and the reference group.  If state wealth is at is lowest level, the odds that a state will be a
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member of the direct interveners group as opposed to the reference group is nearly certain 
at 99.9 percent.  Equation 11 outlines these results.
Y11 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y11 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.063) – 3.99 (-4.074) (Eq. 12)
– 0.163 (48.428) – 4.942 (-2.517) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y11 = 9.871
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.9999
Table 16 below summarizes the results for hypotheses 1C and 1D.  Briefly,
however, while state per capita income is significant to group formation and thus
indicative of policy instrument choice, its influence is in the opposite direction as 
predicted for the dimension of coercion but it is correctly predicted for the dimension of 
directness.  Wealthier states appear to choose more coercive and less direct biofuel policy
instruments.  States with higher per capita income are more likely to be a member of the
coercive biofuel policy group of the experimental inducers rather than any of the other 
three groups.
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Table 16:  State per capita income and the likelihood of group membership
Variable Comparison Support (Y / N)
Level Group Odds Meaning H1C H1D
High Conventional .0006 When the state per capita income No Yes
is higher, the odds are only 0.61% 
that the state will be in the 
conventional group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Conventional .9999 When the state per capita income No Yes
is lower, the odds are 99% that the 
state will be in the conventional 
group versus the experimental
inducers group.
High Non- 0.0008 When the state per capita income No Yes
experimenters is higher, the odds are 1% that the 
state will be in the non-
experimenters group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Non- 0.999 When the state per capita income No Yes
experimenters is lower, the odds are 99% that the 
state will be in the non-
experimenters group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
High Direct 0.0005 When the state per capita income No Yes
interveners is higher, the odds 0.97% that the 
state will be in the direct 
interveners group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Direct 0.999 When the state per capita income No Yes
interveners is lower, the odds are 99% that the 
state will be in the direct 
interveners group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
What does this finding represent for policy instrument scholars? Wealthier states‘ 
policy instrument choices are different from the poorer states‘ choices.  Policy makers in 
the less wealthy states choose more direct government instruments and intervention while 
at the same time choosing less coercive instruments.  This may well refute the assumption 
that wealthy states that have more capacity or resources for governance often rely on 
direct intervention than the states with less capacity.
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Agricultural Employment Measures
The hypotheses regarding agricultural employment propose that the levels of 
agricultural employment decreases the likelihood that a state will have coercive biofuel 
policy instruments while increasing the likelihood that they will have direct instruments.  
The hypotheses regarding agricultural employment are re-stated below:
H7C =  States with higher percentages of state employment that are based on 
agriculture will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than states 
with lower percentages of employment based on agricultural production.
H7D =  States with higher percentages of state employment that are based on 
agriculture will have biofuel policies that are higher in directness than
states with lower percentages of employment based on agricultural 
production.
Agricultural employment and the likelihood of conventional group membership
To test these hypotheses, the same method is used for agricultural employment as 
is used above for the state per capita income.  To begin the examination of conventional 
group membership, the natural log of agricultural employment is set to its maximum level 
of -2.545 while the rest of the variables are set to their mean values.  Equation 12 
calculates the log odds of a state being in the conventional group versus the experimental 
inducers group.
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Y12 = 320.561 – 33.233 (LnSPCI) – 6.078 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.157 (ISCD) -4.238 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 1.092 (RC_People_Low) + 0.152 (RC_People_Medium)
Y12 = 320.561 – 33.233 (10.317) – 6.078 (-2.545) (Eq. 13)
– 0.157 (48.428) – 4.238 (-2.517) – 1.092 (1) + 0.152 (0)
Y12 = -4.853
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.0077
This result does not support Hypotheses 7C.  It indicates that a state is more likely
to be in the experimental inducers group than the conventional group when agricultural 
employment is at its highest level.  The experimental inducers group has adopted a
biofuel policy portfolio that is higher on the coercion and directness dimensions than the
conventional group.  The odds ratio for this equation indicates that the chance of being in 
the conventional group versus the experimental inducers group at higher levels of 
agricultural employment is less than one percent.  The impact of reform levels does not 
change from those outlined above in the discussion of state wealth‘s impact.  If, as in 
equation 13 below, the lowest percent of agricultural employment (-6.071) is substituted, 
the odds of being in the conventional group versus the experimental inducers group are
certain.  
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Y13 = 320.561 – 3.233 (LnSPCI) – 6.078 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.157 (ISCD) – 4.238 (LnPctEmpMan) 
– 1.092 (RC_People_Low) + 0.152 (RC_People_Medium)
Y13 = 320.561 – 3.233 (10.317) – 6.078 (-6.071) (Eq. 14)
– 0.157 (48.428) – 4.238 (-2.517) – 1.092 (1) + 0.152 (0)
Y13 = 12.499
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 1.000
Agricultural employment and the likelihood of non-experimenters group
membership
The impact of the level of agricultural employment on group membership of states 
in the non-experimenters group versus the experimental inducers is similar to the impact 
for agricultural employment discussed above and did not support hypothesis 7C.  When 
the level of state agricultural employment is set to its maximum level as in Equation 14 
below, the likelihood of a state being in the non-experimenters group versus the 
experimental inducers group is slightly under 1 percent.   
Y14 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) + 0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y14 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.317) – 5.1 (-2.545) (Eq. 15)
– 0.15 (48.428) – 4.67 (-2.517) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y14 = -4.644
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.0093
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However, as Equation 15 indicates, the odds of a state being a member of the non-
experimenters group versus the experimental inducers group increases to an almost 
certainty, 99 percent, at the lowest levels of agricultural employment.     
Y15 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) + 0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y15 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.317) – 5.1 (-6.071) (Eq. 16)
– 0.15 (48.428) – 4.67 (-2.517) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y15 = 13.317
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.999
Agricultural employment and the likelihood of direct interveners group
membership.  
The pattern for the states that are members of the direct interveners is similar to 
the other two groups with respect to agriculture.  When the percentage of agricultural 
employment was set to its highest level, the likelihood that a state is a member of the
direct interveners groups versus the experimental inducers group is slightly under 3 
percent.  Equation 16 below offers evidence by again setting the natural log of the percent 
of agricultural employment to its highest level.  
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Y16 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99(LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y16 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.317) – 3.99 (-2.545) (Eq. 17)
– 0.163 (48.428) – 4.942 (-2.517) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y16 = -3.506
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.0292
As the percentage of agricultural employment is adjusted downward to its minimum level 
the odds of a state being a member of the in the direct interveners group as opposed to the
experimental inducer group increase to 99 percent as shown by equation 17.  
Y17 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99(LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y17 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.317) – 3.99 (-6.071) (Eq. 18)
– 0.163 (48.428) – 4.942 (-2.517) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y17 = -10.562
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.9999
The impact of agricultural employment levels do not behave as predicted by the 
hypotheses but yield interesting results regardless.  States with higher levels of 
agricultural employment are more likely to be members of the more coercive group, the 
experimental inducers, than members groups with less coercive policy instrument 
portfolios.  Also, membership in the group with less direct instruments, again the
experimental inducers, is more likely at higher levels of agricultural employment than at 
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the lower levels of agricultural employment.  Table 17 that follows summarizes these
results.
Table 17:  Agricultural Employment and the likelihood of group membership
Variable Comparison Support (Y / N)
Level Group Odds Meaning H7C H7D
High Conventional .0077 When state agricultural N N
employment is higher, the odds are 
only 1.8% that the state will be in
the Conventional group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Conventional 1.00 When state agricultural N N
employment is lower, the odds are 
cerrtain that the state will be in the 
Conventional group versus the
experimental inducers group.
High Non- 0.009 When the state agricultural N N
experimenters employment is higher, the odds are 
2.3% that the state will be in the 
non-experimenters group versus
the experimental inducers group.
Low Non- 0.999 When the state agricultural N N
experimenters employment is lower, the odds are 
99% that the state will be in the 
non-experimenters group versus
the experimental inducers group.
High Direct 0.029 When the state agricultural N N
interveners employment is higher, the odds are 
91% that the state will be in the 
direct interveners versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Direct 0.999 When the state agricultural N N
interveners employment is lower, the odds are 
99% that the state will be in the 
direct interveners versus the 
experimental inducers group.
There are a number of important lessons from this result.  First, it appears that 
those states with the most at stake economically make different policy choices than those 
with less at stake and these choices do not automatically include choosing instruments 
that involve direct government intervention.  Rather these states appear to choose
instruments that are more coercive.  This finding represents a fundamental shift from a
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commodity pricing, direct government model where agriculture is paid to plant or paid 
not to plant to a more free market, behavioral model whereby agricultural activity is 
rewarded through inducements.
Second, while the agricultural interest group variables did not survive the model 
creation, the fact that the levels of agricultural employment are highly correlated with 
those interest variables indicate that the influences of these organized groups cannot be 
dismissed and require further exploration in the future.  For policy science, these results 
indicate that the power of policy interests cannot be dismissed and deserve continued 
attention.
Elite Ideology Measures
The hypotheses regarding elite ideology suggest that those states whose political 
elite are generally conservative embrace more market-oriented practices that are
demonstrated by biofuel policies that are both lower in direct government intervention 
and coercion.  The exact hypotheses are re-stated below.
H20C = Those states whose elite opinion is more conservative will have biofuel 
policies that are lower in coercion than those states whose elite opinion is 
more liberal.
H20D = Those states whose elite opinion is more conservative will have biofuel 
policies that are lower in directness than those states whose elite opinion is 
more liberal.
Elite ideology and the likelihood of conventional group membership
The equations used to explore ideological relationships to policy adoption and the 
group membership potential of states in the conventional group versus the experimental 
inducers are outlined below.  Recall that elite ideology values range from 0 to 100 with 
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100 designated as the most liberal of elite ideology and zero the most conservative (Berry
et al. 1998; Lindquist 2007).  The following equation follows upon the practice of setting
the elite ideology variable (ISCD) to its maximum value of 92.514 and setting all other
values to their mean and examining state reform levels at low.
Y18 = 320.561 – 33.233 (LnSPCI) – 6.078(LnPctEmpag)
– 0.157 (ISCD) – 4.238 (LnPctEmpMan)
- 1.092 (RC_People_Low) + 0.152 (RC_People_Medium)
Y18 = 320.561 – 33.233 (10.317) – 6.078 (-4.0744) (Eq. 19)
– 0.157 (92.514) – 4.238 (-2.517) -1.092 (1) + 0.152 (0)
Y18 = -2.478
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.077
The results indicate that when the elite opinion is set to its most liberal the odds 
that a state will be in the conventional group versus the experimental inducers are only
7.7 percent.  This result supports the hypothesis that the more conservative states opt for
less coercive policies than do the more liberal states.  At the same time, however, 
conservative states appear to favor direct biofuel policy instruments does not support 
Hypothesis 20D.  The conservative states are more likely to be members of the groups 
that choose direct instruments.  Further evidence of this is found when elite ideology is 
set to the most conservative or minimum level (5.25), in equation 19 below.
147
  
       
        
    
          
         
     
      
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
        
        
     
          
         
     
      
Y19 = 320.561 – 33.233 (LnSPCI) – 6.078 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.157 (ISCD) – 4.238 (LnPctEmpMan) 
-1.092 (RC_People_Low) + 0.152 (RC_People_Medium)
Y19 = 320.561 – 33.233 (10.317) – 6.078 (-4.0744) (Eq. 20)
– 0.157 (5.25) – 4.238 (-2.517) -1.092 (1) + 0.152 (0)
Y19 = 11.222
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.999
Again, these results indicate that when state elite ideology is conservative, it is 
almost certain that the state will be in the conventional group rather than the experimental 
inducers group.
Elite ideology and the likelihood of non-experimenters group membership
Equation 20 also supports the hypothesis that states with conservative elite 
ideology will adopt less coercive biofuel policy instruments.  The odds of a state being a
member of the non-experimenters group versus the experimental inducers group are only
2.99 percent when the elite ideology measure is set at its most liberal.  
Y20 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) + 0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y20 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.317) – 5.1 (-4.074) (Eq. 221)
– 0.15 (92.514) – 4.67 (-2.517) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y20 = -3.477
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.0299
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This pattern continues to hold for the experimental inducers group when elite ideology is 
set at its most conservative or minimum level.  Equation 21 below demonstrates the
pattern.
Y21 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) + 0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y21 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.317) – 5.1 (-4.074) (Eq. 22)
– 0.15 (5.25) – 4.67 (-2.517) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y21 = -3.477
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.999
If the elite ideology of a state is at its most conservative, the odds that the state will be in 
the non-experimenters group as opposed to the experimental inducers group is 99 percent.  
Elite ideology and the likelihood of direct interveners group membership
The evidence continues to offer support for the hypotheses on coercive instrument 
choice and levels of state elite ideology.  The more liberal the elite ideology measure the 
less likely it is that a state will be a member of the direct interveners group over the
experimental inducers.  As demonstrated by equation 22, when state elite ideology is set 
to its most liberal value the odds of a state being in the experimental inducers group is 
only 1 percent.  
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Y22 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) +0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y22 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.317) – 3.99 (-4.074) (Eq. 23)
– 0.163 (92.514) – 4.942 (-2.517) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y22 = -4.589
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.010
When the state elite ideology level is set at the most conservative level the pattern 
continues to hold.  As equation 23 demonstrates below, the odds that a state will be in the
direct interveners when its elite ideology is conservative is 99 percent.  
Y23 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y23 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.317) – 3.99 (-4.074) (Eq. 24)
– 0.163 (5.25) – 4.942 (-2.517) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y23 = 9.635
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.999
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Table 18:  Elite Ideology and the likelihood of group membership
Variable Comparison Support (Y / N)
Level Group Odds Meaning H20C H20D
High Conventional .077 When state elite ideology is high Y N
(liberal), the odds are 8.6% that 
the state will be in the 
Conventional group versus the
experimental inducers group.
Low Conventional 0.9999 When state elite ideology is low Y N
(conservative) the odds are 99% 
that the state will be in the 
Conventional group versus the
experimental inducers group.
High Non- 0.0299 When the states elite ideology is Y N
experimenters higher (liberal), the odds are 3.4% 
that the state will be in the non-
experimenters group versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Non- 0.9999 When the state elite ideology is Y N
experimenters lower (conservative, the odds are 
99% that the state will be in the 
non-experimenters group versus
the experimental inducers group.
High Direct 0.010 When the state elite ideology is Y N
interveners higher (liberal), the odds are 
24.7% that the state will be in the 
direct interveners versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Low Direct 0.9999 When the state elite ideology is Y N
interveners lower (conservative), the odds are 
99% that the state will be in the 
direct interveners versus the 
experimental inducers group.
Earlier policy science research indicates that elite ideology plays an integral part 
in the types of public policy enacted by state policy makers (Erikson et al. 1993).  The
results here extend those findings to policy instrument choice.  Not only do liberals and 
conservatives appear to prefer different types of public policies as demonstrated by
Erikson et al, but they also have strong preferences for different types of policy
instruments.  And while common wisdom would indicate that conservative legislators 
would prefer less direct instruments these results do not support those finding.  Rather, 
the opposite is found to be true.  States with liberal elite ideology appear to prefer 
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instruments that are more coercive and less direct than states with conservative ideology. 
At high levels of ideology or the most liberal position, the odds that a state will be a
member of the conventional group of states versus the experimental inducers group is 
only about 8 percent.  
Manufacturing Employment Levels
The percentage of state employment derived from the manufacturing sector is 
included in the model because, much like the percentage of state employment in 
agriculture discussed above, it captures a state‘s dependence on a particular economic
sector that has an interest in biofuel policy instruments and how policy makers respond to 
that sector.  The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the U. S. Chamber of
Commerce have identified specific biofuel policy instruments as part of each 
organizations energy policy goals.  The goal is to develop of biomass production into a
self-sustaining market.  Specific instruments cited include increased private partnerships, 
research and development and increased educational efforts.  The organization also 
supports a ―rationalizing of existing statutes and regulations‖ which translates into the 
creation of consistent policy instruments, i.e. economic and social policy instruments,  
across states that would make doing business less complicated (McCoy 2007).  The
emphasis on a market based approach coupled with moves to increase partnerships should 
result in the particularized biofuel policy instrument choices described below by
hypotheses H8C and H8D.
H8C = States with higher percentages of state employment based on 
manufacturing will have biofuel policies that are lower in coercion than 
states with lower percentages of employment based on manufacturing
production.
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H8D = States with higher percentages of state employment based on
manufacturing will have biofuel policies that are lower in directness than 
states with lower percentages of employment based on manufacturing
production.
One item worth noting, unlike the agricultural variable, the manufacturing
variable is not a significant factor to group membership across all three comparison 
groups.  It is not able to say anything about membership in the conventional group versus 
the experimental inducers group.  Therefore, it will not be reviewed in the following
analysis and the equations for this group are not included.
Manufacturing employment and the likelihood of non-experimental group
membership
The likelihood of a state being a member of non-experimental group versus the 
direct interveners is only 46 percent when the percent of manufacturing employment is
set at its highest value of -1.811.  This likelihood increases to 99.9 percent when 
manufacturing is at its lowest levels of employment (-3.778) while all other variables are
held at their mean.  This relationship does not support hypothesis 8C but but does support 
hypothesis 8D.  States at the highest levels of manufacturing employment are more likely
to be in the group of states that select instruments that are higher in coercion and lower 
directness than states that have lower levels of manufacturing employment.
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Y24 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag) 
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) +0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y24 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.317) – 5.1 (-4.074) (Eq. 25)
– 0.15 (48.428) – 4.67 (-1.8111) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y24 = -0.1621
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.459
Y25 = 278.734 – 28.744 (LnSPCI) – 5.1 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.15 (ISCD) – 4.67(LnPctEmpMan)
– 4.326 (RC_People_Low) +0.308 (RC_People_Medium)
Y25 = 278.734 – 28.744 (10.317) – 5.1 (-4.074) (Eq. 26)
– 0.15 (48.428)– 4.67 (-3.778) – 4.326 (1) + 0.308 (0)
Y25 = 9.0214
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.9998
Manufacturing employment and the likelihood of direct interveners group
membership
The results of equations 26 and 27 not support hypothesis 8C regarding the 
relationships between levels of manufacturing and the coercion dimension of policy
instruments chosen by states.  At higher levels of manufacturing employment, the
likelihood that a state will be a member of the direct interveners group rather than the 
experimental inducers group is just 29 percent.  At the lowest levels of manufacturing
154
  
 
 
         
        
     
          
         
     
      
 
        
        
     
          
         
     
      
 
  
employment the likelihood of membership in the direct interveners group increases to a 
near certainty at 99 percent.
Y26 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y26 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.317) – 3.99 (-4.074) (Eq. 27)
– 0.163 (48.428) – 4.942 (-1.8111) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y26 = -0.893
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.290
Y27 = 280.735 – 28.616 (LnSPCI) – 3.99 (LnPctEmpag)
– 0.163 (ISCD) – 4.942 (LnPctEmpMan)
– 3.719 (RC_People_Low) + 0.49 (RC_People_Medium)
Y27 = 280.735 – 28.616 (10.317) – 3.99 (-4.074) (Eq. 28)
– 0.163 (48.428) – 4.942 (-3.778) – 3.719 (1) + 0.49 (0)
Y27 = 8.825
-1 -1 Odds ratio = ln / 1 + ln = 0.9998
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Table 19:  Manufacturing Employment and the likelihood of group membership
Variable Comparison Support (Y / N)
Level Group Odds Meaning H8C H8C
High Conventional
Not significant to group membershipLow Conventional
High Non- 0.459 When state manufacturing N Y
experimenters employment is high, the odds are 
46% that the state will be a 
member of the non-experimenters
group versus the experimental
inducers group.
Low Non- 0.9998 When state manufacturing N Y
experimenters employment is low, the odds are 
99.9% that the state will be a 
member of the non-experimenters
group versus the experimental
inducers group.
High Direct 0.290 When state manufacturing N Y
interveners employment are high, the odds are 
29% that the state will be a 
member of the non-experimenters
group versus the experimental
inducers group.
Low Direct 0.9998 When state manufacturing N Y
interveners employment is low, the odds are 
99.9% that the state will be a 
member of the non-experimenters
group versus the experimental
inducers group.
New Public Management Reforms
This New Public Management Reform of Human Resources (NPM-HR) variable 
is operationalized as a dummy variable in the multinomial regression model.  The reduced 
integrated model indicates that the NPM-HR variable can only say something about the
membership of states between the non-experimenters group and the direct interveners 
group versus the experimental inducers group. It can say nothing regarding the 
relationship between the conventional group and the experimental inducers group.  The
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medium level of reform in the NPM-HR measure is not significant to group membership 
and therefore, can tell us nothing more about the membership likelihood between the 
comparison groups and the reference group.  As with the manufacturing variable which 
was not uniformly significant, the conventional group and the medium levels of NPM-HR 
reform will not be discussed below.
Hardy explains with dummy variables the interpretation take on a specific
meaning interpretation in multinomial regression.  This variable is interpreted as 
representing an ―increment or decrement to the log-odds‖ of being in the comparison 
group versus the reference group at various levels of the dummy variable (Hardy 1993).  
Similar to the slope dummy variable in ordinary least squares regression, the dummy
variable in multinomial regression acts to increase or decrease the odds of being in group 
A or B.  
In order to interpret the dummy variable, Hardy specifically suggests the 
calculation of the antilog or inverse of the NPM coefficient.  For example, the coefficient 
of the low level of reform in the non-experimenters versus experimental inducers group is 
equal to -4.326.  The formula for calculating the anti-log is outlined in equation 28 below.
antilog = 100(exp(βnpm)-1) (Eq. 29)
The anti-log of this coefficient is -0.98.  Hardy explains that this means the expected 
value of the odds of being a member of the comparison group is 98 percent lower than the 
value for the reference group (Hardy 1993).  The calculations for the antilogs are
provided below in table 20.
The hypotheses for the Government Performance Project Human Resource
Reforms project are restated below.  
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H26C = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project Human 
Resource Reforms project measure is higher will have biofuel policies that 
are higher in coercion than those states whose GPP score is lower.
H26D = States whose score on the Pew Government Performance Project Human 
Resource Reforms project measure is higher will have biofuel policies that 
are lower in directness than those states whose score is lower.
NPM-HR Reform and the likelihood of non-experimenters group membership
The antilog for the non-experimenters group was discussed briefly above. It 
means that it is 98 percent less likely that a state at the lowest levels of reform will be in 
the more coercive, less direct group of experimental inducers than if a state at the highest 
levels of reforms.  Therefore, this provided evidence for hypothesis 26C and 26D.  States 
that exhibit highest levels of reform are more likely to be members of the group of states 
with biofuel policy instruments that more coercive and less direct.
NPM-HR Reform and the likelihood of direct interveners group membership
The results are very similar for the comparison between the direct interveners 
group versus the experimental inducers group. The antilog at the lower levels of reforms 
for the direct interveners group is -0.975 or 97 percent.  This indicates that it is nearly 98 
percent less likely for a state at the lowest reform levels versus the highest levels to be in 
the reference group of experimental inducers compared to the direct interveners group.
These results again reinforce the findings regarding membership in the coercive group as 
well as offer evidence for both hypothesis 26C and 26D which contends that states with
higher levels of reform will choose more coercive and less direct biofuel policy
instruments than states at lower levels of reform.  Table 20 below summarizes the results 
for the parameter estimates and changes in the odds for the NPM reform variable.
158
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 20: GPP Reform Impacts
Parameter
Group estimate antilog Percent
Non-experimenters -4.326** -0.98 98% decrease
Direct interveners -3.719** -0.975 98% decrease
Of the independent variables that were found to be significant in the final model, 
the most perplexing result is that of the NPM variable from the Government Performance
Project Human Resources reforms.  What is perplexing is that this particular reform 
measure is significant as opposed to other measures such as the perceptions of general 
NPM reform adoptions other GPP reform measures such as infrastructure or money
reforms.  This connection likely indicates more subtle reform influences than originally
suspected.  Perhaps the other GPP reforms are not evenly distributed across a government 
system and that human resource reforms indicate a stronger commitment to NPM ideals 
than other reform efforts measured by the Government Performance Project.  Literature
on the prevalence of NPM reforms indicate that human resources reforms are most
consistent group of reforms made in the country, though they do not exhibit consistent 
application (Hays and Sowa 2006; Kellough and Selden 2003).  This is an interesting
question that merits research attention in the future.
Beyond the issue of why NPM-HR reforms, what lessons can be learned from 
these results?  The question that prompted the exploration of NPM reforms in this 
research was whether or not these reforms resulted in the type of instrument choices 
advocated by reformers or not.  There has been little research done to date to answer this 
question and the results here indicate that as states experiment with NPM-HR reforms, 
they tend to choose instruments that are more coercive and less direct than states that 
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experiment with reforms at lower levels.  As a result it appears that NPM reforms do have
an impact on instrument choice that the tools chosen are consistent with the basic precepts 
of new public management philosophies of less rowing and more steering in the public 
policy arena.  
How do these results translate to the choice of biofuel policy instruments by state
policy makers?  It was hypothesized that a large number of factors contributed to the 
development and adoption of biofuel policies including economics, political interests, 
state culture and ideology and New Public Management (NPM) Reforms.  The variables 
offered here distill to five significant factors:  per capita income, the percent of state 
agricultural employment and percent of state manufacturing, elite ideology and state level 
reform of human resources found by Pew‘s Government Performance Project.  These
remaining variables rose from each of the variable groups except the political interest 
variables.  
State wealth contributes significantly to membership outcomes in coercive or 
direct policy instrument states.  While important research has dismissed the role of state
wealth as a predictor of policy and found that state liberalism and ideology generally were
more important predictors of policy than state wealth this research does not investigate 
actual policy instrument choice, only policy (Erikson et al. 1993).  The research here
examines the types of instruments chosen and finds state wealth to be a significant factor.  
Perhaps state wealth captures the components of state level capacity to make policy and 
the general will to make it (Gray 2008).  Those states that are wealthier tend to have both 
higher numbers of biofuel policies and those policies tend to be more coercive than states 
with lower levels of per capita wealth.  This may well be indicative a more robust policy
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system that can create and administer more policies than the systems in the less wealthy
states.  
Those states with the most to gain by developing a biofuel policy system appear to 
be the ones with the least amount of biofuel policy infrastructure in place as well as the 
capacity to make the policy.  The second generation of biofuels using high cellulosic
feedstocks will become economically and technically viable in the near future.  If a state
such as Mississippi has not invested in the value added infrastructure such as production 
plants or distribution systems and has failed to develop the market through a variety of 
state marketing efforts, the state risks being the place where the biofuel crop is grown and 
harvested but not the place where the actual economic benefits of employment and 
development through production are created.  The variable that was expected to 
significantly contribute to the final model but did not, the presence of biofuel feedstocks, 
coupled with the inverse relationship of agricultural employment to policy instrument 
choice may provide evidence that the states with the most at stake are already on the 
losing side of the production equation.  
Instrument theorists contend that policy instrument choice may simply be a
function of policy maker ideology rather than a rational evaluation and selection from all 
possible options and the research here indicates support for that contention (Peters 2000; 
Salamon 2002a; Ingram et al. 2007).  Elite ideology is the most important variable in the
model when determining group membership between the experimental inducers and 
direct interveners.  Those states with more conservative elites tend to have biofuel 
policies that are more direct than those states with more liberal elites.  This is the opposite 
of what is predicted which could indicate a strong tendency for one ideological group to 
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select a certain type of policy over another.  Or it could simply represent the inheritance
of biofuel policies by prior elite regimes that were more representative of that group.  
This second conclusion is much less likely when considered in light of the research that 
indicates that elite ideology is relatively stable within a state‘s political culture creating a
policy environment that is not prone to large shifts in policy direction (Berry et al. 1998).
Figures 8 and 9 below outline the final model of policy instrument choice.  It 
includes the variables that were found to be significant to the types of policy instrument 
choices of policy makers.  While it is significantly abbreviated from the original model of
choice, the remaining variables offer valuable insight into the instrument choice calculus.
Economic Variables
- State per capita income (SPCI) ( + )
- Percent of state employment agriculturally based (PCTEMPAG) ( + )
- Percent of state employment manufacturing based (PCTEMPMAN) ( + )
Cultural & Ideological Variables
- State Elite Ideology (ISCD) ( + )
New Public Management Adoption
- Pew GPP, People (GPP_People) ( + )
State Policy
Position –
Coercion
Dimension
Figure 8: Final Model of Instrument Choice – Coercion Dimension
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Economic Variables
- State per capita income (SPCI) ( + )
- Percent of state employment agriculturally based (PCTEMPAG) ( - ) 
- Percent of state employment manufacturing based (PCTEMPMAN) ( + )
Cultural & Ideological Variables
- State Elite Ideology (ISCD) ( - )
State Policy
Position – 
Directness
Dimension
New Public Management Adoption
- Pew GPP, People (GPP_People) ( + )
Figure 9: Final Model of Instrument Choice – Directness Dimension
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation draws together for the first time three separate streams of public
administration theory:  New Public Management (NPM), political culture, and policy
instruments.  It offers a method for evaluating and comparing of policy instruments in the 
context of the American states.  Despite calls from prominent public instrument theorists 
to examine connections between theoretical streams and to develop a method of analysis, 
this dissertation represents the first attempt to do so (Kettl 2002; Ingram et al. 2007;
Linder and Peters 1984). Its goal is to understand the influences on policy makers and the 
impact of those influences on subsequent policy instrument choice and to develop a 
clearer understanding of the interactions of variables on policy outcomes.  It did this 
through the policy lens of biofuels in the 50 American states.    
Importance and implications of this research to public administration scholarship
From its beginning, this research was an attempt to develop answers to basic 
policy formulation questions.  First, how do policy makers choose policy instruments, 
what influences them in the decision making process?  Do characteristics unique to a state
pre-determine the types of policy instruments chosen by its policy makers? During the
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research process it has been noted that very little scholarly effort has been expended to 
understand how policy instruments are chosen in the American states.  Most of the
scholarship to date has been focused not on the instrument as the primary tool by which 
government conducts its business, rather scholars have chosen to focus on the process, 
often leaving the questions surrounding instruments, the reasons for policy makers‘
instrument choices, and even the effectiveness of the tools is largely unexplored.  Caught 
between the opposing currents of reform in public administration, differing opinions of 
the role of government and governance, policy instruments have only recently begun to 
attract scholarly attention in the United States and elsewhere.  This research adds to this 
body of public administration knowledge by seeking to fill in the voids in policy
instrument theory, namely what influences instrument choice.
It is worthwhile just to review the definition of policy instruments.  Policy
instruments discussed here are the methods or tools by which government conducts public
business.  Lester Salamon describes them as the ―tool[s] of public action‖ that are
identifiable or structured with distinctive characteristics (Salamon 2002a).  They offer the
means to a pre-determined end, a change in citizen behavior (Schneider and Ingram 
1997).  
Fundamental to this research are the policy dimensions of coercion or directness.  
Coercion is a dimension that has been used by Theodore Lowi and Lester Salamon to 
describe the degree to which or how much policy tries to change or restrict an 
individual‘s behavior (Salamon 2002a; Lowi 1964, 1972).  Coercion in instruments can 
range from overt sanctions or threat of sanctions to maintain social order, for example
imprisonment or the imposition of fines as the result of committing a criminal or civil 
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offense.  Coercion can also be more subtle through the offering of incentives to citizens 
for changes in behavior.  In this case, a citizen is concerned with being placed at a 
disadvantage economically and may well comply with the government in order to not be
disadvantaged.  Examples of the less overt sanctions of importance to this research 
include incentives to purchase flex fuel or alternative fuel vehicles where money is 
offered in return for behavioral change.  The directness dimension of policy instruments 
refers to how much action is taken by government to intervene in the public problem that 
needs to be addressed.  Does government administer and finance the action and as such 
create an instrument that is highly direct as in the case of many types of economic
regulations or is government action limited and indirect as with government sponsored 
enterprises or voucher programs?  These two dimensions were chosen as the focus of this
research because they directly answer how a state government and how policy makers 
view the fundamental role of government and governance in addressing public problems.
It has been proposed by this research that the choice between these two 
dimensional aspects of policy instruments is fundamentally influenced by state-level 
characteristics including economics, political interests, culture and ideology and reforms 
to governance.  To a large extent, this research has found this proposal to be true.  State
level wealth as measured by state per capita income, the impact of important economic
sectors on a state, the ideology of the state‘s elite, and the state‘s embrace of reform all
impact the types of choices made by decision makers regarding the means by which 
governments address public problems.  The results are important additions to public
administration because they help scholars understand instrumentl choice in more detail in 
a number of ways.
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First, money counts.  At first blush this represents no new breakthrough in 
scholarly knowledge as many scholars have proposed that money is vital to understanding
state level policy making capacity and the types of groups that become involved in the 
policy process (Gray et al. 2004; Dye 1966, 2001; Hwang and Gray 1991; Olson 1965, 
1971).  Much of the extant literature found that wealthier states built administrative
infrastructure that allowed for more direct government action.  Wealthier states chose
policy instruments that were less direct.  Even though the states could theoretically afford 
to build direct governance capacity, they chose instruments that were more coercive.  The
research here proposed that states that were wealthier would choose less coercive and less 
direct policy instruments.  What do these results mean for public administration in 
general?  Clearly, a state does not choose biofuel policy instruments simply based on 
whether or not it can afford to administer policy or develop instruments.  If that were the 
case then one could reasonably expect to see wealthy states with highly direct 
instruments.  The results do offer tentative support for the notion that recent reforms, 
especially those offered by the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm, have
taken root in the policy making process and have resulted in fewer direct government 
instruments being employed in the particular policy arena of biofuels.  Regardless, 
wealthy states in this research have chosen a different path to address biofuel policy, one
that relies heavily on inducing citizens to behave differently through less direct means.
A corollary to the finding that money counts is the finding that those who bring
money to the table tend to count more than those who do not.  Specifically, the 
dependence of a state on particular economic sectors influences the types of policy
instruments chosen.  This proposal was made as a result of research on target groups by
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Ingram and Schneider.  They propose that groups that are favored by policy makers, i.e. 
important economic sectors or groups, influence the types of choice made by those policy
makers (Schneider and Ingram 1993).  Simply, the favored group gets what it wants.  It 
also gets at essential arguments made by pluralist scholars regarding group influence
(Olson 1965, 1971; Ainsworth 2002; Brudney and Hebert 1987).  Two economic sectors 
were found to be significant during the analysis of the variables:  the level of both 
agricultural and manufacturing employment in the state.  If , as suggested by Schneider 
and Ingram, these two economic sectors are favored by policy makers because of their 
position in the state, it is logical that the instruments favored by these groups are adopted 
by policy makers.  The results of this research did not support the Schneider and Ingram 
contention.  Policy makers did not choose instruments that favored either group.  What
can be concluded from these results?  It appears that states with the most at stake
economically, those with higher levels of agricultural or manufacturing employment, 
make different policy choices than other states and these choices are not made based 
simply on the importance of the economic sector in question.  Essentially, the choice of 
biofuel policy instruments is more complicated than the presence or absence of 
dependence on a favored target group such as agriculture or manufacturing.
The inclusion of political culture, ideology and interest variables into the model of 
instrument choice also offer a new perspective on policy design and instrument choice.  
Ingram and Schneider include political culture in their model of policy design but no 
scholars have examined the connection to state level political culture in policy instrument 
choice (Schneider and Ingram 1997).  Other scholars have called for further exploration 
of Elazar and the concept of political culture on governance issues but little has been done
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to date (Miller et al. 2006).  The potential linkages between culture and instrument design 
and choice remain under-explored relationships in the literature.  This dissertation was an 
attempt to fill that void in the field‘s knowledge base.  While there was a lack of evidence
for a tie between political culture and biofuel policy instruments this result in itself 
contributes to policy scholars‘ knowledge about instrument choice.  The lack of evidence
found here for a link between Daniel Elazar‘s political culture construct and policy
instrument choice may be a result of the policy instrument choice itself.  Much of the 
scholarship that finds evidence for political culture is in areas of long established public
policy arenas, see for example Koven and Mausolff in state budget policy or Mead in 
welfare reform (Mead 2004; Koven and Mausolff 2002) . The lack of connection to 
political culture could indicate that the biofuel policy arena, a relatively new and technical 
area, has matured after the large population shifts have diluted Elazar‘s regional political 
cultures.  These population shifts are the most persistent objections raised by political 
culture scholars to Elazar‘s conception, that political culture could not remain stable in 
the face of large changes in population (Darmofal 2006; Miller et al. 2006).  This could 
support the contention that policy instruments, as social institutions, have a history
grounded in the history of the larger culture (Lascoumes and LeGales 2007).  As a result, 
perhaps established policy arenas or those that attract broader, sustained public attention 
adopt instruments that would be more in line with Elazar‘s political culture concept.  This 
question of new versus established policy arenas and instrument offers a rich avenue of 
future research.  
Though no evidence is found to link political culture as conceptualized by Elazar 
to policy instrument choice, there is strong evidence of a connection between political 
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ideology and the types of instruments chosen by state level policy makers. A basic tenet 
of policy instrument theory is that ideology influences the type of policy instruments 
chosen by policy makers and this certainly was the case here.  Those states with different 
elite ideology make different biofuel instrument choices.  Common wisdom suggests that 
conservative elites would favor less direct instruments while liberal elites would prefer 
strong government action.  These were not the results found here.  States with liberal 
elites were more likely to be in the group that preferred more coercive, less direct 
instruments and states with more conservative elites were in states with more direct 
instruments.  It could be argued that these results suggest that while elites may ―talk the 
talk,‖ they do not ―walk the walk.‖  This would be an inappropriate conclusion.  The
policy process is a more complicated and chaotic system than that platitude can convey.  
It is not enough to conclude that different ideological elites make different choices 
because it begs the question of why?  Until now, however, there has been little evidence
of if and how elites influence instrument choice and this research offers the first evidence
that it does.
The New Public Management (NPM) movement of the last two decades called for
a radical shift in government operations, moving services from the public sector to the
private, contracting with private entities to provide public service, the creation of public –
private partnerships to deliver necessary services and a reconstruction of government in 
order for government to act more efficiently and effectively (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  
Many instrument scholars complain of the dearth of scholarly evidence regarding
instrument choice in the presence of NPM reforms and this research attempted to provide 
evidence of the types of instrument choice made in NPM environments.  At the outset of 
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this research it was expected that states with higher levels of the NPM reforms would 
exhibit a tendency to choose instruments that involve less direct government intervention 
as well as higher levels of behavior inducing coercion.  This should be evident in high 
NPM states selected biofuel instruments that rely on private initiative through contracting
and free market techniques.  The only NPM variable that appears to have an impact on 
group membership and biofuel policy adoption is that of the Government Performance
Project‘s measure of state level human resource reforms.  The results indicate that those 
states with higher levels of NPM adoption are more likely to be in the group of states that 
adopt more coercive and less direct biofuel instruments than those states with lower levels 
of NPM adoption.  This result offers the first solid evidence that NPM reformers do adopt 
policy instruments in line with their stated goals.
Future research
A fundamental question in any research is that of generalizability, is it possible to 
apply and extend the findings to other policy arenas?  The answer to this question is 
certainly yes.  The application of this policy instrument technique to other policy arenas is
an obvious extension of this research.  First, the possibility of exploring state level biofuel 
policy instrument choice for patterns that exist at this finer level of detail is the first step 
in extending this research.  Direct application of this model to this different unit of 
analysis could be a very fruitful step toward a deeper understanding of policy instrument 
choice.  Another avenue of exploration would be to apply instrument theory to the local 
level to see how local policy instrument choices vary across jurisdictions within states.  
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Many of the questions of wealth, capacity, ideology and reform could be applied to local 
level policy makers and instrument choices.  
An addition to instrument theory made by this research is the market development 
instrument.  This instrument has particular promise for policy instrument theory.  The
extension of the market development instrument to other policy arenas will provide 
valuable insight into the process and decision calculus, particularly for areas of planning.  
Valuable questions that could be answered in conjunction with this particular instrument 
include whether there are other policy arenas that employ this instrument? What is the 
impetus for market development instruments at the state level?  Are these types of 
instruments developed in response to general market conditions or are they part of federal 
activity?
The NPM results merit continued research and follow up.  It is possible other
areas of government will yield important results as well.  There is valuable insight to be
gained by examining policy instruments used in other areas such as budgeting, planning, 
economic development in light of NPM reforms.  Do these areas differ in levels of reform 
and instrument choices as well?
A particular area that appears ripe for this type of analysis is the area of public
higher education.  The types of influences outlined in the initial model of economics, 
interest groups, political culture and NPM reforms impact the higher education policy
making environment as well.  The Spellings Commission Report is the last in a long line
of call for reform to higher education during the last two decades.  Data sources regarding
policy instruments, the variables discussed above are available nationally and can be
applied to the analysis used here.  Most importantly, however,  there is a need for a better 
172
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
understanding of policy instrument choice and instrument use in the higher education 
arena.  Many of the same questions discussed by policy instrument theorists are
unanswered in the higher education policy arena.  
Additionally, further investigation into the impact on policy instrument choice on 
democracy and democratic accountability is a much needed component for future
research.  Do various instruments have different impacts on accountability as proposed by
a variety of instrument theorists (Ingram et al. 2007; Schneider and Ingram 1997, 1993)?
How are the burdens and benefits of policy instruments distributed within society?
Economic development theory and policies would greatly benefit from an instrument 
approach when examining questions of accountability. 
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Appendix B: Model Reconstruction with Conventional Group as Reference Cluster
Parameter estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, Economic
Variables
Full Economic Model Reduced Economic Model
Variables NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO
Constant -133.256 -238.028 -96.422 -134.020 -236.810 -123.514
LnSPCI 11.526** 21.427** 8.462 11.520** 21.316** 11.207**
PCTGSPA
(4.176)
-15.604
(7.619)
-2.746
(5.195)
-23.100
(4.001) (6.964) (4.775)
PCTGSPM
(42.529)
54.613**
(56.466)
78.747*
(45.115)
37.594 55.673** 79.476** 45.153*
LnPctEmpAg
LnPctEmpMan
LnFeedstock
(23.086)
1.530*
(0.878)
-5.919**
(2.535)
0.065
(31.551)
2.583*
(1.509)
-6.556*
(3.926)
0.095
(26.155)
2.261**
(1.125)
-5.185*
(2.835)
0.441
(22.147)
1.382**
(0.641)
-5.906**
(2.472)
(29..459)
2.610**
(0.997)
-6.594*
(3.818)
(25.200)
2.627***
(0.785)
-5.186*
(2.804)
(0.320) (0.440) (0.370)
-2 log likelihood
2χ
2Psuedo R (McFadden)
Reduction of Error
98.781**
31.648
0.243
60%
100.499**
29.930
0.229
60%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
31.648 – 29.930 = 1.718
dff – dfr = 18 – 9 = 9
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Appendix B:  Model Reconstruction with Conventional Group as Reference Cluster
Parameter estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, Political 
Interest Variables
Full Political Interest Model Reduced Political Interest Model
Variables NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO
Constant 3.656 48.28 5.746 3.953 55.817 5.506
EOAI -0.146 -146.18** 1.878 -3.222 -158.44** 2.951
(7.742) (70.232) (7.653) (6.963) (73.820) (7.285)
EOBC -1.240 69.928** -6.692 -1.305 67.405** -7.694
(5.922) (34.353) (6.219) (5.487) (33.395) (6.434)
EOEN -1.767 -47.993* -3.034 -3.408 -58.719** -3.177
(4.689) (26.563) (4.861) (4.167) (28.116) (5.158)
FBMEM 15.107 121.881* -6.394 13.759 141.541** -2.520
(17.664) (63.970) (20.754) (15.982) (63.787) (19.396)
BUMEM -88.122 -249.128 34.305
(94.6628) (298.132) (88.739)
EVMEM 314.819 2441.039* 62.869 245.002 2266.05** -197.627
(377.928) (1236.709) (444.387) (301.057) (1041.935) (397.144)
AgIntDo -1.038 0.902 0.635
minance (0.994) (1.846) (1.026)
-2 log 102.053 107.367*
likelihood
2χ 28.376 23.063
2Psuedo R 0.218 0.177
(McFadden)
Reduction of 56% 46%
Error
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
28.376 – 23.063 = 5.313
dff – dfr = 21 – 15 = 6
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Appendix B:  Model Reconstruction with Conventional Group as Reference Cluster
Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, 
Political Culture Variables
Full Political Culture Model Reduced Political Culture Model
Variables NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO
Constant 2.299 -2.742 3.256 2.132 -2.594 2.712
ISCD 0.028 0.091** 0.016 0.24 0.092** 0.010
(0.019) (0.038) (0.022) (0.018) (0.036) (0.021)
URPC -7.235** -5.948 -8.095* -5.664* -7.284 -7.041*
(3.607) (5.499) (4.488) (3.143) (5.067) (3.794)
Individual 0.239 -0.562 -1.864
Dummy (0.883) (1.216) (1.212)
Traditional 0.937 -1.077 0.482
Dummy (1.018) (1.477) (1.100)
-2 log likelihood 109.108** 115.854**
2χ 21.322 14.575
2Psuedo R 0.163 0.112
(McFadden)
Reduction of Error 50% 36%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
21.322 –16.899 = 4.423
dff – dfr = 12 – 9 = 3
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Appendix B:  Model Reconstruction with Conventional Group as Reference Cluster
Parameter estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, New Public 
Management (NPM) Variables
Full NPM Model Reduced NPM Model
Variables NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO
Constant -11.623 -16.832 -25.249 -3.939 -6.954 -10.145
ASAP_1 -12.861** -8.985** -9.618** -4.598* -3.164 -4.977*
(4.607) (4.467) (4.442) (2.526) (2.903) (2.811)
ASAPI_2 0.974** 1.026** 1.391** 0.396* 0.410 0.626**
(0.395) (0.412) (0.432) (0.219) (0.252) (0.243)
RC_Money_Low 27.188*** 23.499*** 22.478***
(1.941) (2.188) (1.535)
RC_Money_Med 26.456*** 24.355*** 24.462
(1.400) (1.927) (0.000)
RC_Infra_Low -3.966* -3.309 -2.196
(2.288) (2.491) (2.156)
RC_Infra_Med -0.783 -1.820 0.682
(2.187) (2.629) (2.274)
RC_Info_Low -3.551 -0.849 -0.986
(2.182) (1.994) (2.034)
RC_Info_Med -1.372 -1.711 -1.318
(1.463) (1.643) (1.608)
RC_People_Low -26.459*** -21.47*** -22.70*** -3.696** -1.314 -2.312*
(2.075) (2.314) (1.930) (1.205) (1.261) (1.253)
RC_People_ Med 3.233 3.699 5.533** 0.810 0.407 1.453
(2.401) (2.554) (2.548) (1.247) (1.587) (1.355)
-2 log likelihood 81.235** 103.900**
2χ 49.195 26.529
2Psuedo R 0.377 0.203
(McFadden)
Reduction of Error 68% 54%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
49.195 – 26.529 = 22.666
dff – dfr = 30 – 12 = 18
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Appendix B:  Model Reconstruction with Conventional Group as Reference Cluster
Parameter estimates for Multinomial Regression Models, Fully
Integrated and Reduced Integrated Model
Fully Integrated Model Reduced Integrated Model
Variables NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO NE v. CO EI v. CO DI v. CO
Constant -210.033 -496.225 -186.822 -41.827 -320.561 -39.826
LNSPCI 22.363** 52.936** 21.314** 4.489 33.233** 4.617
(7.905) (16.212) (7.900) (3.459) (12.409) (4.117)
LnPctEmpAg 3.599** 10.730** 5.947*** 0.978 6.078** 2.088**
(1.487) (3.612) (1.616) (0.633) (2.231) (0.730)
LnPctEmpMan -4.040** 3.664 -4.216** -0.433 4.238 -0.705
(1.587) (3.316) (1.628) (0.863) (2.731) (0.961)
FBMEM 33.239 -44.775 -23.033
(25.388) (45.656) (27.195)
BUMEM -511.025** -404.743 -614.781**
(190.368) (263.160) (194.841)
ISCD -0.006 0.164** -0.023 0.007 0.157** -0.006
(0.016) (0.076) (0.018) (0.014) (0.062) (0.017)
RC_People_ Low -4.940*** 2.819 -4.071** -3.234*** 1.092 -2.627**
(1.408) (3.568) (1.508) (0.922) (2.212) (1.101)
RC_People_ 1.234 0.658 1.046 0.156 -0.152 0.338
Medium (1.517) (2.318) (1.648) (1.090) (2.015) (1.206)
-2 log likelihood 63.867*** 80.257***
2χ 66.562 50.173
2Psuedo R 0.510 0.385
(McFadden)
Reduction of Error 66% 70%
χ2 (full model) – χ2 (reduced model)
66.562 – 50.173 = 16.389
dff – dfr = 24 – 18 = 6
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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Appendix C:  Final Model with different reference clusters
Cluster 1
Conventional
Cluster 2
Non-
experimenters
Cluster 3
Experimental 
Inducers
Cluster 4
Direct  
Interveners
Conventional as Reference
Constant -41.827 -320.561 -39.826
LnSPCI 4.489 33.233** 4.617
Elite Ideology
(ISCD)
0.007 0.157** -0.006
LnPctEmpAg 0.978 6.078** 2.088**
LnPctEmpMan -0.433 4.238 -0.705
RC_People_Low -3.234*** 1.092 -2.627**
RC_People_Mediu 
m
0.156 -0.152 0.338
Non-experimenters as reference
Constant 41.827 -278.734 2.000
LnSPCI -4.489 28.744** 0.128
Elite Ideology
(ISCD)
-0.007 0.150** -0.013
LnPctEmpAg -0.978 5.100** 1.110**
LnPctEmpMan 0.433 4.670* -0.272
RC_People_Low 3.234*** 4.326** 0.607
RC_People_Mediu 
m
-0.156 -0.308 0.182
Experimental Inducers as reference
Constant 320.561 278.734 280.735
LnSPCI -33.233** -28.744** -28.616**
Elite Ideology
(ISCD)
-0.157** -0.150** -0.163**
LnPctEmpAg -6.078** -5.100** -3.990*
LnPctEmpMan -4.238 -4.670* -4.942*
RC_People_Low -1.092 -4.326** -3.719*
RC_People_Mediu 
m
0.152 0.308 0.490
Direct Interveners as reference
Constant 39.826 -2.000 -280.735
LnSPCI -4.617 -0.128 28.616**
Elite Ideology
(ISCD)
0.006 0.013 0.163**
LnPctEmpAg -2.088** -1.110** 3.990*
LnPctEmpMan 0.705 0.272 4.942*
RC_People_Low 2.627** -0.607 3.719*
RC_People_Mediu 
m
-0.338 -0.182 -0.490
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Appendix D: Government Performance Project Index Reform Level by State
Variable Reform Level States
Money Low (1) Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, New Jersey, Oregon,
California, Indiana, Montana, New York
Money Medium (2) Arkansas, Mississippi, West Virginia, Wyoming, Arizona, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, Illinois,
North Carolina, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, 
Wisconsin
Money High (3) Delaware, Utah, Vermont, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Iowa, Washington, Kansas, Minnesota,
South Carolina, South Dakota
Infrastructure Low (1) Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, West Virginia, Wyoming, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, California, Illinois, North
Carolina, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wisconsin
Infrastructure Medium (2) Rhode Island, Vermont, Arizona, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Indiana, Montana, North Dakota, Texas
Infrastructure High (3) Delaware, Nevada, Utah, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Iowa,
Washington, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, South Dakota
Information Low (1) Alabama, Alaska, New Hampshire, Wyoming, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
New Jersey, California, Indiana, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota
Information Medium (2) Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Maine,
Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, Illinois, North Carolina,
Kansas, New York, Wisconsin
Information High (3) Delaware, Utah, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Iowa, Washington, Minnesota, New
Mexico, South Carolina, Texas
People Low (1) Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Wyoming, Colorado,
Tennessee, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, Montana, New Mexico
People Medium (2) Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, California, Kansas, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota
People High (3) Utah, Vermont, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia, Iowa,
Washington, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean
LnSPCI 10.0625 10.67297 10.3166978
LnPctEmpAg -6.071 -2.545 -4.074
ISCD 5.25 92.514 48.428
LnPctEmpMan -3.778 -1.811 -2.517
RC_People_Low 0 1 0.50
RC_People_Medium 0 1 0.50
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